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ABSTRACT 
 
In Canada profound diversification of multiple moral, political and normative commitments of a 
multiplicity of communities is unstoppable.  Its historically liberalized, modernized and 
secularized law dominates principles of procedural justice in expressing the monistic liberal 
theory of rights now entrenched as individual rights within its charter.  For religious believers, 
basing legal and political life on moral behavior acquired through generations of norms is 
integral to both security of state, and integrity of multiple communities.  Tension exists between 
religious rights, demands of different visions of the good life, secular politics and the slow 
reshaping of liberal constitutional law in recognizing religious pluralism in the context of 
freedom of religion guarantees.  The greatest challenge in liberal freedom of religion 
jurisprudence is to balance equality and difference and attain judicial consistency.  If conflicting 
normative systems are not able to combine their respective power and co-exist, the potential of 
conflicts to escalate is serious. 
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INTRODUCTION - The Limits of Modern, Secular Liberal Legalism: 
Restraining Different Ethics in the Context of Equal Religious 
Citizenship 
 
“In a plural world, law is an ongoing process of articulation, adaptation, re-articulation, absorption, 
resistance, deployment, and on and on.  It is a process that never ends …; study the multiplicity and 
engage in the conversation rather than impose a top-down framework that cannot help but distort the 
astonishing variety on the ground.”1  
 
A. Overview:  The monistic claims of modern, liberal, and secular values 
 
Today, the modern Western democratic state broadly engages in the rule of, and 
the organization of, social life by a set of fundamental liberal rules and principles as set 
out in its constitution.  The notion of the rule of liberal constitutional law—the normative 
political philosophy of all modern Western states—describes a purposive and an effective 
legal system that: respects individual identity; is generally obeyed and breaches of which 
are enforceable by the state; limits government powers; and is itself independent of the 
other branches of government and powerful private interests.
2  
Western secular law is part 
of this liberal modernity.  This systematic liberal political philosophy that is dominated 
by an individualistic, secularist, universalistic and rationalistic framework is a product of 
Western European legal tradition and culture that was voluntarily adopted by Western 
countries as legal modernity.
3   
Constitutional law now consists of statute law and 
precedent (stare decisis) and in the West, it is part of the democratic system.  
However, the current age is of a multiplicity of modernities, the next avatar of 
                                                 
1
 Paul Schiff Berman, “A Pluralist Approach to International Law” (2007) 32 Yale J Int L 301 at 
328 [hereafter Berman, “A Pluralist Approach”].  
2
 The Constitutional Law Group, Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd).  (Toronto:  Edmond 
Montgomery Publications Limited, 2003) at 2 [hereafter CCL];  Wagner, Peter. A Sociology of 
Modernity:  Liberty and Discipline (London & New York: Routledge, 1994) at xi [hereinafter 
Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity].   
3
 Wagner, ibid.  The European ideology of classical liberalism grew out of struggles for liberation 
from Stuart Kings in England.  It was due to revolutions in Europe, the Glorious Revolution in 
1688 in England and the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 that power shifted to 
parliament with public and political authority finally resting in the people as democratic rights.   
2 
 
this liberal modernity.  There is therefore a co-existence within Western plural societies 
of a multiplicity of meaning systems leading to multiple truth claims.
4
   In the West now, 
there are spaces of forced coexistence of an “astonishing variety” of primary sources, 
including of moral standards.
5
  The dominant and firmly rooted Western liberal secular 
legal system is now required to lend order to plural normative lives in their midst.  
In Canada, in 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) was 
enacted as a basic feature of the Canadian constitution.
6
  Although, since 1982, these 
values have been reassessed and even restructured with complex politics and 
philosophies about multiculturalism, disagreements on major social transformations are 
highly divergent.  In globalization, although epistemic theories about personal freedom 
remain central in providing organization and focus of problems, explanations and 
interpretations,
7
 the formation of modernity generally is not a uniform process of 
                                                 
4
 Roger Ballard, “Common Law and Common Sense:  Juries, Justice and the Challenge of Ethnic 
Plurality” in Prakash Shah ed, Law and Ethnic Plurality:  Socio-Legal Perspectives (Leiden, 
Boston:  Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) at 23 [hereafter Ballard, “Common Law”]. For 
relevant works on pluralism and the law, see Meena Bhamra, “On Cultural Diversity:  The 
Importance of Normative Foundations for Legal Responses” in Prakash Shah ed, Law and Ethnic 
Plurality: Socio-Legal Perspectives (London: Glass House Press, 2005) at 24; John Griffiths, 
“What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 J Legal Plur Unoff Law 1 at 38 [hereafter Griffiths, “What 
is Legal Pluralism?”]; Prakash Shah,  Legal Pluralism in Conflict  (London:  Glasshouse Press, 
2005) at ix [hereafter, Shah “Legal Pluralism in Conflict”]. 
5
 Berman, “A Pluralist Approach” supra note 1.  For further development of pluralism in a 
societal context, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority 
Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) [hereinafter Kymlicka “Multicultural Citizenship”]; 
Timothy Macklem “Faith as a Secular Value” (2000) 45 McGill LJ 1; Charles Taylor, Modern 
Social Imaginaries (Durham:  Duke University Press, 2004) at 5 [hereafter Taylor, Modern Social 
Imaginaries]; Paul Schiff Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism” (2006-2007) 80 S Cal L Rev 1155 
[hereinafter Berman, “Global”]. 
6
 CCL, Supra note 2. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [Charter].   
7
 Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa 
2
nd
 ed (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 3.  
3 
 
secularization.
8
  I hope to show that the interactive space—the sociocultural space—is 
currently a terrain of contestation precisely because the space for normative difference 
does not seem to exist.  Because a sociocultural space without meaningful values and 
norms is a space of conflict—divisions in terms of rights and obligations, and the creation 
of hierarchies, in the current globalized age, how egalitarian are the claims of liberal 
values?  How can this modern liberal secular state encourage religious diversity, 
pluralism and the common good?  And in Canada, as an offshoot of the Western liberal 
secular modernity—although its liberal democratic philosophy is admirable—how 
effective is the interactive space in this modern liberal secular and democratic society for 
both a plurality of religions and liberal law to co-exist in the governance of a multiplicity 
of lifeworlds and where legal resolution is free from arbitrary interference?
9
   
Does Canada’s constitution sufficiently prohibit the state from favouring any one 
religious community, and does it protect religious freedom for all?  In the context of 
normative pluralism and the dominance of the universalized agency of the liberal 
individual, are religious individuals forced to choose between the tenets of their faith and 
full participation in society?   
For at least the last two hundred years, the central aspects of Western liberal 
modernity have been the ongoing global normative concepts that continue to drive the 
evolution of reason defined as instrumental rationality.  Master theories about liberal 
institutional and cultural progress from pre-modernity to modernity were based on the 
works of Marx, Tonnes, Durkheim, Simmel, Parsons and others.
10
  These theorists 
                                                 
8
 Wittrock, Björn. “Modernity:  One, None, or Many?  European Origins and Modernity as a Global 
Condition.” (2000) 129:1 Daedalus 31 at 32 [hereinafter Wittrock, “Modernity”]. 
9
 The concept of secularism will be defined in Chapter II.   
10
 See Wagner, supra note 3, also generally, supra note 4.  
4 
 
focused on economic growth, specialization, rationalization, individualization and so on 
as crucial to the processes of liberal modernization.
11
  Liberalization was coupled with 
the process of secularization, a process that separated religion from law and for Knights, 
as part of freeing the Christian religion from legal and political rule, Christianity was 
separated from the territorial state.
12
  These secularized socio-political claims functioned 
as a form of morality and eventually became law that was equipped to interpret the 
positions of the secular liberal judiciary.
13
  The instrumental rationale of liberal 
modernity, as structured within its political systems and egalitarian ideals, supposedly 
ensures that the rule of secular liberal law would not be domineering and public 
regulation would not constrain the liberties of individuals.
14
   
The singularly determining centre of society—the rule of constitutional law, 
based on the modern Western secular form of liberty—may not be capable of shaping the 
entirety of social relations.  There is “reciprocal influence” that exists within human 
sociabilities, human hierarchies and human relations.
15
  The sociological dynamics of 
group relations, of power or not, continue to be shaped by socio-political collectivities by, 
for, and of, group processes.  Humans are ultra-socialites, no matter what their 
surroundings.  Humans are consistently engaged in highly coordinated relationships of all 
kinds, be they face to face or not.  The tasks humans are involved in are related to 
survival, the provision of resources, and reproduction.  And for these endeavours, the 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., also see Wagner, supra note 3 at x to xi. 
12
 Samantha Knights, Freedom of Religion, Minorities, and the Law. (London & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) at 1.36. 
13 Warwick Tie, Legal Pluralism: Towards a Multicultural Conception of Law (England: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 1999) at 102. 
14
 Ibid. also Supra notes 4 & 5.    
15 Dacher Keltner, Gerben A. Van Kleef, Serena Chen, and Michael W. Kraus. “A Reciprocal 
Influence Model of Social Power: Emerging Principles and Lines of Inquiry” (2008) 40 Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology at 155. 
5 
 
human is basically constantly involved in navigating through myriad relationships of 
anthropological groups.   
Many questions arise:  Is there such a thing as a coherent sense of self? A 
coherent sense of self would point to an ability of the self to identify and govern 
themselves as completely aligned with a particular ethos, theory, concept, philosophy, 
norm, or theology, that is so balanced, so lucid, so comprehensible, so logical, so 
complete that it is possible to both, on the one hand be explained to others as truth, and 
simultaneously, be understood by all as totally justified.  In effect, can humanity—in the 
form of a community, nation, or world—be cohesive such that it is unified, consistent, 
organized, and solidly interconnected with interrelations that logically complete each 
other?  Generally, it is known that ideas of coherence or so called rationality: of self, of 
community, of nation or of world, are a fallacy.  
Although constitutional values respect the equality and human dignity of 
individuals, interpretation, or institutional responses—the final arbiter being the high 
courts—include a variety of secular visions of social justice based on liberal strategies.  
Forms of secularized liberal legalism have constitutional recognition and democratic 
legitimacy in modern states.  The aim of these strategies is to create stable and lasting 
political identities linked to concepts of social good and political rights or positive rights 
such as the right to vote and participate in politics, freedom of thought, conscience and of 
association, freedom of movement, and free choice of occupation and the protection of 
the rule of law.
16
  As part of this political ideology relating to personal freedom, the 
established liberal legalism with rational values further stresses human dignity and 
                                                 
16
 CCL, supra note 2. Also see generally supra note 4 & 5. The 18
th
 century positivist approach 
attemps to strip all subjective considerations from the scientist for objective value free 
investigations.  
6 
 
autonomy: liberty, relating to limited government; equality of right, relating to obeying 
similar laws enforced by the state; and critical thought, relating to the consent of the 
governed.
17 
 However, whether the multiplicities of modernities are committed to the 
existing liberal or non-liberal norms, they all have numerous open interpretations of the 
good life.   
A powerful theme for all faith-based cultures globally is that the role of the ethical 
imagination in legal expressions of the civil is fed by religious and cultural narratives as 
sources of the self.  What therefore are the capacities of the already conflicted liberal 
logic and norms?  Can liberal law be redefined to make it more hospitable to diversity 
without compromising its commitment to universal liberal principles?  Again, as Berger 
insists, modernity does not interfere with religious beliefs but secularization and the 
pluralizing modernities make the task of uncovering religious truths more difficult.
18
  
And Parekh laments that the logic of liberalism tends to view human beings as 
completely constituted by their culture where culture is a superstructure interacting with 
an unchanging and identical human nature.
19
 
I also hope to show that the classification of different categories of class, 
citizenship, religious believer, consumer and producer can be constrained by liberal legal 
doctrines as dominated by this individualistic, secularist, universalistic and rationalistic 
framework.  Communities have always survived in worlds where cultural mediums give 
rise to the law—jurisgenesis—and where intelligible normative behaviour and stronger 
                                                 
17
 Bhiku Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (New 
York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2006) at 338 [hereafter Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism]. Also, 
see generally Supra notes 4 & 5.  
18
 Linda Woodhead, Paul Heelas, and David Martin.  Peter Berger and the Study of Religion 
(London & New York: Routeledge, 2001) at 3 [hereinafter Woodhead et al, “Peter Berger”]. 
19
 Parekh, supra note 17 Rethinking Multiculturalism. 
7 
 
bonds are in context.
20
  Narratives, prescriptive or adjudicatory, are normative 
commitments—the law.  Robert Cover will tell us in Chapter 5, that there is a constant 
construction of law through various norm-generating communities.
21
  And Falk-Moore 
will tell us in the same Chapter that heterogeneities are self-regulated.
22
  The 
sociocultural space is consistently normatively full.  Also, multiple modernities are not 
openly critical of Western modernity “as a metanarrative but as a vehicle of Western 
domination.”23   
In particular,  in a survey of jurisprudence on freedom of religion in Canada, I 
found that freedom of the individual was a paramount value as guaranteed in s. 2 (a) of 
the Charter—which states that as part of the fundamental freedoms, “everyone has the 
freedom of conscience and religion.”  The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), in the Big 
M. case—a part of the case study herein on freedom of religion jurisprudence in 
Canada—in effect confirmed, per Dickson J., that the individual is the central bearer of 
rights.
24
  Could this be is a problematic form of liberalism that the Western secular and 
normative philosophy embodies?   
In terms of freedom of religion, for recent theorists such as Charles Taylor, 
Robert Cover, Griffiths, Tie, Menski, and many others, despite the fact that liberal law 
                                                 
20
 Robert Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 
Harv L Rev 4 at 11 [hereafter Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982”].  
21
 Ibid. Cover “The Supreme Court” at 48. 
22
 Sally Falk Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study” (1973) 7:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 719 [hereinafter Moore, “Law and 
Social Change”] at 722.  
23 Lee, R.L.M.  “Reinventing Modernity:  Reflexive Modernization vs Liquid Modernity vs 
 Multiple Modernities.” (2006) 9 Euro Jnl Soc Theor (3) 355-368 at 350 [hereinafter Lee 
 Reinventing”]. 
24
 In Big M., infra note 272, per Dickson, J. … “an emphasis on individual conscience and 
individual judgment also lies at the heart of our democratic political tradition.  The ability of each 
citizen to make free and informed decisions is the absolute prerequisite for the legitimacy, 
acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-government” at para 122. 
8 
 
purports to have the ability to account for religion amongst many other norms, including 
non-liberal norms, the standardization, uniformity and even the secularization thesis of 
liberal modernity are all to be now considered as received differently in different contexts 
around the globe.
25
  The ambit of the protection of the law has to consider the historical, 
sociological, political and the religious contexts.
26
   
In this age of intense plurality, Ryder confirms that multiplicities of citizens seek 
equal rights, including “equal religious citizenship”, under the rule of the established 
modern Western secular law.
27
  Globally, cries for civil toleration of all other religions 
remain consistently alive in a variety of modern democratic political documents—from 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
28
 to the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights issued by the United Nations.
29
  I would argue that 
currently, because the globe is in an epoch of voluminous interconnections due to the 
impacts of globalization, and although Western liberal secularized democracies are being 
emulated around the globe, in the West now, there are a large number of possible 
varieties in cultural patterns, religious beliefs, and commitments to both liberal and non-
liberal norms—all aiming at “institutional specificity.30”    
The ideology of legal pluralism is therefore central to my thesis; liberal freedom 
                                                 
25
 See Supra notes 4 & 5, 7 also infra notes 17, 20, 22, 23, 31, and 38. 
26
 Knights, supra note 12 at viii. 
27
 Bruce Ryder, “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship” in Richard Moon ed, 
Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) [hereinafter Ryder, “The 
Canadian Conception”] at 87. 
28
 Congress shall make no law respecting religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof….  U.S. 
Const. amend. I. 
29
 Article 18 of the United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:  “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief, and freedom alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”   
30
 Wittrock, “Modernity” supra note 8 at 32. 
9 
 
of religion jurisprudence is only one legal technology; there are other instruments that 
protect basic human rights and happiness.
31
  Although, liberal legalism both supports and 
limits pluralism, and there are provisions for toleration of others, the current Canadian 
national identity is based on majoritarian political views, in turn, based solely on Western 
forms of liberty, and further based on presuppositions connected to the concepts of 
secularism related to the protection of the Christian faith only.   
However, demands for recognition go beyond toleration; recognition has to 
include legitimacy of and social respect for difference.  Shah sums up:  “liberalism as a 
practical attitude, rather than as a focus of sophisticated philosophical debate, has 
become deeply impoverished…socially ignorant and ethically barren.”32  As a 
consequence, liberalism, and its broad legal approach with its many merits, has gradually 
been challenged by the multiplicity of the modern to reexamine its, liberal legalism’s, 
very fundamentals.  Liberal legalism, as the main force of liberal modernity, may be a 
force that is unable right now to accommodate modernism’s incarnation/avatar; the 
multiplicity of the modern.   
In that judges have a political function in creating, applying and interpreting the 
law by specialized political and legal techniques, Shapiro denotes this as “a myth of 
speciality” and that law is not an independent area of substantive knowledge.33  If every 
constitutional question has to be considered in traditional legal analysis terms, and if the 
rule of constitutional law is not an all-encompassing philosophy, based as it on 
historically and politically universalized and secularized principles, how do Canadian 
                                                 
31
 Peter C Sack, “Legal Pluralism:  Introductory Comments” in Peter Sack & E.J. Minchin eds,   
Legal Pluralism:  Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII.  (Australia: Australian 
National University, 1986) at 14.    
32
 Shah, “Legal Pluralism in Conflict”, supra note 4 in foreword by Cotterrell, R. at ix. 
33
 Martin Shapiro, “Political Jurisprudence.” (1963) 52 Ky LJ 294 at 295. 
10 
 
courts distinguish religion from non-religion?  Is state law equipped to transcend 
difference in freedom of religion cases?  Is the state normatively prone to validate 
equality more than equity?  And in terms of national identity, do religions have a role in 
society? 
In consideration of all my questions and given that liberal law presides over the 
management of society, I needed to understand the following in the Canadian context:  
the concepts of the primacy of legal rights attached to the autonomous liberal individual; 
the concept of secularism and the application of the process of secularization in 
jurisprudence; and the prospects for the cumulative plurality of law, and in particular, the 
rights of the increasing diversity of religious adherents in the West given the current 
globalization and rapid immigration that continues to occur.   
In recognizing that the modern liberal consciousness is a social construction, I 
also needed to understand the appeal of this liberal modernity and its effects on 
individuals, institutions and societies.  However, in that the shifting condition of 
modernity is now a multiplicity of modernities in their current empirical and real 
situations, how does the prevailing legal system—constitutional law—identify and 
negotiate social and cultural differences?  The aim is to examine the possibilities for 
peaceful coexistence of state law—understanding that its liberalized and secularized 
constitution has to limit the full extent of religious freedoms—with the norms and 
customs of the multiplicity of modernities in Canada.   
1. The political power of constitutional authority as legitimated by the 
processes of modernization, liberalization and secularization 
 
It was during the 17
th
 century Whig tradition of liberty under law as part of the 
11 
 
process of liberal modernization that the word “liberal” was coined.34  It comes from the 
Latin, “liber”, meaning “free.”35  The conception of freedoms of the citizen stems from 
this root of classical liberalism of Christian Europe as part of classical modernization.
36
  
Liberal modernization has been a progressive process from traditional monarchy to legal 
authority and legitimacy of people living together under the same laws or rules of 
conduct; a democracy requires the rule of law.  The ideology of liberalism is therefore 
central to the onset of legal authority as human emancipation and as understood in a 
modernizing and predominantly Christian Western Europe.   
When classical jurists began to reflect scientifically on the European doctrine of 
liberalization, they presupposed a certain internal coherence within the rule of liberal law 
that was separate from religious authority.
37
  In this shift towards rationality and secular 
approaches to the liberalization of the individual, Western liberals began to believe that 
society would achieve material and political progress if science would focus on, and 
critically examine, ‘man’ and society to yield a general knowledge about the natural 
principles of law, morality, myths, superstitions, religious dogma, other traditions and 
customs.
38
  However, the process of secularization does not succeed in completely 
relegating religion to the confines of the “private” sphere and there are many 
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combinations of ‘the secular.’39  Although the emergence of Western thoughts about law 
initially emphasized natural law, these thoughts later included Latin Christianization.
40
 
Natural law, or inherent law, lies at the intersection of theology (concerned with the 
transcendental), and philosophy (concerned with notions of the world and the 
temporal).
41
  Although in liberal secular modernity, interpretation of belief is left to the 
believer, Christianity was seen by 18
th
 and 19
th
 century philosophers as akin to 
liberalism’s secular surrogate.  Liberalism’s moral and social role is tied to the centuries 
old Christian faith.
42
  Liberalization is therefore steeped in the image of Christianity by 
way of: language, categories, thought, self-understanding, and life.
43
 
Currently, secular institutions organize life “in this world” as opposed to reference 
to the religious or the transcendent.
44
  Freedom of religion is two pronged:  to free public 
life from religion and to open a space for continuous dialogue among religious traditions 
and between the religious and the secular.  For a “self-sufficient social [and modern] 
morality without transcendent reference” reason is independent of Godly Revelation so 
that this former ‘morality’ is supposedly devoid of other inconsequential non-contributing 
elements.
45
  However, Taylor insists that both these dimensions of life are indespensible 
in society.
46
  Again, as Taylor points out, even if good religions and good public remain 
the exclusive perview of the autonomous individual, the confusion arises in that it is now 
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a separation of religion and state and no longer the Christian church and state as the 
scientific rational definition of secularism and as identified with modernity.
47
  What is a 
fair and harmonious mode of coexistence between religious communities without, as 
evolved, Western connotations of the secular?   
For Taylor, secularism is not about state and religion, it is about the democratic 
state and diversity and the goal is to protect people in belonging and to practice freely 
their outlook thus treating people equally whatever their option.
48
  In that modern 
democracies have to be secular, plurality necessarily requires neutrality making 
secularism a complex requirement of balancing social goods.  For human rights, equality, 
the rule of law, and democracy, state neutrality in effect protects any basic position, 
religious or not.  Yet, religion continues to be pitted against secularity.
49
 
However, Christianity remains at the heart of Western thought in general and in 
law in particular.  And although normatively, the question of whether religion should be 
confined to the private sphere is heavily contested in public forums, the current form of 
modernization, secular and liberal, carries with it the assumption that secular liberal 
ideology contains truths for the regulation of the good life.
50
  However, despite the fact 
that modern constitutional law is ever-changing, redirected and regulated towards 
positive ends and equality of opportunity within society, religions such as Islam continue 
to face tremendous pressures to be removed completely from the public sphere, 
particularly within Western contexts.  The most important facet of Western liberal secular 
modernity is that in a democracy, sovereignty resides in the will of the people; the 
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numerical majority of an organized group can make decisions binding on the whole 
society.
51
  Coupled as part of modernity with this democratic ethos, the Eurocentric 
processes of secularization and liberalization were mostly unalterable within Western 
states as were they in their “empires.”  These assumptions about the processes of 
liberalization and secularization still extend globally with points of interconnections in 
the now intercultural capitals of Europe, United States and Canada.
52
  Uninterrupted, the 
above assumptions, empowered as they are by politics, continue to be essentialized and 
reproduced within modernizing constitutions. 
Again, not only are centralization and universalization of human rights, both 
international and domestic, having stemmed from particular universalistic explanations 
for events based on presuppositions of theorists from classical liberalism, they are also 
based on various Christian conceptions of liberty.  And generally, respect for equality, 
human dignity, and other good moral values are part of natural law.  However, social 
arrangements, including those that are meaningful and that seek to identify with different 
terms and conditions of citizenship, are susceptible to conscious human engineering by 
the instrument of the rule of liberal legislated law.
53
   
As will be seen in the discussion of case law on freedom of religion, there are 
limitations in values that are in effect admitted; constitutional arrangements can be 
authoritatively justified as reasonable by the commitment of judges to the democratically 
instituted constitution.
54
  In a democracy, the boundaries between the private and the 
public are variable according to the political will of the citizens, the authority of the judge 
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is limited by democratic choice.  And juridical outcomes may result from a flawed 
understanding of the meaning of secular.  In that it is now a secular, liberal democratic 
constitution that legitimates political authority in an environment of legal and religious 
pluralism, specific sociopolitical questions are translated into legal issues left to the 
discretion of judges who are bound by the limited set of general ideas aimed at protecting 
individuals from state control.
55
  As the historical processes of secularization become 
firmly installed, the identification of religion as akin to an irrational force, tends to 
become stronger.  The shared sense of public and political reason is predisposed to public 
controversy.  What is apparent is that urbanization and fast paced global movements are 
profoundly secularizing forces that erode traditional bases of legitimation.
56
  Although 
the processes of liberalization and secularization are fluid, they are also fragile and 
contested.  How can these processes be both, fortified yet, less controversial?  
Canada, for instance, is now composed of cultures, groups, associations and 
institutions that are culturally and ethnically diverse.  Currently, the state also has many 
groups of religious believers that are seeking recognition in concrete sociopolitical and 
sociolegal arrangements.  Canada is a liberal democratic state and since the enactment of 
the Charter within its constitution in 1982, equitable justice and substantive equality are 
supposedly furthered.
57
  The rule-based conception of liberal constitutional law, 
particularly in the post-Charter era, has the power to determine how the law is imagined, 
and there is a “concrete impact of legal arrangements on the distribution of power and 
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rewards among the various elements in…society.”58  As a basic element of the Canadian 
Constitution, the Charter has even given legal and political powers to its courts thus 
affording them a certain equal partnership to the legislature in ordering society.
59
  
Although the Charter was a product of, and a part of, the responses to the increasing 
plurality within Canadian society, in the liberal interpretation of constitutional values 
related to equality rights, there is tension between the Charter and the current nature of 
Canadian pluralism.  Case law that will be discussed in Chapter III will show 
interpretations that unjustly fail to recognize the economic and social rights of minorities.  
The greatest challenge for liberal modernity and legalism is to balance equality and 
difference.  To what extent can questions of identity, including that based on religious 
adherence, be effectively addressed within its liberal democratic and legal frame?   
It is understood that in the accommodation of religious freedoms of minorities, 
the reach of religion encompasses theological, philosophical, anthropological, 
sociological, psychological and other possible dimensions.  Religion is very difficult to 
define as it entails these aspects of social, cultural and normative human behavior that 
goes beyond liberal politics.  It is therefore not only difficult to limit, it cannot be 
interpreted accurately from any one point of view.  Further, the rule of liberal secular 
constitutional law tends to consider other forms of modernization as subject to its 
political and legal accommodation.
60
  Are religious values subordinated or is this a 
reflection of a desire to not elevate some religious beliefs at the expense of others?  Does 
accommodation address pre-existing disadvantage, inequality and inclusiveness of other 
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forms of institutions?
61
  Is the Western human rights tradition aimed at the 
accommodation of pluralism, including religious pluralism?   
2. The interaction of liberal political and legal tradition of the 
autonomous individual, and the morals of a multiplicity of modernities  
 
Liberal modernity, liberal legal doctrines and practices, based on the autonomous 
individual, are now required to interlink with other aspects of dynamic life.
62
  The 
reproduction, complexity and dynamics of liberal modernity presently are represented by 
the relentless magnification, hybridization, traditionalisation, homogenization, and 
pluralizations of knowledge of global cultures and religions.
63
  These interrelated and 
simultaneous processes form the very essence of globalization and suggest a model of 
liberal modernity in its multiplicity.  Lee too confirms that the concept of a multiplicity of 
modernities is that of cultural diversity that disputes the universality based on the 
Western experience.
64
  I maintain that the current age, globally, is of a multiplicity of 
modernities, the next avatar of modernity.  But the space of forced coexistence of a 
variety of moral standards in the West—particularly of the dominant and firmly rooted 
liberal secular legal system in ordering plural normative lives—is now a terrain of 
contestation because liberal legalism both supports and limits pluralism.  
However, a reconstruction of modernity—now a multiplicity of normative 
communities—is urgently needed; there is a need to understand different perceptions as 
part of the dynamics of social change in more empirically realistic and metaphysically 
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open terms.
65
  The political concept of liberty, as attached to the liberal culture of 
secularization, has penetrated legal theory, and this “law” generally has become state law.  
Because current majoritarian political views on liberty are based on presuppositions that 
are no longer neutral, it will be argued that classification of different categories of class, 
citizenship, religious believer, consumer and producer can be constrained by liberal legal 
doctrines.  Given that Western law is characterized and governed by the rule of 
constitutional law as fundamental to Western liberal modernization and secularization, 
how well can it accommodate the multifaceted social and religious base of believers who 
are most unlikely to treat their religious convictions as purely private or personal matters?  
For example, in Islam, just as in Christianity, the role of the ethical imagination in legal 
expressions of the civil is fed by religious and cultural narratives as sources of the self; 
this is a vital theme for all faith-based cultures globally.  Again, the fact that the 
modernity of Islam is already diverse within itself compounds the complexity in coming 
to grips with plural modern Islamic ethnicities in countries such as Canada.   
Historically, religious believers have had the power to resist legally ordered 
strategies that coerced and conflicted with their essential moral codes.  The liberal 
political tradition based on liberal modernity and secular law may be in danger, not from 
hostile extraneous forces so much as from its own naïve emphasis on individualism and 
from its own tendency to naturalize and thus universalize solutions that are noticeably 
uninformed.  The legal concept of equality between individuals tends to obscure more 
substantive questions of difference: the plurality of religious beliefs and practices, ethnic 
identifications and historical patterns of collective experience.  Contemporary liberal law 
dominates liberal social theory; seems to have proclaimed its superiority over other 
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cultures and religions so that only Western liberal ideals are recognized in the public and 
political sphere; and has curtailed the power of certain transcendent religions to morally 
order the lives of believers and thus of society at large in the public and political sphere.
66
   
The dominant rights-based regime, coupled with the common law consisting of 
“rules springing from the social standard of justice, or from the habits and customs from 
which that standard has itself been derived” may not be representative of a growing 
multiplicity of changing and overlapping normativities.
67
  The constitution is in effect the 
ultimate word in all facets of social life, particularly as interpreted by judges on specific 
issues.  In that human rights and basic freedoms are deemed to be guaranteed by the rule 
of liberal constitutional law, this ideology also assumes that social diversity is 
represented by the liberal legislature.  In Canada, if disagreeing normative systems are 
not able to combine their respective power and co-exist, serious social and political 
conflicts will escalate.   
In the 21
st
 Century, is the secular liberal justice, based on its own historical 
fundamentals and law, therefore the legitimate authority to recognize differences?  Is 
there a model of liberal legalism that can allow a co-existence of a plurality of norms, 
including diverse religious orders, within liberal democracies?  What are the possibilities 
of peaceful co-existence of religious normativity and authoritative normativity in Canada, 
in the 21
st
 century and beyond?  How can the legal constructs of myriad cultures 
legitimately be distinguished from the locus of the popular, dominant and certified legal 
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order that imposes its own limitations and that are not able to admit change at the 
required speed?  How do individual groups legally express their distinctive worldviews, 
such as religious beliefs, that lend them a sense of well-being and belonging within a 
larger evolving political association and a wider field of legal regulation?  In Canadian 
terms, in an age of globalization, is there a legal space wherein models of liberalism itself 
can allow a co-existence of a plurality of religious norms in the country?   
B. Research objective 
 
This LL.M. thesis will attempt to explore the movements of modernization and 
secularization that define individuated freedoms in liberal constitutional democracies.  
Individual freedoms are paramount in liberal constitutions and secularity is central to 
modern liberal democracies.  It is important to understand that due to the impacts of 
globalization, growing pluralism exposes the limits of liberal modern secular 
constitutions; in particular the existence of normative pluralism shows that secularity is 
one among many worldviews and that liberalization—an ideology that is to be admired—
should not be ignored in an age of a multiplicity of modernities.  The complexity of the 
tension between religious rights and secular politics is akin to a tug of war between the 
principles of legitimation and the principles of justice wherein the principles of religion 
are subjected to intense manipulation.  There is a difference between fact-finding and 
evaluation; the separation of fact and value with an emphatic commitment to empirical 
inquiry may not be objective. 
Trubek points out that social science is a multidimensional activity in which 
considerations of a general and metaphysical nature are as important as specific empirical 
findings and in which all levels, from the most basic presuppositions about social life, to 
21 
 
the minutest empirical findings, have their independent yet related places.
68
  Also, 
political jurisprudence cannot be a complete philosophical system at any given time 
because jurisprudence expands with political science as judicial and legal facets are 
integrated into political life.  Judicial realism is a growing socio-political science.  A 
secure space for normative difference is missing.   
The aim of this thesis is to further explore the extent to which normative 
pluralism, emerging from specific religious beliefs, is accommodated by Canadian courts 
pursuant to the guarantee of religious freedom in the Charter under s. 2(a).  Other 
Charter guarantees also protect religion from state discrimination, however, problems 
arise frequently when state legislation fails to consider the perspectives of religious 
claimants and often sets limits that produce conflicts with individual beliefs as will be 
illustrated in case law in Chapter III.   
I maintain that the focus has to be not on an obligation to respect complex and 
historic public policy, or on the levels of decision-making processes, but on the changes 
in the social and ethical values that are being contested within a shared social space.  For 
Shah, there is a contest in defining the concepts of equality and tolerance in liberty.
69
  
Again, can liberal law be redefined to make it more hospitable to diversity without 
compromising its commitment to universal liberal principles?   
Plurality, including a variety of moral and religious orders will not disappear in 
Canada; neither will the interaction between myriad normative orders and their many 
institutions of origin.  Since Canadian constitutionalism recognizes and fulfils the desire 
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of the individual as the highest good—a political ideology of liberal modernity—not all 
liberal values that underlie social and economic human rights are associated with human 
dignity.  The constitution may be inadequate in acknowledging difference.  Difference is 
supposed to result only from rational choices pursued by individuals, voluntary acts.  But 
liberal law inevitably denies the relevance of some distinctiveness making governance 
through rules questionable.
70
  
C. Methodology and the structure of the thesis 
 
Although the focus of this LL.M. thesis is on fundamental democratic rights and 
just law in the face of diverse norms and legal pluralism in contemporary Canadian 
society, it is specifically centered on the possibilities of a peaceful co-existence between 
the rule of liberal law and the norms of plural religions in post-Charter Canada.  To 
understand current history on the management and accommodation of religious diversity 
in constitutional law and practice in Canada, an examination of recent freedom of religion 
jurisprudence in the post-Charter era will reveal the responses and the built-in limitations 
of liberal law to the claims for equality of differing and competing norms of a 
multiplicity of modern citizens—multiple modernities.  This examination concerning 
freedom of religion as guaranteed in the Charter will serve as a study highlighting the 
tension between the slow development of legal outcomes that are supposed to be guided 
by values essential to a free and democratic society that respect different beliefs and 
practices of diverse peoples, and the needs of the rapidly increasing number of religious 
persons living as minorities in Canada.  This thesis hopes to demonstrate the significance 
and the durability of the different forms of normative ordering in contemporary Canadian 
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society.  It will also argue that a problem of escalating and violent conflicts related to 
fundamental democratic rights and just law in the face of diverse knowledge and diverse 
religions may be imminent in Canada.   
The ideology of legal pluralism is necessarily valuable in Canada; it supports the 
concept that there are different ways of being for which different adjudicative bodies can 
be organized.  Again, the ideology of legal pluralism is therefore central to this thesis 
because freedom of religion jurisprudence is only one legal technology, there are other 
instruments that protect basic human rights and happiness.
71
  And demands for 
recognition go beyond toleration; recognition has to include legitimacy of and social 
respect for difference.  
D. Chapter breakdown 
 
This thesis will consist of six chapters inclusive of the introduction and the 
conclusion.  The Introduction is an overview of the thesis concerning arguments on the 
limits of liberal legalism and the restraints on equal religious citizenship.  It also provides 
the general framework of the thesis.  Chapter I will elaborate on this clash of liberal 
legalism and religious diversity.  The chapter will highlight the conflict between the 
historical theoretical presuppositions within modernity and liberal legalism, and the 
current plural sociolegal perspectives that now represent the citizen in Canada.  The aim 
is to point out, philosophically, the possible mistakes in the presuppositions about liberal 
law and to demonstrate the urgency of addressing conflicts.  Chapter II will elaborate on 
and explain the misconceptions of the concept of secularism and the aggressive form of 
secularism that is now dominant within liberal law, and of the relationship between 
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politics and secularity.  Chapter III is a review of freedom of religion jurisprudence in the 
post-Charter era with a view to illustrating the impasse caused by the failure of courts to 
definitively resolve religious values of multiple modernities within the liberal rights 
perspective based on individual liberty.  In particular it will serve to show that legal 
relationships are complex wherein courts are having “difficulty distinguishing between 
treating people as equals and changing them into different people.”72  Chapter IV will 
explore the possibilities of coexistence of liberal law and religious pluralism amongst the 
multiplicity of the modern in Canada in the 21
st
 century and beyond.  The final chapter 
will conclude the thesis.   
E. Literature review  
 
1. The possibility of reinterpretation of liberalism at the intersection of 
secularism, freedom of religion guarantees and religious identity 
 
Although, classical liberalism was initiated to smooth out conflicts between 
Christian religious groups and politics, many inadvertently believe that it has in effect 
displaced religion altogether.
73
  Laws—by collective agency—may be passed for 
supposedly “neutral” secular reasons.74  However, as the diversity of immigrant 
populations increases, instrumentalized state responses that have the effect of limiting 
freedom of religion, including of different Christian faiths, are challenged as they tend to 
be coercive, as will be reflected in freedom of religion jurisprudence.
75
  Freedom to 
choose normativity is in effect imposed by the abstract and codified classification of the 
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liberal identity regardless of myriad social interactions of the same identity.
76
  In that 
civic authority and political power are established and legitimated by constitutional law, 
different religious claims are seen as complex and demanding autonomy.
 77
   In a system 
of well-entrenched individual rights, group rights tend to be subordinated; inherited 
culture becomes subjected to Western legal culture and in particular, courts are 
constrained by this Western tradition.  However, state intervention is not only about 
regulating and managing intercommunal conflict; it is also about moral obligations.  
Political justice does not consider moral arguments that can be shared.  A theological 
critique of the dominance of secularity is missing.  Yet, plurality is a by-product of 
modernity itself. 
In Canada, at the intersection of liberal law, plural religious beliefs, citizenship 
and religious identity, because state responses are based on the modern liberal definition 
of secularism that is further based on freedom of individual conscience and a structured 
form of freedom of religion, the purpose of freedom of religion as guaranteed under s. 
2(a) of its Charter is not to maintain a particular religion but instead to protect and 
continue a culture of liberalization and secularization.
78
   Any future arrangements for 
social diversity to exist must be open to different group rights so that deep democracy is 
reflected within the Canadian population.  Interconnectedness breeds dynamism and 
dynamism necessarily feeds off of interconnectedness.  It may be time to reinterpret 
liberalism in the context of the multiplicity of the modern and the evolving legal norms, 
for the optimum development of the multifaceted individual in Canada.  Or, as Parekh 
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states generally, what we need is a liberal theory of multiculturalism.
79
 
2. The role of law in a globalizing world of interacting normativities 
 
As stated, globalization highlights the challenges of inter-normativity reflecting 
differentiated forms of law.  The globe has now been communicating intensely in 
significant ways.  As the structures and dynamics of globalization continue to evolve, the 
closely knit worldwide society of migrants and immigrants also continue to maintain their 
connections to their places of origin; they particularly continue to observe the tenets of 
their religions, which many consider to be the final authority for human conduct.  Each 
event, relationship or individual has distinct features and reflects a desire for self-rule, the 
oldest political good in the world.  However, multicultural groups also seek to participate 
in existing institutions of dominant societies, but in ways that recognize and affirm, rather 
than exclude, assimilate and denigrate their culturally diverse ways of thinking, speaking 
and acting.
80
  But “a treatment can be differential without being preferential.”81   
For Arthurs, globalization necessarily changes social values at its foundation so 
that the role of law changes.
82
  The law also identifies and negotiates differences.
83
  
However, if laws differ, for Trubek, rationalization of the law and the creation of general 
rules will not be able to emphasize decision of specific cases that take “account of 
political, ethical and other affective dimensions of conflict.”84  For Trubek (falling back 
on Weber’s arguments), formal law maybe unavoidable and its bureaucracy can create 
for itself “an iron cage”…“a shell of bondage which [powerless people] will perhaps be 
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forced to inhabit some day.”85  And Berman states that any adjudication of conflict will 
lead to “jurispathic activity” (meaning law that “kills” all alternative interpretation of 
norms by offering only one normative worldview).
86
  For Berman, the multifold 
interactions between different governance structures that further generate norms are “a 
space for the ‘jurisgenerative’ interplay of multiple normative communities and 
commitments.”87  This is a social need.  For Berman, to manage hybridity, attention has 
to be paid to a pluralist framework to be able to comprehensively conceptualize a world 
of hybrid legal spaces—a wide variety of transnational and international regulatory 
problems can be conceptualized in managing hybridity.
88
   
The primary purpose of equality rights is to protect the individual human interest 
in belonging, simultaneously, to several communities.  And for Cotterell, legal theory 
needs to be conceptualized with the content of social relations of community and the 
combinations of networks within which they exist.
89
  For the relation of law and culture 
and for the interpretation of interests, intentions and causations, different abstract types of 
communities should be distinguished—the institutionalized and the non-
institutionalized.
90
  And to that extent, if human rights are being reconceptualized in the 
context of legal pluralism globally, do important jurisgenerative changes in Canada need 
to be framed from an alternative plural perspective?  Again, the post-Charter era is also 
an era of intense global communications and migration that represent a “tremendous body 
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of rules that envelop any social field.”91 Generally, “normative conflict among multiple, 
overlapping legal systems is unavoidable and might even sometimes be desirable, both as 
a source of alternative ideas and as a site for discourse among multiple community 
affiliations.”92   
In Canada, accommodation of religious practices is reluctantly offered to 
individual adherents as and when they require exemption.  It will be seen that the sharp 
balance between competing rights of individuals and groups in the context of freedom of 
religion is a constant theme in case law.  The impasse that is caused by the inability of 
courts to resolve specific struggles involving accommodation of religious values are 
explained as a plurality of contests over recognition politics and the limits of recognition 
centering on the liberal rights perspective based on individual liberty and secularism.
93
  
For legal pluralists, intercultural normativity includes the inner dynamics and value 
systems of the ethnic minorities as crucial in analysing the character of legal 
reconstruction for improved social conditions. 
F. The Focus of this thesis 
 
Although freedom and equality are central to liberal law, neutrality cannot be 
absolute.  In the multiplying base of moralities, perhaps a new conception of a political 
moral order in society would require that state law allow the believer to live according to 
her/his own specific convictions, both, those perceived as rational and those perceived as 
“irrational.”94  Different norm systems of multiple other modern identities are 
interplaying with each other with complex results.  In that guaranteed rights remain 
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limited and abstract, the legitimacy and existence of specific religions depends not only 
upon state laws that are at the discretion of judges focused on individual autonomy, but 
also where individuals, as members of their cultural communities, engage with plural 
norm systems (their own consciences, and a variety of other plural community 
conventions).  
This thesis focuses on the consistent failure of the rule of liberal legalism in post-
Charter Canada to evolve at a pace that enables it to recognize and accommodate the 
ongoing plurality of normative material and systems, including religious diversity or 
different ways of ordering of life of its rapidly-expanding diasporic populations.  If 
conflicting normative systems are not able to combine their respective power and co-
exist, the potential of conflict to escalate is serious.  Finally:  no single position has 
successfully exhausted truth. 
30 
 
CHAPTER I - The Clash of Modern Liberal Legalism and Religious 
Diversity:  Historical Presuppositions and Current Plural Perspectives 
 
What are the possibilities for conflicting norms to coexist in a shared space of 
power to order moral conduct?  This chapter is a theory-based literature review of the 
politics of recognition of the plural sociolegal perspectives, that is, the different norms 
and conventions, including religious beliefs and tenets, of intercultural communities  in 
modern Western secular liberal states.  Generally, legal prescriptions are located in 
discourses of history.
95
  A brief outlay of the history of modernization, liberalization, 
secularization and globalization will help in understanding the following terms that 
appear within the literature:  “classical modernity”, “liberal modernity”, “multiple 
modernities”, “the rule of liberal legalism”, “secularity and modernity”, “modernity and 
globalization.”  This same history will serve to outline the philosophical presuppositions 
of the current liberal modern law.  As part of the processes of modernization and 
liberalization, at least in the last two hundred years, religion was removed from political 
rule; church and state were separated for the purposes of freedom of religion.   
In outlining the presuppositions of liberal secular modernity and liberal law in the 
context of the politics of recognition generally, this chapter will highlight the dominance 
of Western liberal secular modernity and its rule of liberal constitutional law in highly 
diverse societies such as in Canada; the rule of law is a collectively accepted centralized 
structure of political and legal authority.  The fact that the rule of constitutional law is 
based on Western liberal classical roots and experience contributes to its comparative 
homogeneity in a world of multiple normativities.  For example, although Islam is 
determined by an ongoing interplay of multiple cultural, linguistic and religious 
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expressions going back 1428 years—based on conquests upon vast geographical spans 
acquired at different historical times—today in the West, Islam, as a civilization, is 
politically homogenized causing the Muslim identity to be feared in the West.  Is the 
Western liberal and secular state law therefore inadequate in the protection of the norms 
of a multiplicity of citizens in its current history as impacted by globalization and 
migrational encumberances?   
Since at least the beginning of the 20
th
 century, with accelerating global 
interconnections everywhere, differently manifest laws are being constantly negotiated in 
theologically and culturally specific contexts.
96
  Because the judicial systems of Western 
countries are based on liberal secular fundamentals, their systems are challenged by the 
ways different social groups continue to organize human lives given their own different 
and sometimes traditional conceptions of the good life.
97
  It will be seen that liberal 
modernity, politically and legally, takes limited account of the fact that different societies 
understand and structure human interaction differently, cultivate different capacities and 
virtues and assign different meanings and worth to human activities and relationships.  In 
the West generally, since liberal secular modernity limits its own capacity to normatively 
recognize different values, or does not react fast enough to social changes, there is 
therefore a forced co-existence of a variety of moral standards in their midst.   
As a consequence of the last seventy years of global interconnections, it might be 
argued that the latest incarnation of modernity consists of ‘multiple modernities’, or a 
plurality of evolving human cultures having plural sociolegal perspectives and 
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developing in significantly different ways in different contexts.
98
  Multiple modernities 
refer to specific norm-generating enclaves that are both traditional and modern; there are 
many such constellations that exist globally and in the West.
99
  The multiple moral and 
political contexts and normative commitments of the intercultural multiplicity may lead 
to peaceful coexistence or produce conflict depending on the capacities and flexibilities 
of modern liberal law itself.   
A. A glimpse at the development of normative political philosophy: 
modernization, liberalization, and secularization since the 18th century  
 
As stated, theoretically, if Western states are liberal modernities, they are based 
on the themes of rationalism, secularism, individualism, human rights, democratic 
governance and most recently, globalization, all of which play a foundational role in any 
discussion of Western modernity and its cognates, such as modernization.
100
  The 
conceptions of liberality that are combined to legally define the good life go back to the 
classical era of the Greek Stoics who influenced Western moral liberal thought.
101
   
However, it was in the 18
th
 century Whig tradition of liberty under the law when classical 
liberalism began to grow that prominent Whigs such as John Locke, Adam Smith, David 
Hume, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison illustrated a fusion of economic and 
political liberalism in their writings.
102
  These thinkers and their followers such as J. S. 
Mill, Locke, Montesquieu and Alexis de Tocqueville drew on Greek rationalism and 
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Christian universalism, both of which stressed monism and a form of centrality of reason 
that arrived at a vision of the good life based on such values as critical rationality, choice 
and personal autonomy.
103
   
Classical liberalism accepted four principles of liberty: personal freedom; limited 
government; equality of right; and consent of the governed.  In this context, personal 
freedom refers to no coercion in the way of life of the individual, limited government 
means the state is only an instrument of society, equality of right means that everyone 
abides by the same rules that the state enforces with impartiality, and consent of the 
governed comes from the people to create a certain form of popular democracy.  Free 
choice became the foundation of the self-worth of the individual.  Concern for the 
freedom of the individual gave rise to the demand that government be bound by law—the 
modern constitution began to take root but religion began to lose the value of its common 
public goods.   
The process of secularization initially occurred as a response to fierce religious 
wars between Protestants and Catholics and which could not be controlled.
104
  A part of 
the Western World’s ideals for social order that is supposedly based on absolute truths 
and rational planning was that liberal law also separate from religious interest.  
Secularization would be the mechanism that curtailed the power of all transcendent 
religions to morally order formal society.  Religious freedoms are now special guarantees 
by the Western state.  American colonies further developed this Western political theory 
of modernization based on the concept of secularism.  This moral monism as combined 
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with classical liberalism and secularism when further combined with the Anglo-American 
idea of modernization, fortified the belief that a single set of values is the most high and 
other values are merely a means to the only one rational and true way to a collectively 
accepted and centralized structure of political and legal authority.
105
  Because this 
secularized form of liberal modernization holds on to the assumptions that it produces 
predictable patterns of uniformity and standardization of knowledge production, there is 
now a continuous commitment of Western liberal and secular law of “equating unity with 
homogeneity, and equality with uniformity.”106 Are the bearers of collective rights of 
particular communities therefore unfettered from following their customs and practices in 
Western liberal modern secular states? 
Because the claims of freedoms of numerous communities are complex and 
difficult to evaluate, particularly in terms of the weight given to differing empirical 
evidence; the internal rationality that has developed differently and is differently 
expressed in societies can often be missed by outsiders.  In particular, attempts at 
interpretation of ancient religious texts by human rationale are often not extensive 
enough.  The formal interpretation of religious texts by human rationale also brings into 
question the motivation and the qualifications of the interpreter.  How important is the 
concept of religion in claims of freedom of religion?  The politics of recognition 
associated with judicial constraints in freedom of religion jurisprudence, I maintain, are 
apparent within the limiting measures of the institutions of liberal secular modernity:  
weak judicial review processes, failed political actions and insufficient philosophical 
reflection.   
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If the monistic liberal law is instrumentally manipulative in an undemocratic 
manner, as Tie thinks, and if liberal claims of justice tend to be homogeneous, then the 
results have to be confusing.
107
 And for Menski, different ideologies, politics, economics, 
sociocultural factors and religions play a critical role in shaping legal systems 
everywhere.
108
  The law cannot be a closed system as legal doctrines and practices have 
to be interlinked with other aspects of life.
109
  Law everywhere is plural, inherently 
dynamic, takes many different forms, is flexible and has different sources.
110
  In an age of 
globalization, with rapid convergence of a plurality of cultures in Western societies, 
whether a particular knowledge instrument is adequate to provide ordering for the good 
life is in doubt.  In the relationship of the rule of liberal law and a multiplicity of norms, 
can ways of life be hierarchically graded by the modern liberal and secular constitution 
that presides?   
1. Liberal secular modernity: rising from classical roots to current 
modern globalized societies and plural sociolegal interconnections  
 
The institutions of the classical modern state in the West arose gradually from 
absolutistic monarchy as did economic organization from the mercantilist economy.  
Absolute monarchy had the power and authority to enforce rules of conduct and to create, 
amend or repeal law and the power to raise revenue via taxation.  In Europe, up until the 
16
th
 century this absolute and perpetual power was accountable  ‘only to God.’  In 1688 
England, the Stuart Kings’ claims to this absolute monarchy were defeated in the 
Glorious Revolution and parliamentary sovereignty, defined as the Commons, Lords and 
the Crown, all held to act together under certain procedures.  Supreme authority now 
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resided in the people but could be delegated in a modern democratic form.  Classical 
modernization and secularity called for explicitly structured patterns of persistent 
integration so that steady progress of the liberal secular modernity would develop through 
defined stages and without variation on this course.
111
   
From the 16
th
 century to the latter part of the 20
th
 century—and Ermarth’s dates 
go even as far back as 600 years ago, to the time of the European Renaissance and 
Reformation—the classical theory of modernity sought to understand the institutional and 
cultural transformations in the processes of ‘modernization’.112  These were times of 
empire-building and modernization was essential to Western colonialism for exploitative 
purposes.  In Europe trade flourished after merchants and traders were able to unify rules 
and customs that were common to them.  Classical trading principles evolved as a self-
standing system of usages, customs, and practices enforceable by merchant courts.  This 
law of commerce administered by merchants themselves functioned in deciding cases 
without interference from local authorities.
113
  In 1648, the European Treaty of 
Westphalia authenticated national boundaries; the nation state developed further territory 
for transformation and modernization.
114
   
Also in the 17
th
 century, American colonies further developed modern Western 
political history by shunning traditional monarchies with new systems of legal authority 
based on the separation of church and state.  Together, the Anglo-American philosophers 
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politicized that they had fully developed human rationality to the point that it was 
possible to judge different religions, societies and historical epochs, and that only they 
possessed the true ‘religion.’115 Other ways of life such as those that were community-
centered and other non-Christian religions were ruled out.  Classical modernism and law 
began to emerge from Christian law.   
Because classical liberalism drew on a rationalism that accorded with Eurocentric 
Christian universalism, it broadly rationalized a harmony between reason and Christian 
morals.  Christian thinkers arguing for modernization and liberalization felt that their 
vision of the good life was within the moral reach of all human beings.
116
  Religious 
normativity was removed from political rule to curb the ongoing political conflicts within 
Christian religious groups.  Church and state were separated for the purposes of freedom 
of religion.  The purpose of this process of secularization was to set the morality of the 
Christian faith as a stand-alone and an important force within society.  The acceptance of 
the truth of religion and religious freedom occurred at a time when virtually whole 
societies practiced some form of Christianity.  Although the original harmonized 
rationalization favoured Christianity, it too was eventually relegated to the realm of the 
private.  It was when Eurocentric political debates concerning modernization and 
liberalization through public reason and individualistic construction of autonomy began 
that the communal, social and moral dimensions of religion began to be reduced to a 
private and an arbitrary choice; religion therefore began to be ignored in the public.
117
  
The processes of secularization gave rise to the ever-expanding political, scientific and 
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legal revolutions within modern societies.   
2. The development of liberal secular democracy and the chanelling of 
liberal legalism 
 
As the liberal secular democracy developed, the requirement of a judicial system 
to interpret and apply the secular aspect of law also developed within the same frame.
118
  
Towards the 18
th
 century, courts generally began to be more concerned with enforcing a 
rigid separation of church and state than with protecting the free exercise of religion.  In 
the development of liberal thought, religious institutions began to be regarded as a threat 
that could destroy the liberties of people.  The West now regards religion as a private 
matter of tradition that should not intrude into the public sphere.
119
  Various forms of 
secularism and liberalism are now the chief features of a modern liberal democracy.   
However, at the end of the 19
th
 century, when a reformed liberalism had begun to 
emerge in attempts of a more democratic liberalism, society became a means of enabling 
individuals to satisfy their desires in a laissez-faire ethos concerning economic well-
being and equality of opportunity.
120
  Not only was the theme of this liberal modernity 
viewed as superior, uniform, predictable, and coherent, but having developed in Western 
Europe, the fulfillment of individual desire for economic growth became the highest good 
within both classical and reform liberalism.  Different governments now tend to tilt 
towards either form of liberalism.   
Because liberalism resulted in a fusion of economics and politics throughout the 
18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries, and classical liberalism identified personal freedom with a 
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free market, the laissez-faire economy has become firm.
121
  However, long before the 
political theory of liberalism had matured into democratic liberalism, and long before 
equality of political participation based on all people having an equal voice, the 
equivalents of social sciences and scientists had a supposed “master theoretical frame to 
organize their focus, problems, explanations, and interpretations…the idea of 
modernity…around the pre-modern/modern divide.”122  As stated previously, processes 
through which all societies were supposedly to have passed in order to develop and 
modernize were explored by mid 20
th
 century sociological works such as of Marx, 
Tönnies, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Parsons, and many others.
123
  In their quest to 
transform and modernize the ‘rest of the world’, the dynamics of their theorized process 
of modernization centered on systematic and universal ideas of classical modernity of 
economic growth, differentiation, rationalization, individualization, urbanization and so 
on.  Until the 1970s, the above mentioned theorists and their economic and social 
development notions for understanding Western modernity with themes from classical 
modernization dominated the entire economic, social and legal development industry 
globally.   
Towards the latter part of the 20
th
 century, at the end of colonialism, reform 
modernism and universalistic explanations for events based on presuppositions of 
theorists from classical liberalism began to be critically scrutinized; these theorists were 
not necessarily “unsullied by political and cultural aspirations” of conquest.124  Liberal 
legal discourses of rights, inclusion and equality coexisted with the legitimization of 
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colonial policies of exclusion and discrimination by the presumption of differences 
between different types of individuals.
125
  The historical channeling of secularized liberal 
legalism by an instrumental and practical view of knowledge has had the theoretical 
resources and the opportunity to establish hierarchy among different ways of life.
126
  
Currently, monistic morals continue to be engaged in vigorously distinguishing liberal 
modernity and its ideology from global opposition with a vision of sustaining itself as a 
vibrant liberal moral culture.   
The rule of liberal constitutionalism remains dominant as modernization’s 
expansive and transient quality and has manifested in most cultures across the globe.
127
  
However, the increasing multiplicity of modernities in the West: the plurality of religious 
orders and different moral doctrines indicate that multiplicities of worldviews and 
lifestyles—containing the original “DNA” of the liberalized and secularized modernity—
also have claims that respect different traditional obligations for the common good than 
the duty to individual autonomy.  However, liberal secular modernity and legalism, and 
its individual agent, continues in a global scope with vigorous interconnections in the 
now intercultural capitals of Europe, Britain, United States and Canada; capital cities 
such as London, New York, and Toronto are highly populated with multiple modern 
people.     
3. Multiple modernities and a hetereogeneity of legal orders 
 
There are many ways of understanding modernity, but the fact that the definition 
of ‘the modern’ is diffuse, elusive and difficult to comprehend is well illustrated by 
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Berman:
128
 
The maelstrom of modern life has been fed from many sources:  great discoveries 
in the physical sciences, changing our images of the universe and our place in it; 
the industrialization of production, which transforms scientific knowledge into 
technology, creates new human environments and destroys old ones, speeds up 
the whole tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power and class 
struggle; immense demographic upheavals, severing millions of people from their 
ancestral habitats, hurling them halfway across the world into new lives; rapid and 
often cataclysmic urban growths; systems of mass communication, dynamic in 
their development, enveloping and binding together the most diverse people and 
societies; increasingly powerful national states, bureaucratically structured and 
operated, constantly striving to expand their powers; mass social movements of 
people, and peoples, challenging their political and economic rulers, striving to 
gain some control over their lives; finally, bearing and driving all these people 
and institutions along, an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist world 
market. 
 
Complex but different historical modes, procedures and institutions make it very 
difficult to define modernities in their specificity.  Friedman attempts to define modernity 
as a process, anywhere, a powerful current of historical condition that combines to 
produce sharp ruptures from the past that range widely across various sectors of a given 
society.
129
  The change knits together the cultural, economic, political, religious, familial, 
sexual, aesthetic, and technological and so forth and can move in both utopic and 
dystopic directions with “shattering” “velocity”; the changes are “across a wide spectrum 
of societal institutions...”130  Modernity everywhere is also relational; it is not a past 
versus the present, or science versus wisdom.  The major rupture—from what came 
before—opens up the possibility for polycentric modernities and modernisms at different 
points of time and in different locations.  In the history of civilization, eruptions of 
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different modernities often occurred in the context of empires and conquest such as the 
Tang Dynasty in China, the Abbasid Dynasty of the Muslim Empire and the Mongol 
Empire, all of which predate Western modernity.
131
  For Said: 
 … such movement into a new environment is never unimpeded.  It necessarily 
involves processes of representation and institutionalization different from those 
at the point of origin. This complicates any account of the transplantation, 
transference, circulation, and commerce of theories and ideas.
132
 
 
The transformation of ideas—interpretation for instance—into new positions in 
time and space, partially or fully, is gradual.  “Hostile soil does not allow transplantation; 
conversely, the practices that take hold in their new location are changed in the 
process.”133  Although liberal modernity is characterized as a break from tradition, a tear-
off from its own continuous time, it in effect invents tradition as part of its own rupture 
from its past.  The process of modernization and traditionalisation can never end.  For 
instance, to declare the end of colonialism as synonymous with the end of modernism is, 
as Friedman states, “like cutting off the modernisms of emergent modernities.”134  
Modernisms as the creative forces within other modernities, such as the writers, the 
artists, the musicians, the dancers, the philosophers, the critics, and so forth, are engaged 
in producing their own modernisms that accompany their own particular modernities.
135
  
So, multiple modernities create multiple modernisms.  And, as Goankar states in 
Friedman:
136
 
to announce the general end of modernity even as an epoch, much less as an 
attitude or ethos, seems premature, if not patently ethnocentric, at a time when 
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non-Western people everywhere begin to engage critically in their own hybrid 
modernities.  
 
Modernism did not come to a close.  Indeed, it cannot come to a close as alluded 
to in the idea of post-modernism.  As did the creative agencies in the colonies, newly 
emergent nations are now exhibiting differentiated modernizations.  The nationalist 
movements and liberations from political dimensions of colonial rule are central to the 
story of their modernities.  In that modernity invents tradition, suppresses its own 
continuities with the past, and longs for what has been seemingly lost, multiple 
modernisms need “respatializing” and therefore “reperiodizing.”137 
As noted, liberalism broke with monarchy and also with religion.  Some want to 
promote the modern and others want to restore an imagined and often idealized past; the 
secular liberal democracy tends to live in an idealized imagined past.  The struggle 
between the modernizing and traditionalizing forces, particularly of religious values 
within Canada, are indicative of a defining characteristic of the current liberal modernity.  
Both, the past-orientated traditionalism and liberal democracy are as much a feature of 
modernity as modernization.  I agree with Friedman: “hidden continuities” “buried within 
the radical ruptures from the past,” refuse to change or cannot change and often have to 
do with the uneven distributions of power and violence in the past, present and 
particularly in the future.
138
    
But institutional changes depend not only upon a transformation in how we view 
modernity and individual rights, that is, the relationship between democracy and human 
rights, but also upon an agent that can effect such a transformation.  For social change, 
what is required is a deeper understanding of democracy and a different agency of social 
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transformation in order to institutionalize respect for human rights.  The agency of 
modernity is not autonomy and freedom to act unimpeded by others; it is a drive to be 
able to name one’s collective and individual identity and to negotiate the conditions of 
history at the zones of encounters of interculturality.
139
  It is this incarnation of 
modernism that supports the unfolding universe where the unfolding happens within a 
specific civilizational context; it is this avatar of modernity, this pluralization of 
modernity, these alternate modernities, these polycentric modernities, these contemporary 
multiple modernities, that have, collectively, gone beyond liberal modernity’s narrow 
mindedness into a dimension of modernity that suggests imaginative, creative and moral 
meaning-making forms and cultural practices that engage in substantial and different 
ways with the historical conditions of a particular modernity.   
The essence of multiplicity of modernity is creativity.  But the creative agency of 
modernity is in the West; the West perpetuates itself as innovative and the rest of the 
world as traditional, as raw for creative appropriation and transmutation into ‘modern’: 
modern art, for instance, or culinary cuisine.  The creative agency of plural law has been 
largely ignored.  This exclusion of the juridical agency of multiple modernities deeply 
affects the definitional projects of modernism.  In effect, multiple modernities also 
produce polycentric law, or a multiplicity of legal orders in which providers of legal 
systems compete or overlap in a given jurisdiction.   
In the West, liberal law is the sole provider of homogeneous law.  However, law 
is instituted by a heterogeneity of normative claims that are consistently formed in 
specific contexts, independent of the state.  Political conflicts are inherent in social 
interactions as cultures are internally heterogeneous entities.  Law is constantly 
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constructed through the contest of various norm-generating communities that prescribe or 
adjudicate normative commitments.
140
  Norm-generation is part of jurisgeneration; 
“pluralism observes [that] various actors pursue norms and it studies the interplay 
[without proposing] a hierarchy of…norms and values.”141  In a situation of legal 
pluralism, the interrelations between different laws are of special importance.  “Law and 
the social context in which it operates must be inspected together.”142  In a world of 
hybrid legal spaces, a wide variety of transnational and international regulatory problems 
can be conceptualized in managing hybridity.  How do we balance complexity and 
essence, particularity and overlap and hybridity?   
A closer look at the new geography of modernism will reveal many centres of 
modernity across the globe that throw light on intercultural traffic and their multiple 
interpretations that are linked to the circuits of reciprocal influence and transformation 
that take place within highly unequal states relations.
143
  Multiple modernities are already 
exhibiting pluralities of space and time based on global linkages with contemporary 
societies.  Each new manifestation of modernity is distinctive and yet, affiliated thorough 
global linkages to other modernities or societal formations.  Each such manifestation of 
‘modernity’ is located in a series of historical processes that brought relatively isolated 
societies into contact with others.
144
  However, a central facet of liberal modernity is that 
people ought to be governed by the rule of law and citizens are under the law that is 
rationally standardized. 
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B. Constitutional democracy: modern liberal secular law as state political, 
economic and social order  
 
The ethics of law, politics and religion were initially separated as a Eurocentric 
instrumentalist means toward the larger end of protecting true religious freedom based on 
the liberal notions of equality and neutrality.
145
  Natural law principles and religious 
principles were to exist independently of any human law-making agency and therefore 
the liberal state may not alter them.  Although historically, law was not a major aspect of 
Western society and was shaped by customs, classical modernists began to perceive that 
purposive rules and public state institutions of social control and authority were 
necessary. The rule of liberal law started as a slow and historically prolonged 
sociopolitical aspect of modernity but since the 19
th
 century modernity and liberal 
legalism have been rapidly swallowing up the globe.  According to Thompson, human 
law became an instrument of imperialism and found its way around the globe.
146
  
Globally, democracy has now come to imply certain freedoms:  political, economic and 
social rights and the rule of the many.  The idea of a modern liberal democracy—
constitutional democracy—that is cohesive entails legally homogenizing concepts for the 
supposed stability and security of the individual and in the interrelationships and 
interactions between individuals and groups within the secular democratic state.   
Theoretically, constitutionalism is a set of fundamental liberal rules and principles 
as shaped by the evolving but homogenized ‘manmade’ law and by which a limited state 
broadly engages in the rule of, and the organization of, social life in modern liberal 
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states.
147
 Constitutional law, as part of rule of state law, along with an independent 
judiciary and respect for minorities, orders society politically.   
The constitution is based on national political identity—autonomy of the 
individual—but emphatically not on religious identity.  The rule of liberal law is a shield 
that protects citizens against the abuse of power and is unconditionally connected to 
individual freedom.  Generally, constitutionalism, in its association with the modern 
secular state, was initially concerned with limits of power and the rule of law; democracy 
and human rights are its later additions.  It is the very ideals of human rights and the rule 
of liberal law that logically lead to constitutionalism and the limited state.  In effect, 
popular democracy, where the will of the majority is accepted, becomes a legitimate form 
of government only when it is united with the traditional Western ideals of 
constitutionalism, rule of law, liberty under the law and limited state.
148
  Because the 
characteristics of modern liberal constitutional law are that it is: a system of rules; a form 
of purposive human action; and concurrently autonomous from and a part of the modern 
liberal state, the rule of constitutional law is subject to the limits of state goals of 
stability.
149
   
A liberal constitution may be changed but the rule of liberal law requires that 
amendments be made according to recognized procedure.  The well entrenched citizen 
rights are extremely difficult to retract.
150
  According to Thompson, liberal law is part of 
a “superstructure” that supplies the “necessities of an infrastructure of productive forces 
and productive relations”; if we judge the “culture of constitutionalism” in terms of its 
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own self-sufficient values “we are imprisoned within its own parochialism.”151   
Limitations on what modern liberal constitutional law perceives as controversial 
religious norms frustrates the ability of government officials to take actions on 
accommodating these norms and misinterpretation sometimes leads to compromise in 
democratic law-making.  The singular rule of liberal constitutional legalism continues to 
ground our legal definitions of personal, social and political life globally.
152
  According 
to Hogg and Zwibel, this purposive law can be influenced by the decision-making of 
courts and public officials.
153
  The protection of religious life is questionable.   
How general, systematic, predictable and effective is this rule of constitutional 
law?  The rule of constitutional law is fundamental to Western liberal democracy and the 
rule or convention plays a significant role in the exercise of power.
154
  Currently, the 
definition of the rule of liberal law is not fixed; it is open ended and is extensively 
debated; however, at minimum, the rule of liberal, constitutional, law “must be set forth 
in advance, be made public, be general, be clear, be stable and certain, and be applied to 
everyone according to its terms.”155  The rulers and the ruled are to obey predictable and 
supposedly impartial rules of conduct.  The rule of liberal law functions as a restraint on 
government by requiring officials to comply with the existing law and by curbing their 
law-making power.  Restraining law-making power is a restraint on the law itself so that 
even a legitimate law-making authority is limited.  Government actions therefore must be 
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positive legal actions and no government action may contravene a legal prohibition or 
restriction.
156
  However, the government is not the controlling or coercive force of society 
but an instrument within it; the norms that take precedence in public life are those that are 
grounded in abstract philosophical principles that lie behind historical liberal reflections 
that are secularized.  In that the liberal theory of law is reduced to a rigid structure of a 
rational force, encumbered with homogenized values, it is not value-free. 
1.   Secularity : a central value in the protection of freedom of religion 
 
It is now taken for granted that the political and the secular are a standard liberal 
correlation because they are central features of modernity, and within liberal law, 
secularity is restricted to a particular constitutional value.
157
  Since the 19
th
 century, ideas 
about the rights of individuals in liberal democracies, that have been abstracted into 
constitutional values, explicitly assume that equal rights have now been ingrained as 
automatic methodology.
158
  A form of voluntary choice-making in the structure of the 
guarantee of freedom of conscience and therefore of the practice of religion, is now 
treated as an intentional act wherein the liberal individual is free to make moral 
considerations in their everyday social interactions.
159
  Moral considerations that are 
recognized by the law are intentions, actions and decisions that fit the public moral code 
on proper behaviour and good character.  Liberal law now protects the rights of the 
abstracted individual believers and their particular moral codes as a constitutionally 
protected identity that is supposedly free to practice his or her faith.  This blanket 
guarantee of a positive right is in keeping with the purpose of all modern secular liberal 
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constitutional governmental structures and institutions including courts to secure social 
order for the autonomy, happiness, dignity and the benefit of all citizens.  But in an age of 
globalization, the guarantees of negative rights are challenged by multiple modernities 
that refer to different concepts on what they feel constitutes good behaviour to be good 
citizens.  For many, secularity is not a central feature of the good life. In Canada, there 
are examples of misrecognition by courts of group identity in freedom of religion 
jurisprudence despite the claimed virtues of the entrenched Charter.
160
  The most basic 
problem for liberal law, and the most difficult, is to balance equality and difference given 
the multiplicity of difference within the modern.   
2. Equality and difference: the politics of subordination within an 
absolutizing legal system 
 
Although restraints are imposed by the constitution on democratic institutions, the 
rule of liberal constitutional law is not a protection against bad laws.  The ability of the 
majority to take away the formal expression of language, religion, and laws of a minority, 
has continued from 18
th
 century Europe when whole societies were homogeneous.
161
  The 
will of the majority cannot be legitimate unless the majority is restrained by an expansive 
constitution.  Difference needs to be protected against the dominance of liberal 
modernity.  The imposition on difference to have ‘blind faith’ in liberal modernity is 
risking loss of essential values.  Studies of various diaspora in Britain conclude that 
communities have not abandoned their cultures, or their religions, but have reconstructed 
their own cultures to develop informal mechanisms.
162
  For Bhamra, the sociopolitical 
reality of the immigrant experience does not accord with the idea of assimilation into 
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mainstream society; it is “analogous to the choice to take a vow of perpetual poverty and 
enter a [cultish] religious order.”163  Some can make explicit choices and leave their own 
culture or religion; however, it does not follow that it is desirable or legitimate to require 
individuals to abandon their own cultures by tacit assumptions given the seriousness of 
the consequences of the choice: permanent subordination.   
The point of theorizing differences, Razack states, “is not for the sake of inclusion 
but for the sake of antisubordination.
164” Consensus based on the principles of justice is 
difficult.  In the relationship between judicially enforced rights and democracy, any 
misrecognition by courts implies social subordination of group identity.  In Canada, the 
individual has freedom of conscience and religion as guaranteed in s. 2(a) of the Charter. 
Case law that will be discussed in Chapter III will show that because religion is 
individual as well as communitarian, there is state interference with minority religious 
practice; individuated rights are protected and valued ahead of the need for social 
cohesion of whole religious communities with different rationales.  The limitation of 
religion is justified within the legal bounds of toleration and explained as a commitment 
to a single democracy, liberal democracy.
165
  Chapter III will also show that courts can be 
authoritarian and legal discourse has the power to colonize others.  We live in an age of 
confused democracy that provides citizens the freedom to make choices among various 
options that are supposed to be legitimate and meaningful and, at the same time, require 
many citizens to create makeshift meanings out of their own cultures, beliefs and 
practices.  A democratic state that imposes equal obligations yet denies equal rights 
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forfeits its legitimacy.
166
  
For Mouffe, an infallible test for political freedom is the legitimacy of opposition; 
freedom only to agree is no freedom.
167
  In a liberal democracy, opposition must operate 
within ‘the rule of law.’  But freedom is meaningful only if it constantly renews its 
rationale of a moral vision of a good legal system and extends to those whose opinions 
differ from the opinions of those in authority.  As Keating states, “the real intellectual 
problem arises from the doctrine of the unitary or uniform or mechanical state in which 
every deviation from uniformity has to be justified by reference to a general and 
universalizable rule.”168  Because the liberal democratic tradition treats the cultural 
differences of multiple modernities as particularist trends or deviations, and because just 
dialogue is precluded by the conventions of modern Western constitutionalism, the 
current liberal state is gradually losing control over rights and the construction of new 
spaces of democratic discourse.   
Vargish stresses that the ultimate agenda of the absolute system of liberal 
democracy is self-perpetuation.  I agree with Vargish and in particular, the functional 
bottom line of the absolutizing legal system of liberal democracy is, in the first instance, 
not the perpetuation of the values it appears to embody and uphold—for example, liberty, 
equality, fraternity, God’s will, Jesus, history as a determining force—but “order and 
power to impose it.
169” Shah eloquently sums up:  “liberalism as a practical attitude, 
rather than as a focus of sophisticated philosophical debate, has become deeply 
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impoverished…socially ignorant and ethically barren.”170  As a consequence, liberalism, 
and its broad legal approach with its many merits, has gradually been challenged by the 
multiplicity of the modern to reexamine its, liberal legalism’s, very fundamentals.  
Liberal legalism is the main force of liberal modernity and a force that is unable to 
accommodate modernism’s incarnation/avatar; the multiplicity of the modern.   
Berman confirms that “a pluralist perspective on…law provides a powerful 
critique to the latest incarnation of realism—rational choice theory.”171  The confinement 
of religious diversity within the liberal form of individual legal agency entails conflict.
172
  
The questions of social justice in modern liberal states go beyond liberal debates about 
whether abstract rights should take precedence over a collective conception of the social 
good.  Social justice cannot be reduced to an abstract legal form; the danger is that, as 
equality slides into sameness, difference becomes weak in standing up for inequality or 
injustice–the strength within difference will weaken if we continue to advocate for 
inequality. 
173
  An essential part of legitimate authority is considerations of fairness; this 
entails equal distribution of political power particularly in a democracy where the law is 
supreme.   
In the sociolegal context, Shah states that diasporic minorities are not taken 
seriously and are perceived as if they are demanding special treatment.
174
  Also, the 
presence of numerous groups, both within, and external to Western states is perceived by 
the proponents of liberalism to be threatening to its fundamental ideals of authority.  
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Religious difference is particularly feared.  Because liberal democracy is identified with 
“a reality that is universal, inviolable, complete, supreme, and, above all, single and 
monological”, mainstream legal analysts in the fields of—feminism, critical race theory, 
gay/lesbian legal studies to name a few—have heralded, what Cotterrell calls, a new 
‘jurisprudence of difference”, which asserts that the social environment of law can no 
longer be thought of as made up merely of individuals addressed equally by law.
175
   
3. The post-20th century emblem of the modern Western state  
 
We have seen that although the idea of modernization is commonly associated 
with the West, modernization in its multiplicity has been occurring in all societies at 
different points of time and in different locations, and, since the 16
th
 century, it has 
created the context of globalization.  For more than four centuries, modern liberal 
constitutionalism has been developing with two forms of recognition:  the equality of 
independent, self-governing nation states and the equality of individual citizens.
176
  It has 
developed with imperialism wherein European nations constructed their own imperial 
systems over the non-European world.  In most of the post-colonial world, modern 
constitutionalism is now fashionable among the so called equal and independent 
constitutional nation states.  State institutions of modernization and liberalization have 
become emblematic of the modern world at large.  However, the argument is that if 
modernism and liberal legalism is defined in terms of the prevalence of a few key societal 
institutions of the political and economic Western order than modernism is reduced to the 
West only and that too as is applicable to the early part of the 20
th
 century.  Everywhere, 
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there is a spectrum of reinterpretation and reconstruction of the constitutional program of 
liberal modernity and of the construction of multiple modernities and its diverse 
interpretations.  Many multicultural and multiethnic movements are attempting therefore 
to redefine the discourse of particularistic modernity in their own terms.  Although 
modernization is not now Westernization, it was considered essential to Western 
nationalism for social control and for colonialism for exploitative purposes and as a 
development strategy applied to the Third World.   
4. Relativized knowledge:  ongoing modernization and globalization are 
not westernization 
 
Every diasporic community globally has been exposed to some form of Western 
modernization either pre-migration or post-migration to the West.  If, as Eisendadt 
suggests, “modernity and Westernization are not identical,” even though modernities 
continue to refer to the Western historical precedence.
177
  The changed cultural condition 
and human interconnections suggests that the bases upon which liberal-modernities are 
lodged needs to be redefined in the context of the role of law in its various social 
contexts.  For peaceful co-existence, a dialogue of difference has to be a normative effort 
in order to appreciate the relevance of the historical and civilizational interpretation and 
commitment of the other.  Legal analyses could be pluralist in nature.  Again, in the 
analysis of legal pluralist, Robert Cover, the rules and principles of justice as instituted in 
formal law and conventions of social order, though important, are only a small part of the 
normative universe that ought to claim our attention.  “We inhabit a nomos – a normative 
universe.  We constantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and 
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unlawful, of valid and void.”178  Those citizens (for instance, Aboriginal peoples, women, 
linguistic and ethnic minorities, intercultural groups, religious organizations and other 
multiplicities) whose customs and traditions have been excluded or suppressed by the 
politics of recognition of modern constitutionalism of the modern nation state are 
struggling for equal recognition.   
For Tully, the politics of the recognition of cultural identities continue in a post-
imperial age of modern liberal constitutionalism.
179
  The modern constitution ought to be 
removed “from its imperial [Western] throne,” because “constitutions are not fixed and 
unchangeable agreements reached at some foundational moment, but chains of continual 
intercultural negotiations and agreements in accord with, and violation of the conventions 
of mutual recognition, continuity and consent.”180   For Tully, in the interest of justice, 
Western constitutional theory is amendable.
181
  
For Said, there is no culture, civilization, or nation that can truly separate itself 
into a pure and an impure or hybrid culture; there are no insulated cultures or 
civilizations, nor in fact have there ever been.
182
  Any attempt to separate them into 
“water-tight compartments” does damage to their variety, to their diversity, their sheer 
complexity of elements and their radical hybridity.
183
  And, as Kymlicka wrote in 1989, 
culture is more accurately understood as a continual process of “renegotiation, re-
evaluation and reconstruction;” it is never finished, and it is not possible to finish it.184    
                                                 
178
 Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982” supra note 20 at 2.  
179
 Tully, Strange Multiplicity supra note 60. 
180
 Tully, ibid at 183 & 184. 
181
 Ibid.  
182
 Edward Said, “Citizenship, Resistance, and Democracy” in Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth ed,  
Rewriting Democracy: Cultural Politics in Postmodernity (England: Asghate Press, 2007) at 24. 
183
 Said, ibid at 25.  
184
 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1989) at 167. 
57 
 
All modernisms develop as forms of cultural translation or transplantation 
produced through intercultural encounters and the constant making and remaking of 
boundaries, and their practical implications for law exist in all societies.  Intermixing 
cultures are not unidirectional; they are multidirectional.  They are not linear influences 
but reciprocal ones.  They are not passive assimilations, and, depending on the 
adaptability or resistance, they transform actively.  Although the scientific, industrial and 
political revolutions succeeded in emerging in the West, others, such as China, India and 
the Muslim world, have been influential on the world stage in global thoughts in many 
areas such as physical and natural sciences to architecture, art, commerce, and social and 
political thought.  Western accomplishments are inextricably linked to those of others.  
The economic, techno-scientific and civic modernity occurred in the West.  But there 
cannot be a new epoch in human experience that is universal.  If all knowledge and 
public institutions were relativized, would citizenship be tenable?  On the flip side, what 
if there was a return of religion to the public sphere often with singular truth-claims?  But 
in a democracy, law is supposedly an aspect of the socio-cultural diversity it administers.   
The interpenetration of civilizations and cultures is the hallmark of democracy in 
the 21st century.  A world civilization would not be worthy of its name if it could not do 
justice to the individuality of different spheres of culture and civilization.  The larger 
problem is the failure of the democratic institution to recognize its relationship with the 
current critique of modernity.  There is a clear indication that modern liberal democracies 
in the 21
st
 century are in trouble. 
Although liberal modernity has multiple interfaces, it fails to converse fully with 
modernities that are firmly attached to religious values as part of life.  The failure of 
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liberal modernity to recognize multiple modernities and to deal only superficially with 
new developments has led to a head-on collision of what I call ‘a clash of modernities.’  
The singular liberal modernity that appears to be most conspicuous is the hegemony of 
the United States, followed by Western Europe and Canada.  In their quest to follow and 
emulate the powerful, all other modernities, liberal or not, secularized or not, are 
complicit in the clash. 
C. A space of opportunity:  an enhanced model of liberalism 
 
Parekh advocates freedom to research and to explore the elements of liberalism 
with a combination of elements drawn from other sources.  Due to the complexity of 
multicultural populations everywhere, the West needs to break away from its obsession 
with the Western culture of liberal essentialism, finality, and intellectual rigidity.
185
  
Mohanty’s statement, as quoted in Razak, about the liberal form of ‘inclusion’ as a 
“harmonious, empty pluralism echoes the lament of some critical pluralists previously 
mentioned, some are listed here;
186” Tully, the diverse ways citizens in the West are 
culturally constituted by legal and political institutions to adhere to the norms of 
uniformity remain unexamined;
187
  Sen, the privileging of legal regulation and 
adjudication in political liberalism raises what he refers to as a question of capabilities 
and chances, and this is a challenge to liberal conceptions of legal equality; 
188
 and 
Parekh, liberalism, with its essentialism, closure, system building and intellectual rigidity, 
marginalizes values such as human solidarity, equal life chances, selflessness, self-
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effacing humility, and contentment.
189
  Liberalism creates skepticism about the pleasures 
and achievements of human life as “it is not sufficiently sensitive to and cannot give 
coherent accounts of culture, tradition, community, a sense of rootedness and 
belonging.
190”  I am convinced that the larger framework of liberal constitutionalism in 
Canada therefore has limited legal capacity to balance individual freedoms against the 
maintenance of different authentic cultures, religions or races.  The limits are due to 
reluctance, according to Lee, to confront uncertainty and he adds that it is not fatal to 
accept uncertainty because it can be pragmatically managed as “part of self-monitoring 
activities…[so that] theories as applied to social change… attempt to bring to realization 
a sustainable economic and political environment under the aegis of modernity”191 
The liberal traditional values such as human dignity, equality, critical rationality, 
respect for others and toleration can only be enhanced with the intercultural multiplicity 
and diverse intellect that obviously has no determining centre.  And, according to Kaya, 
no centre of society is capable of shaping the entirely of social relations.
192
  He argues 
that modernity is open-ended enough to allow spaces for multiple interpretations.
193
  
Multiple modernities are therefore not based on a centre that determines any activity and 
sphere in the social world.  A concealment of the immense variety of cultures, of peoples, 
of religions, historical traditions and historically formed attitudes remains open to 
disputes over the common good or the good life.
194
 Benhabib defends constitutional and 
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legal universalism at the level of polity but within a “deliberative democracy” of legal 
pluralism and institutional power-sharing.
195
 And the space of culture, or religion, or 
language or history, whose importance is no less than that of the power of rationality, 
provides opportunities to interpret imaginary significations of modernism in multiple 
ways.   
Studies of the plurality of civilizations confirm that many of the cultural, legal, 
political, and scientific forces in people’s lives move in competing and often inconsistent 
directions.  Multiplicity is inherent in modernity.  The plurality of the cultural worlds is 
irreducible.  Intercultural multiplicity and diverse intellect are therefore inevitable.  The 
intense multiplicity of the current complex epoch reflects a modernity in which tensions, 
contradictions and dualities are much more evident and openly expressed.  There is no 
coherence in the current world and the conflicts within the diversity of myriad 
interpretations indicate the radical pluralism of the cultural and theological worlds.
196
  
To continue to call Canada a liberal society is to homogenize and oversimplify 
contemporary society; it also gives liberal Western societies a moral and cultural 
monopoly that treats non-Western societies as illegitimate and troublesome intruders.  
For Parekh, paradoxically, it is the glory of liberal society—tolerant, open, and free—that 
it is not, and does not need or even seek to become, exclusively or entirely liberal, that is, 
committed to a strong sense of autonomy, individualism, self-creation et cetera.
197
  This 
permanent inner logic and strength in liberalism has been misunderstood by philosophers 
of all stripes until recently.
198
  This logic stems from his argument that liberalism views 
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human beings as wholly constituted by their culture where culture is a sort of 
superstructure, resting on, and interacting with, an unchanging and identical human 
nature.  The fact that this human nature shapes human beings and defines the nature and 
content of the good life is not appreciated as a source of significance of religious 
diversity.  When religion serves to keep the divisions between the modern and the 
traditionalist intact, an extremely important aspect of a modern society is sidetracked.   
D. Conclusion 
 
In the last 50 years, many, many millions of refugees, movements of peoples by 
choice from country to country, immigrants, displaced peoples and others have 
crisscrossed over to different cultures.  In Canada, its Eurocentric value system with its 
universal code of liberal modernity, however, clashes with the practical and legal needs 
of the multiplicity of modernities.  If the challenge of human rights and social justice is 
not confronted, struggles could potentially erupt into violence.  In particular, there is a 
persistent non-acknowledgement of religious differences and historical and legal frames 
of all available systems of values, beliefs and practices, giving rise to conflicts.   
The ideology of liberal legalism developed from Locke’s classical liberalism to 
Mill’s more reformed liberalism, and its amplification, modification and sometimes even 
reduction, has struggled through parliament with Stuart Kings, the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688, the establishment of supremacy over monarchy, to where the people now have a 
moral right to establish the rule of law.
199
  From a sociohistorical vantage point, 
ideologies are not static, timeless systems of ideas.  As a general rule, the quality of the 
outputs of any system reflects the quality of its inputs; a system of constitutional 
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supremacy has to be based on the value choices of the multiplicity.  Agreement on 
political matters and social justice need not exclude recognition of difference.  This is 
most crucial in recognition of religious scriptures.  And law may not be the only system 
available for social justice.  The treatment of “equality” is a societal value as an essential 
part of the constitutional framework.  Normative refinements of the liberal democratic 
theory would view pluralism as a value worth protecting and not simply as a fact to be 
tolerated. 
The term ‘multiple-modernities’ acknowledges the relevance of  many versions of 
modernity and lived experiences that are culturally and historically contingent.  
Currently, the world at large is rooted in  liberal politics and integrating people into 
changing markets with a dangerous abandonment of the democratic commitment to 
equality.  “There is no universally valid mediating frame:  no common denominator, no 
constant, especially not time and space to act as the common basis of resolution in a 
universally valid discourse.”200  
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CHAPTER II - The Secular Legal Order:  Misconceptions within 
Liberal Law of the Relationship between Politics and Religion 
 
In the contemporary West, due to a steady influx of immigration and a growing 
base of standards of morality, the relationship between religion and law reflects a 
plurality of rationales, all of which are simultaneously looking for answers to questions of 
authority, justification of universal rights, and rational answers to questions of code of 
conduct in everyday life.  However, the theory of secularization also reflects the 
relationship between current law, politics and religion that exposes the now—given a 
multiplicity of legal regimes—weakened foundations on which modern secular 
constitutional democracies are based.  The secularized relationship between plural 
religions, constitutional law and politics may be illogical and legal resolution on religious 
issues is difficult.   
This chapter will explore what the possibilities are of expanding the boundaries of 
liberal secular modernism and whether law is able to recognize and accommodate a 
further multiplicity of authentic normative orders.  Is liberal law: neutral towards religion, 
anti-religion, or non-religious?  Is the scope of the authority of each, the public and the 
private spheres, religion and law, distinct and unfettered?  Can the state itself be allowed 
to continue to have a specific conception of the good, in this case, rational secular 
morality?  Given the plurality of moralities, how can a liberal secular state and society 
encourage religious diversity, pluralism and the common good?  If morality is an 
important characteristic within multicultural societies, what is the role of religion in 
guiding public morality in such societies?  According to Parekh, reason can “suffer from 
limitations” leading to widespread differences of views and sometimes clouded by 
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emotion.
201
  What are the possibilities of faith and reason to interact in these modern 
societies for a moral and judicious political life?  Is it possible to have a universal value 
system that is applicable to the beliefs and practices of a multiplicity of modernities in a 
liberal democracy?   
A. Regulating religion: Eurocentric tensions between religious rights and 
secular politics 
  
In the West, as part of the force of Eurocentric modernity, the theory of liberal 
secularization was conceptualized to transform and completely differentiate the spheres 
of the religious and the secular.  It originated to liberalize and to remove religion from 
legal and political rule.  The freeing of religion from Christian politics and civil unrest, 
religious wars and revolutions was to legally solidify Christianity’s moral force within 
civil society.
202
  As a single process of differentiation of the various institutional 
spheres—from early modern to contemporary societies—secularization is understood as a 
defining characteristic of processes of modernization and liberalization that guarantee the 
individual citizen freedom of religion.
203
  For Casanova, this process has remained 
uncontested; what needs to be opened up is an exploration of Christian historicity of 
Western Europe along with a multiple other different historical patterns of secularization 
in other civilizations and world religions. 
In the discourse between state law and religion—religious legislation attached to 
constitutional values—there is often disadvantage or exclusion of some religions and 
faith practices and in particular those which are not of the established, official or 
                                                 
201
 Parekh at 53, Rethinking Multiculturalism, supra note 17. 
202
 Heyking, supra note 117. 
203
 José Casanova, “The Secular and Secularisms”  (2009) 76:4 Soc Res 1049 at 1050. 
65 
 
recognized religions.
204
  It is argued that the moral fibre and the good within civil society 
are inspired by religious traditions and doctrines.
205
  It is further argued that all citizens 
have multiple and distinct identities that they choose at will, much like chameleons and 
they ought to be allowed to participate in the public sphere with their key aspects intact if 
the modern liberal state itself is to remain comparatively free of moral chaos manifesting 
in multifaceted conflicts. 
  For instance, in a 2009 freedom of religion case involving A.C, a mature but 
minor Jehovah’s Witness, refused to accept blood transfusion as her religious tenet.206  
The criteria that the majority at the SCC used, in the process of reasoning, and choosing 
and explaining this particular religious tenet, was what constitutes a liberal legal category 
and classification.  But the court was also required to deliberate upon the capacity of the 
adolescent to understand her personal normative subjectivity to a religious tenet.  It was 
an ingrained, sincere, belief of A.C. that if she accepted blood transfusion, she would be 
damned for eternity.  But the analysis of the case was synthesized into a body of 
previously derived secular legal principles and constitutional limitations.  The court was 
in effect required to manage religious tenets within a specific new realm, the realm of 
private values in a public forum; a constraint that is self-imposed on the secularized 
system.  The moral, deeply held religious beliefs, and the political contexts are most 
times confused with the claims of justice.   
1. Secularism as a definitive characteristic in the progress of modern 
liberation 
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Liberation and separation of religion from the state were to benefit politics, law 
and morality.
207
  The secular referred to state law, policy, and economy and the religious 
included mostly various Christian churches.  The definition of secularism was first coined 
in 1851 by Holyoake; it was formally published in the Oxford English Dictionary in 
1911.
208
  The rationale then was focused on neutrality: secularism “neither affirms nor 
denies the theistic premises of religion” but it does replace the “uncertainties of theology” 
and it is “founded on considerations purely human.”209   
The process of secularization progressed in the human and societal development 
to what is perceived as from the primitive ‘sacred’ to the modern ‘secular.210  The social 
and political order shifted gradually from the “hand of God, to the hands of men of God, 
to the hands of many, many, ordinary men” who would undertake a secular order that is 
supposedly virtuous.
211
  In other words, Western societies and social order evolved from 
a theological reference to God and blind faith, to a metaphysical stage wherein human 
reason questions and investigates the religious authority.
212
  This is an abstract stage.  The 
final abstraction from religion is where the process of secularization is the Anglo-
American scientific process that supposedly has answers to moral questions everywhere 
generally, and in particular in the rule of law. 
The process of secularization has been structured as parallel to the political 
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process of Western modernization and liberalization.  In the continuing evolution of 
processes from pre-Enlightenment theological roots where man and society deferred to 
unquestioned natural principles of law, morality, religion, myths and traditions, to a 
metaphysical stage of the justification of universal rights so that the authority of religion 
became questionable, to a further stage where scientific reason and generalization of 
these principles of law became paramount for the achievement of material and political 
progress for self-fulfilment, liberal legislators and courts generally began to be more 
concerned with enforcing a rigid separation of church and state than with protecting the 
free exercise of religion.
213
  Today, the claim of liberal neutrality defines the process of 
secularization as the process in which religious consciousness is not essential in the 
operations of social systems.  Although there are many variations of secularism, the term 
“secular” has become synonymous with the construction, codification, grasp and 
experience of a realm of reality that is differentiated from “the religious.”214  It is simply 
a statement that: this is different from religion.  Globally, faith-based practices are now 
often considered to be hostile to political secular liberty.  
In contemporary legal reality, the secular non-religion liberal order is now 
understood as a normal human condition, as if God does not exist, in the public sphere.
215
  
And it is the application of the contemporary category of the secular, godlessness, that 
defines the legal and political identity of the liberal secular state and its society and that 
lends liberal legalism both its  legitimacy and autonomy.  This monistic liberal ideology 
of rights has remained steadfast in Western sociology and social sciences despite 
thorough contestations by legal, feminist, race and other critics.  More importantly, the 
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complex relationship of religion and modernity may leave spaces for contestation such 
that radical ideologies may gain legitimacy within societies where governance fails.  
With increasing plurality, the territory which lies in-between religion and politics is 
difficult to regulate.  In Canada, the legal foundation for the private-public divide is not 
always clear. 
2. Secularization, Christendom, and Religious Identity:  in the separation 
of church and state or religion and state, where is (a) freedom of 
conscience, (b) equality, and (c) neutrality? 
 
The 2008 Bouchard-Taylor Report commissioned by the Government of Quebec 
in 2007 found that secularism is generally regarded as a “straightforward, unequivocal 
principle that prescribes the separation of church and state, state neutrality and, by 
extension, the confinement of religious practice to the private sphere.”216 However, for 
Bouchard and Taylor, the “declaration of independence” by the state from the church is 
not clearly distinguished.
217
  There is confusion in the total separation of church and 
state, from that of religion and state, the latter being a political arrangement.  
The Report defines current understanding of secularism in Canada as:  
A system based on four constituent principles:  two profound purposes (freedom 
of conscience, and the equality of deep-seated convictions); and two structuring 
principles the separation of Church and State, and State neutrality).
218
 
 
The Report concludes that within this perspective, current accommodation for 
religious reasons is perceived as being incompatible with secularism.  The Report 
determined that secular systems should achieve a balance between four principles:  the 
moral equality of persons; freedom of conscience and religion; separation of church and 
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state; and state neutrality in matters of religious and deeply-held convictions.
219
   
However, the idea that reason can fulfil its emancipating function solely if it is 
free of any religious faith is also debatable; a person can certainly use his/her reason in 
the conduct of their life while maintaining a place of faith.
220
  The faith adherent’s 
identity is tied not only to his/her religious community; it is also tied to his/her social, 
psychological and economic self in significant ways.  If identity is non-existent, 
meaningful relationships would not exist.  Virtually every aspect of good human conduct 
is capable of being the subject of religious belief, and moral considerations would require 
the state be neutral in the public sphere in accommodating all authentic religious 
groups.
221
  Is absolute state neutrality even a practical possibility?   
The hard anti-religious sentiments within the modern state are difficult to 
disentangle.  For Taylor, “nothing this hard and fast exists in any other human culture in 
history” rather, the distinction between a higher being and ordinary beings exists 
universally.
222
  Again, when combined with the political understanding of the secular 
self, it is argued that liberal law requires that all citizens ignore at least part of their 
identities in order to be citizens but at the same time recognize that complete separation 
will be impossible.   
Also, Christian morals have remained integral as a code of conduct of civic life 
despite secularist processes.  But generally, “law and religion are each obsessed with 
questions of right and wrong, sin and crime…and both set that inquiry into a larger, 
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structural, often hierarchical frame.”223  Both are acquired and held by a collectivity on 
the basis of a certain morality.  In particular, religious beliefs and practices have been 
acquired and held by a collectivity on the basis of religious scriptures and faith.  Because 
in reality the secular always overlaps with the religious, and it is becoming progressively 
very difficult to access the realm of the religious by minority religions in the public 
domain in the West, “any genuine freedom-of-religion law must protect not only 
individual belief, but the institutions and practices that permit the collective development 
and expression of that belief.”224  The preservation of the choices and therefore the rights 
of each individual will preserve the individual as a ‘holistic’ entity.  The challenge to 
rational liberal secularized constitutions is that often, decision-makers universalize 
different interests of society as if they are acceptable to a specific individual. 
Generally, the presence of numerous different moralities, both within, and 
external to Western states is perceived by the proponents of liberalism to be anti-law and 
threatening to its fundamental ideals.  This may lead to a misunderstanding as to the 
reality of the hard fusion of the religious and the secular in different supposedly non-
liberal spheres.  Religious communities in Western secularized states are required to 
either adapt to Western modernity or reject traditional values.  Empirical linkages 
between modernity and secularity may not be prominent but the removal of religion from 
public life and the creation of a space for the toleration and freedom of religion from 
discrimination are now expressed in secular terms and as a political guarantee.
225
    
Given this contemporary, more political, understanding of the separation of 
church and state and given the guarantee of freedom of religion in liberal law, can newer 
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moralities that overlap be generalized and incorporated into universal principles of liberal 
legalism and by way of consensus?  Or is liberal law theorized as primarily a political 
design for governance on principles that consider only the secular rights of individuals 
and not other principles that the same individual may need to adhere to, such as, the 
needs of faith organizations that the individual belongs to?  In the rapid advancement of 
modernity and secularization globally, religious influence seems to be weakening.  Who 
then controls all aspects of social needs of the individual? 
B. The role of religion in society 
 
The importance of religion in society is its role.
226
  Although religion—a 
discourse with diverse and contested meanings—cannot be an adequate analytical 
category for public normativity, it is a source of self-dignity and self-identity.  Different 
faiths consider religion as a way of life and binding religious principles are an integral 
part of the governance and conduct of the self and in the improvement of the quality of 
their lives.  Believers are not exempt from existentiality: family, community, and 
commercial life.  Although different civic realities are experiences and expressed 
differently in various modern contexts, religion continues to feed the moral and 
permissible mindfulness that consistently formulates these expressions of the believer 
civil citizen.
227
   
Parallel and correlated to these realities are transformations of numerous religious 
and secular lives in an age of rapid cross-cultural exchange of human relations and 
norms.
228
  There is a risk of totally erasing peoples’ roots.  However the role and function 
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of religion in society, and the degree to which religion is valued and protected is 
persistently invoked by the rule of liberal secular law in the consideration of national 
identity.  Freedom of conscience and therefore of choice of religious belief is supposedly 
protected by liberal constitutional law.  But, again, constitutional law continues to build 
on the weak foundations of the public-private divide.  The protection of religious interests 
is sometimes confused with the protection of cultural interests, particularly of the 
majority; the guarantee of freedom of religion is confused with other rights such as 
cultural equality and respect.
229
  The progressive sophistication of the politics of modern 
liberalism includes a form of non-religious morality that is oblivious to the inner aspects 
of humanity and, at the same time, is very concerned with worldly interests of the 
individual.
230
   
In Canada, because liberal constitutional law considers religion to be a private 
matter that cannot be allowed to infringe upon the public sphere, we need to consider 
this:  the interpretation of both, religion and liberal secular rationalism, rest on human 
reason, an important, necessary, and the only available faculty to human disciplined and 
moral thinking.
231
  Can what a multiplicity of practitioners of different faiths believe to 
be the supremacy of God be given constitutional meaning or would this in effect be a 
threat to the values of a free and democratic society as understood within liberalism?  The 
rationalist liberal makes the finite, and fallible, human reason, the basis of the rule of law.  
However, human reason, for the religious person, relies on the “infinitely superior and 
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infallible divine reason.”232  Rational constitutionalism is, for the believer, procedural, 
methodological and guided by evidence but religion or faith is committed to a substantive 
body of beliefs that involve the place of “emotions, spontaneity, intuitions and gut 
feelings.”233  A dynamic modernism, I maintain, goes into an expanded horizon of 
rationality that includes the construction of quality social consciousness.  However, this 
quality is subject to interpretation; the acceptance of fallibility can only lead to an 
energetic search for truth as no single position exhausts truth.
234
   
Although interpretation of religion is key, in the rapidly pluralizing state, the 
public right to freedom of religion in Canada’s Charter therefore remains one of the most 
controversial of rights.  It is the liberal moral foundation of freedom of religion—the fact 
of the value of faith understood as a mode of belief distinct from reason—that supposedly 
has the capacity to contribute to human well-being.
235
  Secularism regards faith as 
valuable only in the recognition of the fact that a secular society has guaranteed freedom 
of religion.  The guarantee of freedom of religion is the most prominent and yet the most 
vulnerable site for the pursuit of faith.
236
  In Canada, current democratic rights and 
protections afforded to the practice of religion may not be within reach for the believer 
for certain frames of moral and ethical behavior. 
Religious beliefs and practices are consistently at the centre of freedom of religion 
jurisprudence.  Canadian cases concerning the carrying of religious objects such as the 
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kirpan,
237
 a religious symbol for many centuries in India for Orthodox Sikhs, is compared 
to a commission of a crime of possession of a dangerous weapon; or the covering of the 
body or face for religious discipline is debated against the identity of the individual for 
security of others, or that a Sikh male’s turban is a legal contravention of uniformity or a 
safety hazard against the individual himself.  
Accommodation of religious practices is reluctantly directed to individual 
adherents as and when they require exemption.  Generally, courts almost always uphold 
restrictions on religious practice. The existence of a large diversity of possible meanings 
for the concept of religion in the contemporary West is always considered in the context 
of its supposed opposite; the secular.  However, the lived experiences of immigrants 
continue to reproduce the diversity of deeply-held legal or normative systems as multiple 
populations grow.
238
  All normative systems revolve around liberal rules to make claims 
to authority.  Because the bewildering multiplicities of religious beliefs that are rooted in 
plural claims to authority are required to cohabit within the supreme state law that 
pervades all aspects of life, the overlap between law and religious practice of individuals 
is potentially conflictual.
239
 
Historically, religion has always been the cause of conflict, but it has also always 
been a source of good public values for society.  The liberal state may lose some benefits 
from, for example, faith-based institutions and organizations such as schools, hospitals, 
social service agencies, charitable and other organizations, all of which may contribute 
financial and other resources to societies.  As stated, to start with, church and state in the 
West were not separate.  For centuries, religion and religious activity have been both a 
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divisive and a cohesive force in society.  Spiritual belief has inspired us for immense 
good but it has also been responsible for mass persecution, intolerance of difference and 
abuse of the rights of others.
240
  Although 4
th
 century Christianity kick-started the concept 
of secularism, it was a series of events during the Reformation in England in the 1530s, 
during the reign of Henry the Eight, that is responsible for modern secularism.
241
  
C. The modern state: its emergence and developing theory of liberal 
secular law 
 
In the 16
th
 century, King Henry broke away from the authority of the Pope by 
separating the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England.  He not only 
established himself as the head of the Church of England, but also as the ultimate 
arbitrator of doctrinal and legal disputes.
242
  Because England was predominantly 
Protestant, Catholics were discriminated against and Protestantism became intertwined 
with national identity.  There was a long and bloody period of religious and political 
persecutions.
243
  Diverse religious groups were subjected to laws that were contrary to 
their beliefs and practices.  Tolerance of religious minorities such as Catholics and Jews 
was rare in England.  Religious minorities had to hide their religious identities and which 
restricted their ability to seek new converts or to seek political power.
244
   In the 16
th
 and 
17
th
 centuries, European fear and hostility to religious plurality was at its worst.  It was 
not until after the “Glorious Revolution” in 1688 that religion first became separated 
from law.  A church polity was established but Catholics in England continued to be 
discriminated against; their civil liberties were severely curbed.  The liberation of the 
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Christian religion from the politics of civil strife, political rule, wars and revolutions 
followed in the 17
th
 century.
245
  In effect, Catholic Church organizations were considered 
illegal until the 19
th
 century.   
As the modern secular state was emerging and disputes finally began to be 
resolved starting in the 17
th
 century, religion began to be removed from law and politics 
in Europe generally.  In 1689, the English parliament enacted the Toleration Act granting 
some religious freedoms, particularly to Protestants.
246
  In 1789, the French declared the 
Rights of Man that involved religious freedoms.
247
  In the struggle for political 
supremacy, many functions, properties and institutions of church control were transferred 
out to non-church laymen: “a rearrangement of the furniture in a civilization whose basic 
features remain unchanged.”248   
Although secularization refers to the actual historical patterns of transformation 
and differentiation of the institutional spheres of the ‘religious’ from early modern to 
contemporary societies, the general theory of secularization is still developing within 
Western sociology.
249
 Secularization that was conceptualized within the European 
historical transformations later became increasingly globalized as part and parcel of a 
general teleology of conquest by the West, globally.  By 1791, two guarantees, freedom 
of religion, and the prohibition of establishing of religion, were entrenched in the 
Constitution of the United States as fundamental rights, now within its Bill of Rights.
250
  
Courts in all liberal democracies were also undergoing changes in empirical sciences 
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towards more rational and progressive legal systems.  Currently, in the separation of the 
traditional role of religion and faith-based values as vital protectors of public morality 
from politics, liberal legalism has become unable to fully understand religion.
251
   
1. The position of privilege of secular law and potential conflict 
 
It is now understood that the political and practical, epistemological privilege 
granted by Western liberals to the Anglo-American jurisprudence of secular modernity, 
or liberal secular legalism, suppresses multiple forms of knowledge and other, what are 
perceived to be ‘non-scientific’ moral codes.252  Because the principles, including moral 
codes for any liberal modern political system are agreed upon, and religion is defined as 
individual conscience, and because these consensus-based principles are detailed and 
have to be timeless, they tend to be rigid.  Again, inividuals are deemed to be 
autonomous moral agents, free to adopt their own conception of what a successful life is; 
the communal and social dimensions of religion are reduced to an arbitrary choice.  In 
this Western-historical connection between liberal law based on Christian morals, other 
established religions and the value of their faiths are deprived of a voice in the ordering 
of a multicultural public.   
Secularism's view that religion is merely a private and arbitrary choice makes it 
easier to suppress religion, whether by limiting religious freedom or by defining it 
in exclusively secular terms. This form of secularization undermines perhaps the 
most basic freedom upon which liberal democracy lies.
253
 
Truths that are external to secularity and liberal rights do not matter in deliberation.  This 
defies the sentiment that generally, religion offers the citizen a sense of well-being, and 
therefore any support for values of faith is in effect supporting the original agenda of 
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secularism itself; the protection of all religions.
254
   
No European society or political system is truly secular.
255
  For Parekh, this is 
“Western moral engineering.”256  If, as Heyking states, the process of liberal 
secularization is “a by-product of an untenable account of Western political discourse 
grounded in Christendom and an Enlightenment account of the autonomy of reason”257, 
and, if the Christian heritage continues to shape the vocabulary, self-understanding, 
institutions, ideas and practices of liberal modernity and law, are the ideas of human 
dignity, equal human worth and unity of humankind to draw their moral energy from this 
heritage that always reappears in the secularized liberal form?   
Many of its current laws and practices and even such things as treating Sundays, 
Christmas Day, New Year’s Day, and Easter, as public holidays, are all further examples 
of the continuing influence of Christianity.  In effect, legislation providing Sunday as a 
universal day of rest, has survived.  It is considered a universal secular principle (not 
everyone accepts this).
258
  The historical roots could be forgotten, but even if Christianity 
survives only as Western culture and thought, its religious basis or overtones do not go 
unnoticed by non-Christians.  If the state holds a particular view of religion, or it views 
the morals of a particular religion as paramount, it is deemed to have entered the realm 
of ideology.  Not only does there seem to be privilege granted to well-recognized 
religions despite the rule against the establishment of any religion,
259
 but as will be 
discovered in case law in Chapter III, the privilege is in effect legally justified in some 
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cases.  In an age of mass migration, legal resolution of conflict between particular 
normative frames of religion and state law will be increasingly difficult if the provision of 
freedom of religion in most liberal constitutions is not neutral.  
Again, the tendency to dismiss the ‘non-liberal’ as atypical, unimportant and 
transitory, often results in arguments and considerations of the socio-legal realities of 
minority groups as making claims for special treatment. That modern liberal law tends to 
marginalize religion altogether makes it a form of political law.
260
  Throughout the West, 
discrimination against many other religious groups continues in a variety of ways.  
Minority religions are considerably weakened by secularized powers.
261
  In Canada, for 
instance, practitioners of faith are finding that the law determines truths for whole groups 
of believers; the law decides which religious practices are acceptable and what sources of 
normative order are to be respected. Conflict may be inevitable.  
If the purpose of the concept of liberal secularism and law is really of servitude to 
the greater goal of religious liberty that would be achieved through accommodation and 
neutrality of religious belief, then this purpose of the separation of private and public law, 
having acquired a position of privilege, is misleading.
262
  In terms of the protection of the 
interests of the religious adherent by the guarantees of freedom of religion in liberal 
constitutions, there is confusion on whether the process of secularization is a political 
process that lies within the framework of law or whether it is a sociological phenomenon 
that is embodied in individual conceptions of the world and different lifestyles.
263
  It is 
understood that the state, and not society, is called upon to serve and to enhance the 
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promotion of genuine religious observance; it is also understood that the state is a 
political and not a religious institution and it cannot coercively enforce any religion.  
2. Canada: Misconceptions and discrimination within liberal rational 
secularity   
 
In Canada, upon application by the Muslim population to the Government of 
Ontario for faith-based arbitration in 2005, the government in effect permanently 
excluded all faith-based arbitration long permitted in the province.
264
  This was based on 
a misguided fear that Muslim populations will use the opportunity to introduce Shari’a 
law against vulnerable Muslim women and that the stoning of women could become 
legalized.
265
  It was feared that Muslim women may not have the ability to choose a 
liberal format for their marital disputes.  And in France, its “morale indépendante” 
continues in contemporary politics as the concept of laïcité—freedom from a rival 
religious morality—and this is evident, for example, on bans on the Muslim headscarf in 
the country.
266
  In Canada, in the relationship between religion and liberal law, the rule is 
that the state cannot establish religion so that the separation between church and state is 
supposedly firm.  However, there seems to be less concern for failing to understand that 
rejection of deeply-held beliefs of others is a form of discrimination and that this is 
related to imbalances in social equality.
267
   
For Razack, the responses to Shari'a law by threatened Canadian feminists (both 
Muslim and non-Muslim) reinstalled the modernity/pre-modernity divide and the secular 
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over the religions distinctions without hesitation.
268
  Canadian feminists utilized the 
power of the state to stigmatize and police Muslims and to reproduce the citizen as 
unconnected to community.  The power of fundamental Islam does oppress women but, 
in Canada, it would have been possible to get safeguards within the Arbtration Act for the 
protection of Muslim women.  However, the Boyd Report concluded that tolerance and 
accommodation of minority groups who seek to engage in alternative dispute resolution 
must be balanced against a firm commitment to individual autonomy; it also found that 
secular state laws do not treat everyone equally because people’s individual backgrounds 
lead to differences in the impact of these laws.
269
  Formal equality and liberal 
essentialism therefore decontextualize subjective interpretation or particular 
interpretations of religious ideology.  Again, the next chapter will confirm Casanova’s 
observation that the liberal constitution itself decontextualizes, interpenetrates and 
mutually constitutes law in decision-making processes concerning freedom of religion.
270
   
For Casanova, there seems to be a misunderstanding in the connection between 
the political objectives of a liberal modernity and the historical concept of secularism: is 
secularism a principle of modern statecraft or is secularism an ideology?
271
  To maintain 
liberal democracy and order, the legitimacy of a norm on religious freedom cannot rely 
on the internal truths, revelations or beliefs of any one system of faith such as it does of 
Christianity.  However, the ethical and moral standards of liberal law purport to operate 
without reference to any specific religion.  Religion is now perceived solely as a certain 
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ideology connected to faith.  The misconception within liberal law of the relationship 
between politics and secularity has incapacitated state law to recognize religious norms as 
significant social norms of multiple modernities.   
In Canada, that the modern liberal state tends to interpret secularity as non-
religious is represented in the 1980 case: Big M Drug Mart challenged the 
constitutionality of the Lord’s Day Act in terms of the guarantee of freedom of religion in 
s. 2 (a) of the Charter.  The Act made it an offence punishable on summary conviction to 
carry out business on Sunday, a day specifically enacted for the Christian Sabbath.  In R. 
v. Big M. Drug Mart,
272
 the SCC set a precedent strangely interweaving individual rights 
and religious guarantees; individuals are free to engage in religious practice and the state 
cannot impose engagement in religious conscience and practice.  However, Dickson, C.J. 
also held that freedom of religion and conscience prohibits state coercion in matters of 
faith.
273
  He also stated that “the Charter has become the right of every Canadian to work 
out for themselves what his or her religious obligation, if any, should be and it is not for 
the state to dictate otherwise.”274  The purpose of the legislation has to be secular.  The 
impugned legislation, the Lord’s Day Act, infringed on the Charter rights of not only a 
plurality of deeply-held convictions and norms of multiple other individuals, but also on 
the freedom to refuse to participate in a religious practice—Sunday as a Lord’s Day.  The 
legislation was seen as coercive to others who were not religious and it was struck down.  
A corporate entity was able to claim rights under the Charter to overturn the non-secular 
spirit of the law.  In that religion is in effect being bundled up with many different beliefs 
and convictions, perhaps even with simple and fleeting figments of individual 
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imagination, freedom of religion loses its “God-given” importance.275   
3. A critique of the secularized legislative purpose as applied to 
individual moral values 
 
The ultimate purpose of secularism, along with freedom of conscience and 
religion is the “recognition of the equivalent moral value of each individual.”276  
However, an ethic that demands human solidarity has to acknowledge that human life is 
not only essentially moral but inherently purposeful.  It underpins the development of all 
human cultures.  Purposefulness and morality are corollaries; authentic religions draw our 
attention to this fact.  And many would argue that every civilization has been created by 
religion. The nation-state—secular, democratic, theocratic or even atheist—has some 
semblance of a religious heritage.  There has to be respect for the common fundamental 
truths of human existence.  However, religious obligations conflict with state interest 
realized through legislative purpose.  The purpose is that government may not coerce 
individuals to affirm a specific religious belief; neither can the government endorse a 
specific religious belief.   
If religion is now expressly part of freedom of conformity to religious dogma, and 
it seems to be bound up with a multiplicity of other non-religious consciences and 
convictions, Macklem questions the relevancy of the guarantee of freedom of religion 
and whether it has been rendered empty by the recognition of other rights and freedoms; 
the content of freedom of religion is not independent.
277
  Macklem therefore asks:   
If the guarantee retains independent content what is the proper justification for the 
freedom which that independent content confers?  Does that justification, if 
available, warrant the extension of the distinctive protection of freedom of 
religion to institutions and practices that are not animated by ideas of the divine, 
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given that the moral outlook that must justify that freedom is necessarily secular, 
that is to say, is not drawn from the tenets of any particular religion or religions, 
and thus is detached from religious doctrine? Or are there secular reasons to 
restrict the guarantee of freedom of religion to activities that are shaped and 
informed by contact with the divine?
278
 
 
A theological critique of the dominance of secularity is missing.   
4. Secularized courts:  ambiguities and confusion in safeguarding 
freedom of religion guarantees 
 
Can the observance of traditional, organized and firmly fixed religions that 
millions adhere to be reduced to a liberal choice?  In 2002, the Canadian society was still 
confused on issues of non-religion and secular in the public sphere as shown in the case 
of Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36.
279
   This case originated when the 
disapproval of the school board trustees, of three school books showing same-sex parents, 
became the subject of a petition by various groups that included gay advocacy.  The B.C. 
trial court held that the trustees had breached the statutory requirement of strict adherence 
to secular and non-sectarian principles when applied to educational concerns.  The B.C. 
Court of Appeal found the trial judge’s “secular principles” placed the beliefs of religious 
citizens at a disadvantage in terms of the beliefs of non-religious citizens.
280
  The SCC 
unanimously overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal in favour of the lower court 
judgment.  Although the SCC dismissed the board’s concerns that children would be 
misled by classroom information about same-sex parents, the court left untouched the 
finding of the lower court that secularity means non-religious.  The SCC also made no 
attempt to define “secularism.”281  However, the SCC determined that using the term 
                                                 
278
 Macklem, ibid.  
279
 Chamberlain v Surrey School Board (2000), 80 B.C.L.R. (3
rd
.) 181 (C.A.), reversing (1998) 60 
B.C.L.R. (3
rd
.) 311 [Chamberlain].  
280
 Ibid. Chamberlain.   
281
 Ibid. 
85 
 
“secular” to mean “non-religious” is erroneous in law, and that religious believers have 
the right to function in society according to their beliefs and that religious institutions 
have equal rights as do non-religious institutions.  
…the Court [of Appeal] interpreted the concept of secularism not to preclude at 
all that a public institute, like a school board, passes resolutions “motivated in 
whole or in part by religious considerations,” while it requires that “no single 
conception of morality can be allowed to deny or exclude opposed points of 
view.”  The obligation of secularism placed on the school board is “aimed at 
fostering tolerance and diversity of views, not at shutting religion out of the 
arena.” …It does not limit in any way…the freedom of Board members to adhere 
to a religious doctrine that condemns homosexuality but it does prohibit the 
translation of such doctrine into policy decisions by the Board, to the extent that 
they reflect a denial of the validity of other points of view.
282
 
 
However, the confusion in the interpretation of “secularism” persists.  In that the 
modern secular state and society tend to interpret secular as non-religious as opposed to 
being neutral, the attempts to neutralize religion in the public sphere, as in the 
Chamberlain case in Canada, may have failed.  In this case, limits on religious freedoms 
by secular principles indicate legal and political tensions due to resistance to differing 
norms.
283
  There is no expansive “baseline against which religious restriction, compulsion 
and inequality are measured.”284  Ambiguities and uncertainties are ever present in liberal 
courts dealing with freedom of religion guarantees.
285
   
Since the Chamberlain case, the secular principles of Canada legally relegate both 
religious and non-religious moral consciences to the realm of the private in keeping with 
the claim of modern and secular liberal law generally.  However, any consideration of 
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secularism has to take into account the intention of the historical ideology of secularism: 
“to exclude religion from all public aspects of society.”286   
Increasingly, migrants, particularly staunch believers who refer to religion as a 
way of life, may feel considerable social isolation and exclusion by restrictions on their 
civil liberties.  In Canada, courts are constrained by the non-neutrality of the process of 
public secularization itself.
287
  In the relationship between religion and citizenship, where 
religion, law and politics intersect, there is uncertainty, fragmentation, and disorder.  The 
misunderstanding of the intended process of secularization in relations between religion 
and politics in liberal democracies is even greater given the pluralization of society.  In 
Berger’s view, the dilutions of transcendence have resulted from misguided attempts at 
liberal modernization; this is particularly so in the transformations of religions in modern 
societies.
288
  The process of secularization was to realign religious affiliations and 
identities.
289
  Not a redefinition of identity.  The tendency is to understand secular as non-
religious when the correct understanding of it ought to mean no preference is given to 
any one religion.
290
  However, the tension as to the concept of religious nationality in 
Canada and numerous views on the code of human conduct has historical roots.   
In that there is confusion between the historic and monistic presuppositions of 
classical liberalism of anti-religious secularism and the more recent and progressive 
classification of the secular as occurred in the Chamberlain, and Big M. decisions, the 
phantom individual remains paramount.  The individual has moral, civil and 
constitutional rights.  All religions are without political authority and are therefore 
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‘fundamentalist.’ Courts in Canada may have inadequately handled the relationship 
between not only the Charter and religion but also aggravated the relationship between 
religion and politics.
291
   
The scientific or rational sense in which secularism is closely identified with 
progressive modernity accommodates religion, but there is also another non-Western 
meaning of secularism where it seeks dialogue among religious traditions and between 
the religious and the secular.
292
  According to Taylor, the “formulae for living together 
have evolved in many different religious traditions, and are not the monopoly of those 
whose outlook has been formed by the modern, [West], in which the secular lays claims 
to exclusive reality”293 Taylor therefore advocates that the distance between the religious 
and the secular has to be not only neutral but in a plural society, it has to be a “principled 
distance.”294  However, although Canada has a written constitution that takes precedence 
over other laws, the goals of democratic governance: social justice, multiculturalism, 
prohibition of the state from favouring any one religious community and allowing 
maximum religious freedom for all, are not safeguarded because there is no strict or 
formal separation between church and state in the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982.  The 
introduction in 1982 of various constitutional guarantees concerning freedom of religion 
also complicated this relationship and generated discord in Canada's constitutional order.   
D. Conclusion 
 
In Canada, despite the institution of the Charter which specifically guarantees 
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individual rights for all Canadians to the full extent of its diverse populations since 1982, 
it will be evident in case law outlined in Chapter III of this thesis, that Canadian courts, in 
their judicial interpretations of different ways of life of myriad ‘culture-based’ normative 
communities, appear to be ineffective in handling plural moralities that are integrally 
significant in the lives of multiple modernities.  The presence of multiple modernities in 
society reflects legal pluralism, diverse knowledge, and most importantly, multiple 
dimensions of individual liberty that are not limited to the single Western form of law 
based on the Eurocentric concepts of liberalism and secularism.   
In the question of neutrality, a judge is admittedly constrained by the enforcement 
of constitutional norms.  Again, it is understood that historically misrepresented tenets of 
particular faiths, tenets that are naturally abhorrent to humanity, can not only infringe on 
the rights of other more authentic tenets but can complicate the task of the judge.  Albeit, 
Canada is now confronted with a growing multicultural social base and a majority of 
which has always considered religion as central to their ways of life.  This citizen base is 
rapidly increasing in a manner similar to many European countries.  For instance, 
Germany, France and England now have the religion of Islam as the fastest growing 
religion; a large percent of the population of Germany now adheres to and practices 
Islam.  Germany has more Muslims than Lebanon and there is an indication that the 
increasing distribution of Islam could have a profound influence on public policy in 
attempts by Western governments to reach out to Muslims.
295
  The increasing distribution 
of Islam in the West is having a profound influence on public policy in attempts by 
Western governments to reach out to Muslims.  In Canada, the fast-growing and altering 
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sociolegal perspectives that contribute to a dynamic diversity of ethnoreligious norms 
cannot be ignored by the pre-existing legal edifice in Canada.   
90 
 
 CHAPTER III - The Juncture of Freedom of Religion and 
Secularization: A Review of Canadian Jurisprudence and Policy 
Before and After the Charter 
 
As stated in previous chapters, the relationship between liberal law and society—
the ideal of liberal modernism and secularism—is now specifically explained as a 
relationship that contains the democratically proclaimed values of freedom, equality 
before the law, participation, and shared rationality.  In particular, secularity—the 
separation of religion and politics—legitimizes this modern liberal ideal.  Legislation and 
particularly its application in courts of judicial proposals and principles are considered as 
crucial in achieving and maintaining this Western liberal ideal for a free, secular and 
democratic society.  Canada’s legislation is structured on a majority rule system wherein 
individual conscience and judgment lie at the heart of this democratic political and 
judicial tradition.  The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was produced by 
this positive law and sets out its political and legislative principles that also have to defer 
to universal principles of equality before the law.
296
   
In effect, the Canadian Charter was instituted for the very purpose of further 
enhancing recognition and accommodation of diverse cultures, particularly of religions, 
in a multicultural society.  Freedom to practice religious belief is fundamental to secular 
liberal politics and gives rise to the very purpose of the universalized legislation on 
freedom of religion and conscience.  But constitutional rights and freedoms are subject to 
legal limitations that can be justified if the law is shown to have compelling 
governmental interest.  Although the law is required to accommodate minority religions, 
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this dominant legal construction in the form of accommodation is not able to address 
historical disadvantage, inequality and completeness of other forms of institutions.   
Section 2(a) of the Charter states that “Everyone has the following fundamental 
freedoms:  (a) freedom of conscience and religion.” The purpose of s. 2 (a) of the Charter 
therefore implies that central to a good life is the right to practice one’s faith in the 
absence of coercion.  But are freedom of religion and other rights of minorities 
constitutionally protected?  Canada has—and is now—along with the rest of the West, 
been confronted with unprecedented levels of conflicting religious movements that are 
expressing mixed perspectives on life. These different perspectives are being consistently 
renegotiated socially and culturally.  If the purpose of liberal law is justice for all, and if 
freedom of religion is firmly guaranteed within the liberal constitution on its own 
fundamentals, how can a secular state encourage rather than interfere with the increasing 
religious diversity, pluralism and a changing notion of the common good?  How are 
judges, by way of judicial assessment, able to keep abreast of the rapidly transforming 
social changes and conditions that are different and at the same time be able to vary the 
intent and the effect of enacted legislation?  In the modern liberal ideal of political 
legitimacy, including secularity, can a progressive politics of religious philosophy be 
accommodated without undue stress on the practice of religion?
297
  Is the practice of 
religion in Canada in effect free of both direct and indirect coercion in the right to 
manifest religious beliefs and practices?  Are certain groups who order their lives by 
traditional values, particularly those values stemming from minority religion, forced to 
act in a way that is contrary to their beliefs and conscience?  Does s. 2(a) withstand its 
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true test in a consistently changing society?  Are religious freedoms progressively 
ineffective?   
A. Universalized liberal law, religion and secular politics  
 
The evolution of the key themes associated with the Western liberal philosophy: 
rationalization, secularism, individualism, human rights, and democratic governance have 
advanced gradually and continue in measured steps.  Coupled with the overarching theme 
of globalization and the current rapid and increasing interaction of the traditional and the 
modern within the West, a reconstructed understanding of these key themes of liberal 
secular modernity confirms a multiplicity of the modern exhibiting multiple normativities 
which include different views also of the sciences, human rights, and democratic 
governance.  Modern normativities, other than liberal normativities—norms of 
individuals, citizens and religious communities—too have a sense of a civic order and 
obedience based on different moralities.  
In Canada, the fact that legal citizenship is based on the dominant and 
philosophically abstract reasons that are grounded within the political concepts of liberal 
modernity and secularism wherein the individual is defined as the central bearer of rights 
generally was confirmed by Dickson, C.J. in a leading SCC freedom of religion case, Big 
M, that will be briefly discussed further in this chapter:
298
 
  … an emphasis on individual conscience and individual judgment also lies at the 
heart of our democratic political tradition.  The ability of each citizen to make free 
and informed decisions is the absolute prerequisite for the legitimacy, 
acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-government.  
 
Judges in Canada rely on this well-entrenched paramountancy of the liberal secular 
individual for achieving equal political citizenship.  Liberal democracy interprets 
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different religious norms by reliance on the liberal political theory or what Dworkin calls 
“political morality.”299  By liberal law, religious believers are not fully members of the 
political community and therefore for courts, any form of state support for a particular 
religious practice constitutes coercion as the modern liberal state cannot coerce the 
conscience.
300
  The common good of religious minorities or organizations within 
particular social fields is thus limited to the realm of the private.
301
    
Again, because Canada has embraced Anglo-American liberalism, historical 
religious values rooted within the Christian faith have translated into positive law and 
subsequently have become binding on Christians and non-Christians.
302
  It was seen in 
Chapter II above, that the presence of historically dominant forms of Christianity in 
positive law blur the ideal of secularism.  Conceptually, Canadian secular law may have 
legitimate public purposes but in terms of practical authoritative outcomes of the purpose 
of s. 2(a)—political freedom to follow one’s conscience—state law seems to continue to 
support some religious values and practices and interfere with others.
303
   
Freedom of religion jurisprudence that will be discussed in this chapter will reveal 
that due to the contradiction between the secular legal order and the liberal democratic 
ideal, the evolution of the themes concerning human rights are at an impasse.  For 
example, in Amselem, another freedom of religion case, Iacobucci J. confirmed that: 
… respect for religious minorities is not a stand-alone absolute right; like other 
rights, freedom of religion exists in a matrix of other correspondingly important 
rights that attach to individuals.  Respect for minority rights must also coexist 
alongside societal values that are central to the make-up and functioning of a free 
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and democratic society.
304 
 
Because constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute, they can be justifiably 
limited.   
 
B. Section 1 of the Charter and constitutional limits on freedom of 
religion  
 
Generally Charter rights are also subject to the s. 1 limitation clause that states 
that:  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  
 
Constitutional rights and freedoms are not absolute.  Under s.1, the legislature is free to 
enact a law that justifies infringement on any of the guaranteed Charter rights provided 
the law is a “reasonable limit” on the right.  Section 1 limitation is calculated to increase 
the net welfare; not all people will benefit as the costs are outweighed by the benefits to 
others.
305
  In the 1986 SCC case, R. v. Oakes, Dickson, C. J. pointed out, for a unanimous 
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court, that only the values of a free and democratic society would suffice to limit the 
guaranteed rights.  The court suggested values such as:
306
 
Respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social 
justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for 
cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which 
enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.  
 
In assessing law and legislative purpose, courts scrutinize the aims and objectives 
of the legislature to ensure synergy with the guarantees enshrined in the Charter.  
However, jurisprudence to date indicates that the objective of the law most often 
overrides the limit to the rules as set by the Oakes justification test.
307
  Berger confirms 
that the assessment of the impact of legal limits obviously has to be in terms of Charter 
values: liberty, human dignity, equality, autonomy, and enhancement of democracy.
308
  In 
a free and democratic society, therefore, some rights can be justifiably limited.  However, 
these terms are an intrusion and sometimes a burden on religious freedoms of both 
individuals and whole groups.  If limits on freedom of religion can be justified as solid 
commitments of the rule of liberal law to public interest, what therefore is the place of the 
lived religion?  What is the legal status of values and symbols that are publicly limited 
under s.1 analyses?  Importantly, does the tradition of judicial review bypass individuals’ 
religious liberties along with their choice of the lived internal social field as guaranteed 
by s. 2(a)?
 309
  Is it possible that s.1 of the Charter can overtly contravene guaranteed 
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rights under its s.2?  And is this therefore a violation of s. 2(a) of the Charter?  But for 
practical purposes, certain degrees of the burden on religious practice are not treated as a 
violation of s. 2(a) as justified under s.1 particularly under a cost benefit analysis.  Do 
religions have a different role that the law recognizes in an era of rapidly changing 
ethnoreligious diversity?  If the state legislative objective is justified under s. 1 to 
override an infringement on a s. 2(a) right guaranteed in the Charter, are then religious 
persons forced to choose between the tenets of their faith and full participation in the 
Canadian society?  Does the Charter protect religious rights of minorities from majority 
rule?  Currently, is the Canadian state sufficiently prohibited from favouring any one 
religious community and allowing maximum religious freedom for all?   
C. Competing moralities:  politically constituted conscience and religious 
beliefs  
 
Although all belief systems of minorities, including those based on so-called 
divine and ancient scriptures, are characterized as non-religious, jurisprudence will show 
that the modern state has projected itself into the realm of the private by imposing the 
abstract political identity in the practice of religion and its social interaction.
310
  However, 
highly educated judges constricted by commitment to constitutional values, are not 
always able to take into account the meaning of practices that subscribe to a lived religion 
of certain communities; these communities have their own internal social worldview and 
do not fit the liberal-legislated and secular understanding of life. Canadian courts 
therefore have to engage in the politically necessary analyses in each case of the 
relationship between the theological and the Euro-philosophical. In the contemporary 
juristic reality—conceptions of democracy and the rule of liberal constitutional law—
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concerning the relationship between law and religion, majoritarian ‘legalized’ individuals 
assert their claims as against the claims of believers. For Shah, the problem is at the very 
heart of the conceptualization of the liberal constitutional law.
311
 Grave 
misunderstandings and injustices have resulted from the imposition of an abstract and 
historic concept of identity in the separation of church and state.  The constitutional 
assumption on and the application of the concept of secularism may be miscalculated in 
Canada.
312
  Again, this nationalist moral identity, observed as a secular identity, is 
steeped in Christianity despite the fact that numerous Christians are not practicing 
Christians.  The Christian Church also has the right to speak on important public 
matters.
313
   
There seems to be a conflict between equal rights of citizens and the right of the 
individual to be normatively different from legislated norms.  However, no legislation 
can be universally valid for a dynamic multiplicity of social needs stemming from 
different and changing principles.
314
   
Individual citizens are now coming forward with their own identity characteristics 
that “nourish human interaction” and the abstract legal identity may become less 
relevant.
315
  How do courts respond to the challenges of the liberal concept of the secular 
individual, including equality of rights, and competing moral and political agendas of the 
multiplicity of modernities?  
In the relationship between liberal law and religion in Canada and in 
constitutional debates about the proper meaning of the right to freedom of conscience and 
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religion, what is normal and typical tends to depend on the legislator’s or the court’s 
vision despite stated Charter values.  The principles that recognize which government 
objectives are important and that warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right has 
not been clearly identified for sustainable change.  There is a growing burden on 
Canadian judges in assessing the constantly changing and complex social, cultural, and 
theological realities and their set liberal tools could be losing their relevance.
316
 In 
Berger’s eloquency, the perspective of law on the true nature and constitutional value of 
religion is always “rendered through the lens of the culture of the constitutional rule of 
law.” 317   The subjugation of others is justified as is this ideological posture.  Reiterating 
Razack, it would seem that: “[theorizing difference] is not for the sake of inclusion but 
for the sake of antisubordination.
318”   
This chapter will survey and attempt to analyze briefly some freedom of religion 
jurisprudence in Canada pre and post-Charter.  In that state political power and civic 
authority are legitimated by constitutional law, the liberty of the individual fuels political 
morality; a position of neutrality between different beliefs of collectivities is absent in 
judicial deliberations such as in case law that will be discussed in this chapter.  
Discussion on pre-Charter case law follows. 
D. Freedom of religion jurisprudence in pre-Charter Canada319  
 
In Canada, legal protection for the practice of the Catholic faith goes back to the 
1770s when Quebec was the first to be granted this liberal protection by the British 
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legislation even ahead of Catholics in England.
320
  It was not until 1852 that equality 
amongst other Christian denominations in Canada (or in the then old Province of Ontario) 
was instituted.  Today, this legislation is effective in Ontario as the Religious Freedom 
Act;
 321
 this statute guarantees “the free exercise of… religious… worship without 
discrimination…”  At Confederation, no religion was established or given prominence 
but the Roman Catholic and the Protestant denominations were guaranteed education 
rights under the British North America Act, 1867 (BNA).
322
  This protection for freedom 
of religion of minority denominational education rights was under s. 93 of the 
Constitution Act.  Although there was no specific provision of a bill of rights within the 
BNA, or specific protection for freedom of religion, the BNA gave sufficient 
constitutional standing to the minority Roman Catholic and Protestant schools in Ontario 
and Quebec.  That these two Christian groups have had a continuous guarantee of secure 
faith-based education is a privilege.
323
   
However, there was hostility towards other religions, including towards other 
Christians.  For example, during the 1930s Jehovah’s Witnesses in Quebec were in 
frequent confrontation with the provincial government, within the then predominately 
Catholic Quebec, for proselytizing.  Evidence of collaboration between the Cardinal of 
the Roman Catholic Church and the federal government to suppress Jehovah's Witnesses 
is briefly stated:
324
  In the 1940s, the federal government passed an order-in-council 
declaring the Jehovah's Witnesses to be an illegal organization under the War Measures 
                                                 
320
 Brown, ibid at 554.  
321
 Religious Freedom Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R-22.  Originally enacted as 14 & 15 Vict., c. 175. 
322
 The Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict. C. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App II, No. 5.   
323
 Brown, supra note 319. 
324
 Ibid. 
100 
 
Act.
325
  The religious activities of “other faiths” therefore were declared illegal by the 
Government of Canada.  Also, pre-Charter jurisprudence shows that the then Province of 
Québec, under Premier Duplessis used coercion to break up Jehovah’s Witnesses’ 
religious services including those held in private homes.
326
  The SCC intervened and was 
instrumental in providing powerful protections of religious freedom in Canada.
327
  In the 
SCC case of Roncarelli v. Duplessis,
328
 Roncarelli an active member of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and an owner of a small restaurant in Montreal furnished bail money for other 
Witnesses who had been wrongfully charged under the Criminal Code for various acts of 
dissemination of religious materials relating to their religion.
329
 In 1946, Duplessis 
ordered the Québec Liquor Commission to revoke Roncarelli’s liquor licence and which 
triggered litigation in the courts.  At the SCC, it was concluded that Duplessis had acted 
without legal authority because Roncarelli’s religious activities were unconnected with 
the statute under which his liquor licence had been granted.   
Subsequent pre-Charter litigation led to a constitutional alleviation of freedom of 
religion.  In Saumur v. City of Quebec, Rand, J. stated in 1953
330
: 
religious freedom…[is] a principle of fundamental character…the untrammelled 
affirmations of religious belief and its propagation, personal or institutional, 
remain as of the greatest constitutional significance throughout the Dominion is 
unquestionable. 
 
Freedom of religion was considered an inviolable right of the individual and a primary 
condition of community norms and life; a condition that “antecedes and does not depend 
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on positive law.”331  Religious freedom, for Rand, J., was a foundational component of 
any political organization; in 1953, religious freedom was not a right to be conferred by 
legislation.   
However, in 1960, when the Canadian Bill of Rights was enacted, this human 
rights charter applied only to federal law; it was difficult to obtain consensus across the 
provinces.
332
  Many judges regarded the 1960 Bill as an interpretative tool only and the 
Bill therefore had weak constitutional value.  In that s. 1of the Bill included protection of 
freedom of religion, for instance, in a 1963 case, the SCC upheld the validity of the 
Sunday closing law thus reversing the protection of freedom of religion that was part of 
the unwritten court tradition since 1953 and that Rand, J. and others upheld as a natural 
right.
333
  This civil liberty was found to be contrary to liberal secular rationality which 
“imposed limitations on absolute liberty of the individual.”334  Freedom of religion was 
therefore no longer an inherent or natural right of citizens; these civil rights were now the 
subject of law and limited by liberal law.  In particular the law rejected the practice and 
beliefs of certain religions.  Equal religious citizenship was therefore not protected by 
civil law.  Although it was felt that in pre-Charter decisions religious freedom enjoyed 
constitutional status and that all religions had equal standing, this guarantee had to be 
exercised within the legal limits of the law as was enacted.
335
  Specific religious liberty 
was limited by rational liberty of general application.  And although courts were prepared 
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to shield religious liberty from laws which sought to limit the “professions and 
dissemination” of religious faith, case law herein will show that there is consistent 
interference with religious worship.   
In the 1960s, the Canadian population was still relatively more homogenous and 
the laws which worked a less direct effect on religious practices were not viewed as 
jeopardizing religious freedom.  In 1982, upon the repatriation of the Canadian 
Constitution, the Canadian Bill of Rights lost most of its importance; almost all the 
guarantees of fundamental freedoms have their counterparts in the Charter.
336
  The SCC 
now mostly does not follow its Bill of Rights decisions on similar points. 
Although religious freedoms have evolved (the state is required to vigorously 
inquire whether there is coercion of religious obedience and belief) simultaneously with 
the evolution of liberal secular democracy, there may now not be more deference to 
religion under the Charter than there was under the Constitution Act, 1867.
337
  And, 
secularization of religion may not be the only way to realize freedom of religion.  
However, freedom of religion is now an integral part of the Canadian Constitution; it is 
one set of group rights that are contained in the now Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
itself under its s 2 (a).
338
      
E. Freedom of religion jurisprudence in Canada in post-Charter era  
 
Canada is a diverse society with questionable secularity.  Canadian courts are 
charged with making some of the most complex, sometimes life-changing decisions for 
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people and for society.
339
  For the protection of individual rights and religious vitality that 
endures, courts are invariably required to adopt systematic strategies in interpreting the 
constitution.  Because claims of religious freedom are complex and difficult to evaluate, 
particularly in terms of the weight given to differing empirical evidence, freedom of 
religion cases representing differing normativities tend to be hard cases.  The 
interpretation of the moral and political concepts in freedom of religion jurisprudence 
tends to be inconsistent and vague.   
The Charter grants religious freedom as a private and expressly not a public 
matter.  Rights in the Canadian Constitution are therefore framed as highly general 
principles that leave considerable scope for debate as to their particular application.  Does 
this imply separate and private courts for religious disputes? A survey of recent SCC 
decisions will determine the particular protections religious persons are afforded 
publically, in a supposedly secular Canada.  It will also help in discovering the extent of 
law’s capacity to recognize the importance of religion for believers both in their private 
lives and as civic citizens.  Although the virtues of the rule of constitutional law are 
essentially functional, they are also moral-political virtues intending to enhance a range 
of goods valued in a pluralistic society.
340
  Brief discussions of six SCC cases, ranging 
from 1985 to 2009, relating to the scope of freedom of religion and equal religious 
citizenship follow in:  (a) Big M.
341
; (b) Edwards Books
342
;  (c) Amselem
343
; (d) 
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Multani
344
 ; (e) Hutterian Brethren
345
;  and(f)  A.C.
346
   
1. R v Big M Drug Mart [1985]1 SCR 295 [Big M]. 
 
Big M is a leading case on the Charter guarantee of freedom of religion.  In this 
case, the SCC struck down the Lord’s Day Act (LDA), a federal statute that bound all 
Christian and non-Christian Canadians to sectarian ideals and values rooted in Christian 
morality.
347
  For many centuries in England, Sunday closing law promoted the Christian 
Sunday Sabbath as a day to abstain from work for religious participation.  Sixteenth 
century English law obligated attendance in Church on Sundays and no business or 
labour was to be conducted.
348
  In later centuries, and in particular, in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
centuries, settlers in North America were required by law to attend church on Sundays 
and were discouraged from participating in non-religious activities such as entertainment, 
travelling and sports.
349
  Contraventions to prohibitions meant severe penalties.  The 
historical translation of Christian morality into positive law still persists.   
In Canada, until 1985, the LDA made it an offence punishable on summary 
conviction for anyone engaging in or carrying on business on Sunday.  The purpose of 
the LDA was to secure public observance of the Christian Sabbath but it also seemed to 
provide a uniform day of rest from labour for people of all denominations.
350
  Otherwise 
lawful, moral and normal activities of non-Christians carried out on Sundays were 
therefore illegal under the purpose of this Act.  This denial or right to work on Sunday on 
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grounds of public religious observance of the Christian Sabbath infringed upon the 
religious freedom of Canadians in general.  And cases challenging Sunday closing laws 
were already in place when the Charter came into force in 1982.   
a) Interpretation of public purpose of law in Big M 
 
In this 1985 case, Big M, the SCC found that the LDA had a religious purpose in 
forcing Sunday closing and was therefore unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court 
addressed, head-on, the fundamental issues raised by individual rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the Charter, as well as issues concerning legislative powers.  The main 
challenge in issue before the SCC, for the first time, was the interpretation of the 
fundamental freedoms protected by the Charter, the guarantee of "freedom of conscience 
and religion" entrenched in s. 2(a).  Section 2(a) in effect protects both religious belief 
and religious practice or observance.  The SCC laid the foundation, finally, of the judicial 
interpretation of religious freedom as guaranteed by the Charter.   
Although the Alberta Court of Appeal in this case dismissed the appeal of its 
Attorney General, the Court was divided on the interpretation of s. 2(a).  The strongly 
expressed positions of the dissenting justices at the Court of Appeal are reflective of the 
tensions and the difficulties of balancing liberal modernism and religious freedom in the 
current sociolegal context in Canada.  In dismissing the appeal from the Court of Appeal, 
Dickson, C.J., in narrating portions of Belzil, J. A.’s judgment, illustrates the conflict 
between minority and majority rights.  For instance, Belzil, J. A. states that the day of the 
week “regarded as holy by the great majority of Canadians is not inconsistent with the 
basic principles of democracy.  That is political reality.”351  On further assessing the 
reflections of the Court of Appeal, Dickson, C. J. states:  
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Mr. Justice Belzil said it was realistic to recognize that the Canadian nation is part 
of "Western" or "European" civilization, moulded in and impressed with Christian 
values and traditions, and that these remain a strong constituent element in the 
basic fabric of our society.  The judge quoted a passage from The Oxford 
Companion to Law (1980) expatiating on the extent of the influence of 
Christianity on our legal and social systems and then appears the cri du coeur 
central to the judgment at pp. 663-64:
 352
 
 
I do not believe that the political sponsors of the Charter intended to 
confer upon the courts the task of stripping away all vestiges of those 
values and traditions, and the courts should be most loath to assume that 
role.  With the Lord's Day Act eliminated, will not all reference in the 
statutes to Christmas, Easter, or Thanksgiving be next?  What of the use of 
the Gregorian Calendar?  Such interpretation would make of the Charter 
an instrument for the repression of the majority at the instance of every 
dissident and result in an amorphous, rootless and godless nation contrary 
to the recognition of the Supremacy of God declared in the preamble.  The 
"living tree" will wither if planted in sterilized soil. 
 
“Positive law had circumscribed freedom of religion so as to prevent the Lord's 
Day Act from breaching the guarantee in the Canadian Bill of Rights,”353   
 
In this majority decision, Dickson, C.J. also stated that “the protection of one 
religion and the concomitant non-protection of others, imports a disparate impact 
destructive of the religious freedom of society.”354  And in defining freedom of religion, 
he offered the following:
355
 
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such 
religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly 
and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief 
by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination.   
 
For Dickson C.J., it was important that due to the “spread of new beliefs” and the 
“changing religious allegiance”356 interpretation of the meaning and purpose of the 
specific guarantee of freedom of religion does not “overshoot the actual purpose of the 
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freedom in question and to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum and must 
therefore…be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophical and historical contexts.”357  In 
the post-Charter era, not only did this case lay down the foundations of religious freedom 
but it also provides courts with an explicit approach in the interpretation of religious 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.
358
   
b) Justification of the impact of law on religious rights in Big M 
 
One of the constitutional questions before the SCC was whether the LDA 
infringed the right to freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed in s. 2(a) in the 
Charter and was it also justified under s. 1 of the Charter.  The Supreme Court held that 
the LDA which prohibited the operation of a business and other commercial transactions 
on Sunday compelled religious practice contrary to s. 2(a) and could not be justified 
under s. 1.  Section 2(a) of the Charter would require the law to accommodate minority 
religions by according exemption for their practices only in cases where there is no 
compelling governmental interest to the contrary and as justified by s. 1 of the Charter.   
Restrictions on acts that are religious practices must be demonstrably justified by 
the government pursuant to s.1 of the Charter or must be shown to be incapable of 
accommodation without undue hardship in the statutory human rights context.  The 
commitment in Canadian human rights law to equal religious citizenship in a pluralistic 
society includes the right to engage in religious practices without interference.  For 
instance, if there is no evidence that accommodating the wish of the religious observer to 
take time off for religious Sabbath will not cause undue hardship on the employer, the 
believer has the right to the time off.  This reasoning constitutes the Canadian conception 
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of equal religious citizenship.  Without the ability to demand that neutral rules and 
policies be adjusted to meet their religious needs, persons of faith cannot participate 
equally in social and economic life.  The believer too recognizes that religious equality 
rights are not absolute; they will have to give way in the face of competing rights and 
interests particularly where the employer’s ability to run a business without incurring an 
undue expense in accommodating the religious needs of its employees is compromised. 
In this case, the SCC held that the LDA prohibited commercial activity for some 
on a Sunday and compromised the guarantee of freedom of religion in s. 2(a) of the 
Charter by historical purposes which compelled adherence to the Christian Sabbath.  The 
purpose was found to be invalid and could not be justified under s. 1.  The legislation was 
therefore struck down.
359
  Dickson C.J. stated: 
On the authorities and for the reasons outlined, the true purpose of the Lord's Day 
Act is to compel the observance of the Christian Sabbath and I find the Act, and 
especially s. 4 thereof, infringes upon the freedom of conscience and religion 
guaranteed in s. 2(a) of the Charter.
 360
     
 
His reasons included the fact that in binding all Canadians to a sectarian Christian ideal, 
the legislation did not have a secular purpose.  Rather, that purpose was an infringement 
of the freedom of religion of non-Christians because, by virtue of the guarantee of 
freedom of religion, “government may not coerce individuals to affirm a specific 
religious practice for a sectarian purpose.”361  The purpose was not compatible with s. 
2(a); it was religious, not secular.   
The object of legislation is critical if liberal rights that are guaranteed are to be 
protected.  The SCC emphasized that religious freedom could be violated by either the 
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purposes or the effects of laws or policies.  However, the purpose and effect of legislation 
are indivisible.
362
  In Big M, Dickson C.J. too opined that both purpose and effect are 
relevant in determining constitutionality where either the purpose or the effect of the law 
can invalidate legislation.  This concept of adverse effects discrimination is evident in 
Dickson C.J.’s comment in Big M that “…the equality necessary to support religious 
freedom does not require identical treatment of all religions…true equality may require 
differentiation in treatment.”363   
In its expansive conception of religious freedom that included protection for 
religious practices from direct or indirect coercive interference by the state, the court 
closely allied with the Charter’s commitments to religious equality in s. 15 and to the 
preservation and enhancement of Canada's multicultural heritage in s. 27.
364
   
c) Implication on constitutional protection of religion in Big M. 
 
Big M is a classic case of the SCC’s s.2(a) jurisprudence that describes a free 
society as one in which fundamental freedoms are ‘equally’ enjoyed.  The shift in 
jurisprudence since Big M, since 1980, is that religion has constitutional relevance in 
terms of an expression of human autonomy and choice.  Liberal law recognizes religion 
as personal choice.  In outlining the harm of Sunday closing legislation, Dickson, C.J. 
stated that the LDA creates “a climate hostile to and gives the appearance of 
discrimination against non-Christian Canadians.”365  He further stated that Canadian 
constitutionalism is committed to the ideal of “a truly free society…one which can 
accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and 
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codes of conduct.”366  An individual may be capable of reflecting upon and revising 
incrementally particular aspects of her/his worldview, but it may be difficult or 
impossible for her/him simply to discard and replace her/his most basic values and beliefs 
or to walk away from her/his religious community.  Religion can claim, within law, an 
autonomous expression of important sets of preferred tastes and chosen pursuits.  A 
necessary outgrowth of the good of freedom and autonomy is that to protect the ideal of 
religion is to protect the right of an individual to make choices about her/his spiritual life.   
In this case, Dickson, C. J. defined freedom of religion as “freedom from 
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious 
dogma.”367  The definition of freedom of religion offered by Dickson, C. J. does not fully 
explain the rationale of this freedom.  He made clear that s. 2(a) protects religious 
practices as well as religious beliefs within the constitutional right to freedom of religion 
of individual liberty to embrace and enjoy a chosen religious belief; the autonomous 
agent is supreme.  Protecting autonomy is the core element of religious liberty and 
autonomy and in this case is secured by ensuring an absence of coercion or restraint.
368
  
Religious beliefs, however, are deeply connected to other believers in faith-based 
communities and the very identity of the believer is shaped by the moral framework of 
her/his religious community.   
In a liberal modernity, religious adherents are free to follow the norms of their 
community yet, their values may clash with those of official law.  The freedom in s. 2(a) 
is explicitly the freedom of the individual, not, although it is connected to collective or 
associational freedoms of the community, the authority of the immediate or extended 
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family or of the faith community.  However, the freedom to act in accordance with 
religious beliefs is the most important means through which religious rights provide 
protection that goes beyond that provided by other fundamental freedoms. 
d) Freedom of religion and secularization in Big M. 
 
Dickson, C.J. added the proviso that freedom of religion would not protect 
minority religious groups in certain religious practices.  The entrenchment of freedom of 
religion in the Constitution promotes state secularization and the government must refrain 
from adopting laws or policies that favour one religion over another.  Any facilitation of 
religious life by the state has to be without discrimination in its treatment of different 
groups or belief systems.  In Big M., the SCC read the guarantee of freedom of religion as 
protecting freedom to follow one’s religious beliefs and practices, freedom from state 
imposition of religious precept and action, and the equal standing of all religious faiths; 
the lower court did not.  The SCC and the Court of Appeal were at opposite poles in the 
resolution of the conflict concerning freedom of religion.   
Although as stated earlier, Christianity is an embedded component of Canadian 
law, the LDA could not withstand a Charter challenge in this case.  Dickson, C.J. stated 
in this case that “the theological content of the legislation remains a subtle, and a 
constant, reminder to religious minorities within [Canada] of their differences with, and 
alienation from, the dominant religious culture.”369  However, even though the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the Charter guarantee of freedom of religion, and equal standing of all 
religious faiths, it omitted the political background of the relationship of the individual 
and the state.  Dickson, C. J. was concerned with the place of religious minorities; but 
while the court’s ruling challenged the status and authority of Christianity as the 
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dominant faith, it could not displace its dominance in society entirely.  The explanation 
for this would seem to be fear of “shifting variable[s]” in future jurisprudence that could 
create uncertainty in the law and the fact that no legislation would be safe from a revised 
judicial assessment of the purpose of the law; it would jeopardize the doctrine of stare 
decisis.  This is a clear case of the power that resides within the judiciary, as ultimate 
arbiters, to be able to manipulate state law by not only incorporating difference within the 
law but also by further entrenching within it the dominance of Christianity.  The law 
remains a slave to the singular purpose of liberal secular modernity even though variables 
within society point to plural indices. 
2. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v The Queen [1986] 2 SCR 713, 35 DLR (4th) 
1 (Edwards Books) 
 
This was another landmark Sunday-closing law case before the SCC, R. v. 
Edwards Books, wherein the Province of Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act was 
challenged by four Ontario retailers as they wished to open their businesses on Sundays 
and other holidays.
370
  The Ontario Act prohibited retail businesses to sell or offer to sell 
retail goods on a Sunday or on a holiday.
371
  In 1983, three of the four businesses were 
charged and convicted under s. 2 of the Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act.  At their 
appeal, the businesses invoked section 2(a) of the Charter.  Given the success in Big M., 
they challenged the constitutional validity of the Ontario Sunday closing legislation.  The 
SCC, in reviewing this case, agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal that the legislation 
had a secular purpose and was therefore valid.  The secular purpose was to provide 
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uniform holidays or pause days for retail workers and that there was no impact on 
religious practice.   
a) Interpretation of public purpose of law in Edwards Books 
 
In this case, there were at least three issues that were considered by the SCC:  was 
the Retail Business Holidays Act within provincial jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Constitutional Act, 1867?  Did the Retail Business Holidays Act violate ss. 2(a), 7 and 15 
of the Charter?  And if it did, was the violation justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter?  
Although the purpose of the law was secular, the court’s assessment of the effect of the 
law was found to limit freedom of religion, particularly as Sunday has historically been 
accepted as the common pause day for religious reasons.  The effect of the law actually 
would impose a burden on retailers whose religious beliefs required them to abstain from 
work on a day other than Sunday.  Even through the Ontario Act limited the Charter 
guarantee of freedom of religion, it was held to be justified under s. 1 and was therefore 
exempt.  The court found that the religious purpose did not render the exemption 
unconstitutional as it was open to the provincial legislature “to attempt to neutralize or 
minimize the adverse effects of otherwise valid provincial legislation on human rights 
such as freedom of religion.”372  The rule is that the purpose of a statute is paramount in 
assessing whether it does indeed violate a Charter guarantee.  The SCC concluded that 
“the constitution does not contemplate religion as a discrete ‘constitutional matter’ falling 
exclusively within either a federal or provincial class of subjects.”373  “The Act was 
within the provincial legislative competence.”374  The impact of the law on religion is not 
critical.  In that the intent of the Act is to provide a uniform day of rest, the Act was found 
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to have “secular inspiration” and did not abridge freedom of religion.  Any economic 
harm was supposedly due to religion. 
b) Justification of the impact of law on religious rights in Edwards Books 
 
In this case, it was found that “none of the retail stores…has established that it 
was open on Sunday for any purpose than to make money.”375  Dickson, C.J.C stated 
that:  
“The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that religious 
beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened.  …legislative or 
administrative action which increases the cost of practising or otherwise 
manifesting religious beliefs is not prohibited if the burden is trivial or 
insubstantial. …376 
 
The SCC also stated that part of the object of the legislation benefits retail 
employees so that a common weekly holiday is available and enjoyed by most of the 
community.  The practicality of Sunday as a pause day was significant but the impact on 
religious practice was inconsequential; the law was upheld as a reasonable limit that is 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.   
c) Implication on constitutional protection of religion in Edwards Books 
 
In the question of constitutional protection of non-Christian believers to conform 
to majoritarian religious dogma that requires Sunday closure for business, the court in 
Edwards Books considered that although “all coercive burdens on the exercise of 
religious beliefs are potentially within the ambit of s. 2(a)”377, “not every burden on 
religious practices is offensive to this constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion.”378  
The SCC stated that the state is “under no duty…to take affirmative action to eliminate 
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the natural costs of religious practice.”379  Retailers and consumers who observe days 
other than Sunday as a day to practice their religious tenets would face loss of business 
on days that they actually take as a pause day.  The constitutional guarantee of these 
retailers and consumers is indirectly coerced.   
d) Secularization and freedom of religion in Edwards Books 
 
According to Hogg, the observance of days of religious significance is a matter 
upon which attitudes will vary from one locality to another.
380
  Although the legislation 
in both, Edwards Books and Big M, concerned Sunday closing jurisprudence, the 
outcomes in each of the cases is different.  In Big M, the purpose of the federal legislation 
was found to be religious and therefore infringed upon the Charter guarantee of freedom 
of religion; it was struck down.  In Edwards, the purpose of the provincial prohibition 
was secular.  If there is a conflict between the federal Act and the provincial Act, an 
unconstitutional statute cannot render provincial legislation inoperative under an 
overriding doctrine.
381
  The impact of the law (intra vires the province or not) on religion 
is generally not critical.
382
  What is critical is the clearly outlined purpose of the 
legislation.  The purpose of the provincial Act is to ensure state interest. 
3. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem [2004] 2. S.C.R. 551 [Amselem]  
 
Amselem was based on a claim alleging infringement of freedom of religion under 
the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.
383
  In this case, Orthodox Jewish 
residents installed individual succahs—outdoor structures built by Orthodox Jews during 
the harvest festival of Succot—on the balconies of their apartments in an upscale part of 
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Montreal, Quebec.
384
  For those connected to the Jewish faith, this nine day festival is 
biblically mandated.  The condominium association demanded the removal of the 
succahs based on the bylaws that prohibited decorations on balconies but offered to set 
up a communal or collective succah in the gardens on the ground floor for religious 
observance.  The explanation given by Amselem was that a communal succah would 
cause extreme hardship with their religious observance, but a succah on their own 
balcony was integral to their personal religious beliefs.  Regulations agreed to by all 
owners explicitly set out the character of the neighbourhood as a condominium building. 
Mr. Amselem, however, defied the condominium, Syndicat Northcrest’s, regulations, and 
insisted on building this Succot on his balcony.  His neighbours raised various economic, 
security, and aesthetic concerns, including concerns about the way they wished to be 
perceived within the common areas by outsiders.  For Amselem, this activity was 
perfectly legitimate and appropriately circumscribed.  The association applied for a 
permanent injunction against succah construction on individual balconies.  The 
corporation’s application was granted by the Québec Superior Court, and this decision 
was affirmed by the province’s Court of Appeal. 
a) Interpretation of public purpose of law in Amselem 
 
At the SCC, the majority in this case found Amselem’s beliefs to be sincerely 
held indicating that this SCC judgment is firmly grounded in public law notions of 
individual rights which include religious freedoms.  Individual self-fulfillment of a 
religious person with “deeply held personal convictions or beliefs385” took precedence 
over the complaint of nuisance regarding the succah and this complaint was found to be 
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unreasonable.  In this SCC judgment concerning freedom of religion, the liberal 
individual is central.  At the same time, the majority decision did not characterize the 
narrative as one of association of religious or cultural groups.  In this case, Iacobucci, J. 
gave the example of a previous freedom-of-religion case, R. v. Jones, wherein La Forest 
J. stated that the court may not question the validity of a religious belief regardless of the 
quantity of claimants that may share that belief.
386
  He also cited the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Burger, CJ, in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division that 
“courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”387  In this case, freedom of religion, 
the majority asserted “revolves around the notion of personal choice and individual 
autonomy and freedom.”388  In liberal democratic and secular terms, the individual 
condominium owner is characteristically understood as the individual condo owner; the 
law only understands religion as a product of choice, a choice connected to the liberty 
and autonomy of the individual. 
In the dissenting judgment of Justice Bastarache in this case, the rights of 
individual neighbours were also balanced as individual rights against each other.  He also 
argued that the law must take cognizance not only of the claimants’ religious interests but 
also of the other owners’ property rights:  “…not only is there a conflict between the right 
to freedom of religion and property rights, but the right to freedom of religion is also in 
conflict with the right to life and personal security, and with contractual rights.”389   
b) Justification of the impact of law on religious rights in Amselem 
 
In this case the SCC stated that, “claimants seeking to invoke freedom of religion 
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should not need to prove the objective validity of their beliefs”390; sincerity of belief is 
not the same as validity of belief.  The majority in this case stated, per Iacoboucci, J.
391
  
In my view, when courts undertake the task of analysing religious doctrine in 
order to determine the truth or falsity of a contentious matter of religious law, or 
when courts attempt to define the very concept of religious "obligation", as has 
been suggested in the courts below, they enter forbidden domain.  It is not within 
the expertise and purview of secular courts to adjudicate questions of religious 
doctrine.  
 
Jurisprudence is limited in its treatment of religion.  
The Supreme Court in this majority decision drew up a definition of freedom of 
religion under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms mindful of the 
overlap with section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter.
392
   In so doing, the Court attempted 
to define religion itself.   
In order to define religious freedom, we must first ask ourselves what we mean by 
"religion". While it is perhaps not possible to define religion precisely, some outer 
definition is useful since only beliefs, convictions and practices rooted in religion, 
as opposed to those that are secular, socially based or conscientiously held, are 
protected by the guarantee of freedom of religion.  Defined broadly, religion 
typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship.  
Religion also tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling 
power.  In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions 
or beliefs connected to an individual's spiritual faith and integrally linked to one's 
self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to 
foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual 
faith.
393
 
 
Although this may seem to be an expansive definition of religion, it is important 
to note that the definition of religious practices as protected under s. 2(a) is still defined 
in individualist terms.   
c) Implications on constitutional protection of religion in Amselem 
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In Amselem, the Supreme Court somewhat weakened the symbolic boundary 
between the public and the private.  The test that law required the truth of the sincerity of 
belief of the liberal individual in religion was satisfactory in meeting the individualist 
definition of religion as explained by the principled basis for the protection of religion.  
However, both, validity and sincerity of belief are central facets of the code of conduct 
for a vast majority of believers.  Additionally, the SCC recognizes that it has no capacity 
to adjudicate questions of religious doctrine.  But for now, Canadian law understands 
religion as central to individual autonomy and religious commitment only as a conscious 
preference.  However, law can understand religion.  For Berger, law is in effect asserting 
something about the true nature of that which it is protecting only.
394
  And for Beaman, 
religion is like law because the way in which it is written and the way it is lived are two 
different phenomena making it very difficult to define religion for the purpose of 
determining religious freedom.
395
   
d) Secularization and of freedom of religion in Amselem 
 
In Amselem, the finding that religion encompasses a right to religious practices if 
the individual has a sincere belief does not take into consideration whether the practice 
was needed according to religious practice. The court simply has to believe the individual 
that his/her practice is connected to religion.  In this case, the court felt that religious 
beliefs are indecisive and individual “beliefs and observances evolve and change over 
time.”396  
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The Supreme Court’s focus on the individual pays full respect to the person 
driven by internal faith and religious obligation and with respect to his private property.  
However, the consequences of the judgment of the majority in the case go beyond 
Amselem and reshape membership both in a religious community and in the community 
of the co-owners and residents of the condominium.  The residents must readjust their 
understanding of what give-and-take means and the ongoing conversation among co-
owners of the building is thus reframed.  Succah structures, for ten days of the year, are 
relabelled normal or reasonable interference with condominium owners’ enjoyment of 
their spaces.  The Jewish holiday of Succot and its implications for celebrants and the 
people who live next to them are now in a shared experience of these structures in their 
neighbourhoods for ten days a year; it is possible to rezone religious space and time by 
positive law in the minds of the Canadian citizenry.   
Berger too confirms that the separation between religion and law is “artificial,” 
where law is informed by the political culture of liberalism and lacking a fluid or 
complex understanding of religion.
397
  Religion cannot be separated from other practices 
of everyday life, culturally, legally, politically, medically and so on.   
4. Multani  v Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [Multani]  
 
The difficulty of securing rights to equal religious citizenship is illustrated in the 
SCC case of Multani, which concerned the ability of a twelve-year-old Orthodox Sikh 
student to carry his kirpan (dagger with a metal blade) on school property—his religion 
requires that a kirpan has to be worn at all times.  In Multani, the Court found freedom of 
religion should protect a non-violent Sikh student's right to wear a kirpan in school.  This 
case began in 2001 when the kirpan of Gurbaj Singh Multani, the Sikh student, dropped 
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to the ground in the schoolyard of the public school he was attending.  Recent events had 
heightened school security in Montreal public schools and this kirpan event was 
exacerbated by religious fears post 9/11.  The event triggered a strong reaction from 
parents, teachers, and administrators.  The school board council of commissioners 
decided that carrying of kirpans violated the school’s no-weapons policy.  This policy 
infringed upon the religious tenets of Multani’s faith.   
Multani’s rights were vindicated at trial at the Quebec Superior Court, but the 
Quebec Court of Appeal found that the school board, “a creature of statute [that] derives 
all its powers from statute,”398 did not have to accommodate Multani’s religious practices 
because the toleration of any security risks in schools would constitute “undue hardship.”  
There had not been any reported incidents of school violence involving kirpans, and the 
boy in question had no record of disciplinary problems.  Sikh students were, after this 
Quebec Court of Appeal judgment, forced to choose between the tenets of their faith and 
attendance at public schools; in effect, Sikh students were to abandon their faith and in 
order to become full members of Canadian society they had to alienate themselves from 
their own.  This would now be a precedent in other Canadian environments.  The matter 
was then appealed to the SCC.   
a) Interpretation of public purpose in Multani 
 
An issue that the SCC was required to consider was whether the school board's 
decision, which infringed the plaintiff's s. 2(a) rights, was justified under s. 1 of the 
Charter.  The uneasy relationship of religious accommodation and religious freedom is 
illustrated in this appeal to the SCC.  The school regulation prevented the student, 
Multani, from acting on a sincere religious belief and the regulation contravened s. 2(a) 
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of the Charter.  Justice Charron, for the majority, found that absolute prohibition (no 
weapons policy in schools) was not justified and the minimal risk to school safety posed 
by wearing the kirpan could be managed by the school.  An absolute prohibition was out 
of proportion to the small risk posed by the wearing of the kirpan and “would stifle the 
promotion of values such as multiculturalism, diversity, and the development of an 
educational culture respectful of the rights of others.”399  She held that this prohibition on 
weapons was too broad to satisfy the minimum impairment branch of the Oakes test.
400
  
But in her attempt for reasonable accommodation, Charron, J. limited the student’s 
freedom of religion by ordering that the kirpan be kept in a wooden sheath and be sewn 
into the student’s clothing so that it could not be easily removed.  Justice Charron also 
accepted and seemed to agree with the lower court decisions upholding an absolute 
prohibition of the kirpan in aircrafts and even in courtrooms as these two environments 
would justify “a different level of safety.”401 Although the Supreme Court in this case 
was divided on the question of whether a state obligation to accommodate religious 
believers is sufficiently strict an obligation to be encompassed by the justificatory 
analysis of freedom of religion under s. 1
402
 of the Charter, it held unanimously that the 
regulation infringed the student’s freedom of religion.   
b) Justification of the impact of law on Multani 
 
According to Charron, J., an individual must show that he or she sincerely 
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believes that a certain belief or practice is required by his or her religion.
403
  In Multani, 
Singh was required to show that he sincerely believes that his faith requires him at all 
times to wear a kirpan made of metal.  She notes, from the evidence that: 
… the Sikh religion teaches pacifism and encourages respect for other religions, 
that the kirpan must be worn at all times, even in bed, that it must not be used as a 
weapon to hurt anyone, and that Gurbaj Singh's refusal to wear a symbolic kirpan 
made of a material other than metal is based on a reasonable religiously motivated 
interpretation.
404
 
 
Regardless of its moral validity, as a legal principle, freedom of religion serves as an 
authoritative source of political power granting powers to institutions and individuals.  It 
can also coerce the same institutions and individuals to refrain from violating the 
principle of freedom of religion.  In that the operation of freedom of religion requires 
justification within the domain of political morality, the liberal theory excludes the 
plausibility of political justification of religious doctrine; political justification must be 
based on reasons accessible to all reasonable persons within the polity.
405
  “What we 
need”, going back to Parekh, “is a liberal theory of multiculturalism” for a co-existence 
of indifference through policies that engage, dialogue and learn, and care for each 
other.
406
  
The importance of freedom of religion by the SCC is further stated by Charron, J. 
She reproduced Dickson, C. J.’s statements in Big M. in terms of the right to choice of 
religious beliefs and to the ability to fully practice these ideals openly.
407
  She quotes 
from Big M: 
Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public 
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safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, 
no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience. 
408
  
 
And in reproducing from Amselem, Charron J. states that “it was explained in Amselem 
that freedom of religion consists: 
... of the freedom to undertake practices and harbour beliefs, having a nexus with 
religion, in which an individual demonstrates he or she sincerely believes or is 
sincerely undertaking in order to connect with the divine or as a function of his or 
her spiritual faith, irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required 
by official religious dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious 
officials.
409
 
 
Charron, J, quotes further from Big M: 
... With the Charter, it has become the right of every Canadian to work out for 
himself or herself what his or her religious obligations, if any, should be and it is 
not for the state to dictate otherwise.
410
  
 
However, in this case—as opposed to the case of Big M, legislation was found to be 
unconstitutional on its face because it violated the Charter right to freedom of religion 
and it could not be saved under s. 1 of the Charter.  Although freedom of religion was 
accommodated there was no full liberty.  Freedom of religion in Canada is a principle 
that asserts its own validity, as a moral principle and as a legal principle.   
c) Implication on the constitutional protection of religion in Multani 
 
Singh’s constitutional rights were broadly well-established some years earlier 
pursuant to previous jurisprudence, namely, Big M and Amselem.  Despite the strong 
support of the SCC for equal religious citizenship, constitutional/state restriction on 
fundamental freedoms under s. 1 remains dominant.  The appellant had to bear a time 
consuming, costly court battle to secure the rights to which he was clearly entitled.
411
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Multani, at an impressionable young age, also suffered prolonged agonizing negative 
attention from numerous Canadian citizens who were ignorant of his rights.  Neutral rules 
need to be adjusted to accommodate religious practices.  The duty to accommodate—
represented as the state’s obligation to facilitate the maintenance of religious pluralism— 
is an idea familiar to human rights law in the context of employment.
412
  This was noted 
in the minority judgment in Multani.  Employers are required to take into account 
religious difference and to accommodate religious preferences.  But accommodation in 
the presence of pluralism is assimilationist.   
5. Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 [Hutterian 
Brethren]  
  
 The Colony of Hutterian Brethren in the Province of Alberta sincerely believed 
that their faith-based Second Commandment prohibited them from having their 
photograph willingly taken as this seriously violated religious belief and would be akin to 
“sinful” behaviour.  However, specific regulations in each province in Canada require 
that all persons who drive motor vehicles on Canadian motorways hold a driver’s licence 
with a photo-identification; Alberta is no exception.  In Alberta, before 1974, a Condition 
Code G license, a non-photo driver’s licence, was granted at the registrar’s discretion, 
under the Traffic Safety Act, to those who objected to their photographs being taken on 
religious grounds.
413
  This Colony carries on business as a rural self-sufficient religious 
commune and claimed that if their members could not obtain drivers’ licenses their 
communal lifestyle and survival would be threatened.   
In 2003, the Province of Alberta amended its Traffic Safety Act and adopted a new 
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regulation under this Act making photo requirement universal.  The objective and 
therefore the interest of the province lay in a new universal facial recognition data bank 
that would reduce the risk of identity theft associated with photo-identification.  The 
photos were to be deposited in the province’s facial recognition data bank for quick 
computer access for this governmental fraud control purpose.  The Colony therefore 
proposed what they believed to be an alternative to the functionality of the control system 
by requesting that they be allowed drivers’ licences marked “Not to be used for 
identification purposes.”   
The Colony’s proposal was denied; they challenged the constitutionality of 
Alberta’s newly enacted regulation alleging an unjustifiable breach of their religious 
freedom in a free and democratic society.  At this point, there were 450 Condition Code 
G licences in Alberta, 56 percent of which were held by members of the Hutterian 
Brethren Colony.  Intra-Province of Alberta, both levels of courts held that there was 
infringement of s. 2(a) and that this infringement upon freedom of religion was not 
justified under s.1.  On appeal by the Government of Alberta, the SCC upheld the 
regulation.   
a) Interpretation of public purpose in Hutterian Brethren  
 
After a six-year court battle, the Colony was not successful in persuading the SCC 
that the impugned regulation was not justified in a free and democratic society.  
McLachlin C.J. C. (Binnie, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ concurring) held that the 
regulation was justified under s.1 of the Charter.  LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ dissented.  
The limiting regulation was found to be constitutional on this narrow, four to three, 
decision and the appeal was allowed.  The majority decision per Mclaughlin held that the 
127 
 
universal photo requirement was rationally connected to the objective of the province, it 
minimally impaired s. 2(a) right and that it was justified.  The SCC proceeded only on the 
justification test under s. 1.  Therefore the validity of the regulation becomes 
questionable.  The question before the courts was whether the vehicle control regulation 
infringed upon freedom of religion of the Colony; did the universal photo requirement 
infringe on s. 2 (a) of the Charter?  If so, was the infringement justified under s. 1 of the 
Charter?  Within the justification is the limit prescribed by law? Is the purpose for which 
the limit is imposed pressing and substantial?  Is the means by which the goal is furthered 
proportionate?    
b) Justification of impact of law on religious rights in Hutterian Brethren 
 
In this case, Mclaughlin C.J.C. was hesitant to use s. 2(a) to transform its 
supposed neutrality based on guaranteed secular principles and the principles of 
universality.  She explained that freedom of religion poses specific challenges because of 
the “broad scope of the Charter guarantee” and that: 
Much of the regulation of a modern state could be claimed by various individuals 
to have a more than trivial impact on a sincerely held religious belief.  Giving 
effect to each of their religious claims could seriously undermine the universality 
of many regulatory programs, including the attempt to reduce abuse of driver’s 
licences at issue here, to the overall detriment of the community.
414
  
 
And as the legislation was challenged as unconstitutional the court had to determine 
whether it falls within “a range of reasonable alternatives.”415 Per McLaughlin: 
Where a complex regulatory response to a social problem is challenged, courts 
will generally take a more deferential posture throughout the s.1 analysis than 
they will when the impugned measure is a penal statute directly threatening the 
liberty of the accused. … The bar of constitutionality must not be set so high that 
responsible, creative solutions to difficult problems would be threatened.
416
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McLaghlin C.J.C. distinguished the reasonable accommodation analysis in Multani on 
which the lower courts in this case had relied on in their assessment of minimal 
impairment, and in their analysis under a s.1 justification.  Is it legislation that is at issue 
or is it statutory discretion that is at issue?  It is understood that for validity of a law of 
general application, government has to show that the measure: (a) is rationally connected 
to a pressing and substantial goal; (b) minimally impairs the right in s. 2(a); and (c) is 
proportional in its effects.
417
  According to McLaughlin, C.J.C., a s.1 analysis is crucial 
where the validity of a law is at stake, but a reasonable accommodation analysis simply 
addresses an alleged violation by the government or its administration, of a Charter 
claim.
418
  For McLaughlin, "reasonable accommodation is not an appropriate substitute 
for a proper s.1 analysis” based on her methodology of Oakes.  The SCC in this case 
redefined the Oakes test.  She explains that when a law which has passed through all the 
rigours of the Oakes proportionality test—pressing goal, rational connection and 
minimum impairment—it could fail at the final inquiry of proportionality of effects.  
The answer lies in the fact that the first three stages of Oakes are anchored in an 
assessment of the law’s purpose.  Only the fourth branch takes full account of the 
“severity of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups.”419 
 
Whereas the rational connection test and the least harmful measure test are 
essentially determined against the background of the proper objective, and 
are derived from the need to realize it, the test of proportionality (stricto 
sensu) examines whether the realization of this proper objective is 
commensurate with the deleterious effect upon the human right. . . .It 
requires placing colliding values and interests side by side and balancing 
them according to their weight.  
 
In assessing the Hutterians’ proposed alternative in the context of the minimum 
                                                 
417
 CCL supra note 2. 
418
 Hutterian Brethren supra note 345 at para 66 and 67. 
419
 Ibid. at para 76. 
129 
 
impairment test, McLaughlin C.J.C. found that it would "compromise the Province's goal 
of minimizing the risk of misuse of driver's licences for identity theft."
420
   
However, in dissenting, Abella, Fish and LeBel, JJs agreed that the impugned 
regulation was not proportionate and should be struck down.  Abella, J. reasoned that the 
burden on the government, of demonstrating infringement of religion, was not justified 
under s.1; in terms of deleterious effects, the regulation seriously harms the small 
Colony’s religious rights and threatens their autonomous ability to maintain their 
communal way of life.  She felt that it constituted an indirect form of coercion leaving the 
Colony members having to make difficult choices concerning religious tenets.  Abella, 
J’s reasoning is that the law does not have to fail at the minimal impairment stage 
because the proportionality test does not end here; her reasoning is more consonant with 
claimants’ rights in Multani and Amselem wherein government inquiry into the sincerity 
of religious beliefs was restricted. 
When Abella J states that in her opinion "the government has not discharged its 
evidentiary burden or demonstrated that the salutary effects in these circumstances are…a 
web of speculation,"
421
 and adds that there is no evidence “from the government to 
suggest that…for 29 years…an exemption to the photo requirement [has] caused any 
harm at all to the integrity of the licensing system”, the dominance of political objectives 
become apparent.  To Abella, J., the basis for determining the exemption is no longer 
feasible.  She finds the impugned regulation is a form of indirect coercion that places the 
Colony “in an untenable position of having to choose between compliance with their 
religious beliefs or giving up their self-sufficiency of their community…[and their] 
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historically preserved…autonomy...”422   
LeBel, J in dissenting also, states that “courts must weigh the purpose against the 
extent of the infringement.”423  He also states that McLaughlin C.J.C.’s approach to 
minimal impairment “would severely restrict the ambit of court review of government 
action and would reduce it to an analysis of the alignment of means with purposes.”424  
How much flexibility does the court have over the effect of government objective when 
assessing the alternative proposed by the Colony?  And are citizens with different criteria 
in the conduct of life to be discouraged from formulating novel alternatives?  It seems 
that with the exception of Big M in freedom of religion jurisprudence, legislative 
objective remains firmly installed.   
c) Implications on constitutional protection of religion in Hutterian 
Brethren 
 
In the s.1 analysis of proportionality in this case—balancing between the 
deleterious and salutary effects of the purpose of the impugned regulation on religious 
rights—the objective of the regulations prescribed by law was given more significance.  
The alternative suggested by the Colony was discarded as illegitimate.  But exactly how 
compromised is this particular government goal in general?  In the balance, the effects on 
the overall system concerned a very small isolated group without a photograph in their 
driving licences; the Colony could have just been given an exemption without much 
impact on the system or legislative schemes.  The impact on the Colony was significant.  
Are there less harmful ways of achieving government or legislative goal?   
Interaction that is based on principles of secularization and democratization when 
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legitimated by authority that is anchored in the politics of legalism, tend to delegitimize 
evidence of community practice, historical precepts and observance, and practice of 
religion, all of which are significant to the lifeworld of a plurality of citizens.  Is the 
objective important enough to limit the Charter guarantee? In the balance, the mal effects 
of the infringement of the regulation by a very small, vulnerable group of people on 
society are significantly less than the mal effects on the colony itself in the infringement 
of their Charter right to freedom of religion under s. 2(a).   
6. A.C. v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30 
[A.C.]425   
 
The focus of this case is on a devout minor-mature Jehovah’s Witness’—A.C.’s—
right to refuse blood transfusion to which she herself objects.  A.C., a girl aged fourteen 
years and ten months, was hospitalized for lower gastrointestinal inflammation and 
bleeding caused by Crohn’s disease.426  It was medically determined that her hemoglobin 
count was dangerously low and that she urgently needed blood transfusion.  Jehovah’s 
Witnesses interpret the bible to prohibit any form of ingestion of blood.  A.C. had signed 
written instructions forbidding transfusion of blood to her under any circumstances.  She 
particularly refused receipt of blood after the advice of her doctor that internal bleeding 
had created an imminent, serious risk to her health and perhaps her life.  
Despite the fact that a psychiatric assessment at the hospital deemed A.C. to have 
the capacity to make medical decisions relating to herself, the Director of Child and 
Family Services of Manitoba apprehended her as a child in need of protection, and sought 
a treatment order from the court under s. 25(8) of the Manitoba Child and Family 
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Services Act (CFSA),
427
 by which the court may authorize treatment that it considers to be 
in the child’s “best interests” if the child is under the age of 16 and when a life is at risk.  
And s. 25(9) of the same Act presumes that the “best interests” of a child 16 or over will 
be most effectively promoted by allowing the child’s views to be determinative, unless it 
can be shown that the child does not understand the decision or appreciate its 
consequences; no such presumption existed here.  However, the applications judge 
ordered that A.C. receive blood transfusions, after concluding that when a child is under 
16, there are no legislated restrictions of authority on the court’s ability to order medical 
treatment in the child’s “best interests.” A treatment involving blood transfusion was 
administered to A.C.  A.C. and her parents appealed the order arguing that the legislation 
(Manitoba CFSA) was unconstitutional because it unjustifiably infringed a variety of 
A.C.’s rights under ss. 2(a), 7, and 15 of the Charter.  
a) Interpretation of public purpose of law in A.C. 
 
The question before the courts was:  What is the legitimacy of Charter guarantees 
under freedom of religion, security of person and equality?  Section 7 concerned the 
Charter rights of liberty and security of person and fundamental justice wherein 
provincial family services apprehended and authorized medical treatment under the 
legislative power of s. 25(8) and contrary to the child’s wishes and consent and personal 
moral conviction, and voluntary compliance.  Section 2(a) concerned Charter rights of 
freedom to practice religion in Canada and in this case the faith-based practice of a minor 
Jehovah’s Witness under the age of 16 having a right to reject blood transfusion despite 
dire consequences and the fact that coercion had already occurred in the forced 
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administration of blood and her ability to understand relevant information or 
consequences of treatment decision under the impugned law.  Section 15 of the Charter 
concerned equality rights, in this case, of discrimination on the basis of being under the 
age of 16 years and whose maturity status on the capacity—in effect her level of 
understanding—to refuse blood transfusions was questioned.  The Manitoba Court of 
Appeal unanimously upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions and 
the treatment order of the applications judge.  A further appeal of the imposed transfusion 
to the SCC was dismissed.    
At the SCC, the appeal was dismissed and ss. 25(8) and 25(9) of the Manitoba 
CFSA were upheld as constitutional in a six to one decision; Binnie J dissented.  Four 
SCC judges—Abella, LeBel, Deschamps and Charron JJ—found that there was no 
violation of her freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, two judges—McLachlin 
C.J and Rothstein J—found that a violation of s. 2(a) did occur but was justified under s.1 
of the Charter, and in dissenting, Binnie J found that the violation of A.C.’s s. 2(a) rights 
was unjustified and that s.25 of the CFSA was unconstitutional.   
In assessing whether A.C. was acting without restraint and with a mature 
understanding of the consequences of refusing blood transfusion, the majority judgment 
delivered by Abella J did consider the child’s religious heritage and the ‘truth’ and depth 
of her core values and beliefs.  However, the paramount aim of the SCC was to determine 
the statutory “best interests” of the child under s. 25(8) of the Manitoba CFSA.  After a 
comprehensive evaluation by the SCC of “the maturity of the adolescent...to determine 
whether … her decision is a genuinely independent one” that reflects understanding and 
the serious consequences of her decision, the SCC felt that a young person’s religious 
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wishes could be respected only “as his or her maturity increases in a proportionate 
response both to the young person’s religious rights and the protective goals of s. 25(8).” 
428
 The three sets of reasoning at the SCC are summarized here: 
b) Justification of the impact of law on religion 
 
I. Four out of Seven SCC Judges found no Violation of s. 2(a). 
 
In this case, the majority at the SCC found that the constitutional balance was 
“appropriate” between achieving the protective legislative goal while at the same time 
respecting the right of mature adolescents to participate meaningfully in decisions 
relating to their medical treatment.
429
  A.C. in effect became a child claimant without 
legislative capacity to exert her autonomous rights, in this case freedom of religion.  In its 
“careful” application of the “best interests” standard, the majority found that although the 
legislative scheme created by ss. 25(8) and 25(9) of the CFSA did impose differential 
treatment on the basis of age, it did not infringe ss. 7, 15 or 2(a) of the Charter because it 
is neither arbitrary, discriminatory, nor violative of religious freedom.  Per Abella J:
430
    
The question is whether the statutory scheme strikes a constitutional balance 
between what the law has consistently seen as an individual’s fundamental right 
to autonomous decision-making in connection with his or her body and the law’s 
equally persistent attempts to protect vulnerable children from harm.  This 
requires examining the legislative scheme, the common law of medical decision-
making both for adults and minors, a comparative review of international 
jurisprudence, and relevant and social scientific and legal literature.  The 
observations that emerge from this review will inform the considered analysis.  
 
Global modern liberal secular rationale prevailed.  In Canada, State goals tend to be 
paramount.  
II. Two SCC judges concurred with the majority decision but found there was 
violation of s. 2(a) that was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. 
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In concurring with the majority decision, McLachlin C.J, and Rothstein, J 
concluded that the legislative authorization to override A.C.’s sincere religious belief and 
objection to transfusion constituted an infringement of her right to religious freedom 
guaranteed by s. 2(a) of the Charter but they also found that the authorization of 
treatment by the applications judge was justified under s.1 of the Charter.  They did not 
dispute “that A.C. possessed a sincere religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness against 
receiving blood products and transfusions.”431  McLachlin, C.J. referenced Amselem 
wherein Bastarache J. stated that:  
…religion is a system of beliefs and practices based on certain religious precepts. 
A nexus between personal beliefs and the religion's precepts must therefore be 
established….  Connecting freedom of religion to precepts provides a basis for 
establishing objectively whether the fundamental right…has been violated….a 
practice must be connected with the religion…the connection must be objectively 
identifiable.
432
  
 
Mclaughlin further states that this is clearly more than a trivial interference with her 
“right to manifest beliefs and practices.”433  She also referenced Dickson C.J. in R. v. Big 
M:  
Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint.  
If a person is compelled by the state or the will of another to a course of action or 
inaction which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is not acting of his own 
volition and he cannot be said to be truly free. One of the major purposes of the 
Charter is to protect, within reason, from compulsion or restraint.  Coercion 
includes not only such blatant forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or 
refrain from acting on pain of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of 
control which determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to 
others.  Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of coercion and 
constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices.  Freedom means that, 
subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, 
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced 
to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.
434
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The majority in this case found infringement to be justified under s.1 of the Charter and 
religious belief could not alter the essential nature of the claim for absolute personal 
autonomy and of the medical intervention for the preservation of life.   
 Again, according to McLachlin, C.J., when s. 25(8) is considered in light of s. 
2(a) of the Charter, the limit on religious practice imposed by this legislation is justified 
under s.1 as a proportionate limit on the right; the life of the minor has to be ensured and 
courts have the discretion to order treatment after consideration of all relevant 
circumstances.
435
  In this case the impugned provisions of the Manitoba CFSA deprived 
A.C. of full decision-making authority as to her firm religious beliefs.  McLachlin stated 
that “in this case, the s. 7 and s. 2(a) claims merge…”436 She also rejected the assumption 
that s. 7 is absolute and trumps all other values; she argued that the treatment order also 
violated s.7.
437
  McLachlin C. J. and Rothstein, J. affirmed the constitutionality of ss. 
25(8) and 25(9) of the CFSA but awarded costs to A.C. throughout.  State action, 
coercion, was at the direction of the judiciary. 
But although the court acknowledged that there was infringement of A.C.’s s. 2(a) 
rights at the justification stage, the principles of fundamental justice were found to be a 
reasonable limit on A.C.’s rights and were allowed to override the sanctity of religious 
values and free participation in deeply held beliefs.   
III. Binnie J.’s dissenting judgment that s. 2(a) was violated by the legislative 
scheme  
 
In dissenting, Binnie J. stated that:  
…the Charter enshrines in our highest law the liberty and independence of a 
mature individual to make life’s most important choices free of government 
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intervention, provided there is no countervailing social interest of overriding 
importance.
438
   
 
Binnie J. reiterates that although judges would instinctively give priority to the sanctity of 
life, for Jehovah’s Witnesses, refusing blood transfusions despite life threatening 
situations is fundamental to their religious convictions.
439
 However, the state, for Binnie 
J., is not justified in taking away the autonomy of individuals, even those under 16 years 
old; given the equality rights under ss. 2(a) and 7 of the Charter if a mature minor does in 
fact understand the nature and seriousness of her medical condition and is mature enough 
to appreciate the consequences of refusing consent to treatment, the young person has the 
capacity to make the treatment decision, “not just to have “input” into a judge’s 
consideration of what the judge believes to be the young person’s best interests.”440  
Binnie J. also references Dickson, J. in the Big M case to emphasize that s. 2(a) covers 
religious practices as well as religious beliefs.
441
  He finds that A.C.’s belief was “sincere 
as must be established by an s. 2(a) claimant.   
In stressing the sincerity and the importance of freedom of religion, he refers to 
Amselem and Multani, the latter quoted here per Charron, J: 
What an individual must do is show that he or she sincerely believes that a certain 
belief or practice is required by his or her religion. The religious belief must be 
asserted in good faith and must not be fictitious, capricious or an artifice 
(Amselem, at para. 52).  In assessing the sincerity of the belief, a court must take 
into account, inter alia, the credibility of the testimony of the person asserting the 
particular belief and the consistency of the belief with his or her other current 
religious practices (Amselem, at para. 53).
442
 
 
To deny the truth of capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment violates A.C.’s 
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“freedom of religion and her right not to be deprived of her liberty or security of person 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”443  Binnie J. further 
states that the “interference with A.C.’s religious conscience far exceeded the “non-
trivial” threshold established in Amselem, and it was rightly conceded that s. 25…violated 
s. 2(a), subject to s. 1 defence advanced by the government.
444
 According to Binnie, J., 
the legislative objective could not justify the limiting of freedom of religion under s. 1 
indicating that the purpose of the law contradicts the Charter right.   
a) Implication on the constitutional protection of religion in A.C. 
 
In the question of refusing blood transfusion in the face of a threat to life of a 
minor as part of sincere religious observation (or be plagued with feelings of being 
damned for eternity), how strong is the claim for accommodation of s. 2(a) rights?  The 
justification of the limiting law lies in the purpose of the freedom itself; the law has to 
fulfil its legislated function in guiding human conduct.  Also an integral purpose of 
fundamental freedoms is the preservation of life and courts are empowered to protect life.  
Section 1 requires that the policy of the legislation be balanced against the policy of the 
Charter.
445
  However, courts can uphold legislation only under s.1 of the Charter and 
they will therefore strive to find that s.1 is satisfied.
446
  Limits are justifiable where the 
freedom is being engaged to restrict the circumstances in which one may be convinced to 
change one’s belief and to protect certain public spaces as neutral zones in moral contests 
particularly those involving the preservation of life.  In this moral debate, the will of the 
majority prevailed.  But proportionality is at the discretion of the reviewing judge/body.  
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In weighing proportionality in this case between the deleterious and the salutary effects, 
the deleterious effects are dominant. Hogg states that: 
…the scope of the judicial review depends upon:  a stringent standard of 
justification coupled with a purposive interpretation of rights against a relaxed 
standard of justification coupled with a broad interpretation of rights.”447   
 
And he further states that to be able to maintain a meaningful balancing process, “judicial 
review will become even more unpredictable than it is now [and]…the purposive 
approach will usually have the effect of narrowing the right…[and]…generous approach 
is subordinate to purpose.”448   The impact of legislated limitations on the democratic 
process is already vague.  How do growing normative bases that are plural continue to 
survive or at least co-exist? 
Again, in this case, there is a difference in the characterization of the purpose of 
the law in the three groups of decisions.  In each instance, although the objectives of the 
law are in concert with the values of a free and democratic society, these objectives are 
related to the infringement of a plurality of Charter rights that go well beyond a 
determination of the maturity of a mature minor which in turn is directly related to 
freedom of religion and illiberal ideals.   
b) Secularization and freedom of religion in A.C. 
 
In the majority decision, although the conscience or religious expression was not 
significantly interfered with, the democratic process was not allowed to expand to include 
an ‘other’ set of beliefs with openness.  The legislative integrity is directly at odds with 
the value of pluralism and the commitment of a liberal state to respect reasonable 
pluralism.  Again, the outcomes of jurisprudence concerning freedom of conscience and 
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religion almost never change sincerely held religious beliefs and values.  In that it is by 
an independent jurisdictional sphere arising from the concept of the separation of church 
and state—the process of secularization—that freedom of religion is tied up with state 
law accommodation, state law does not recognize religion.  Religious believers however, 
see themselves not in terms of individual rights claimants, but in terms of community 
rights.  Faith is a collective activity and the key right is self-government.  The believer 
“categorically disregards elementary self-interest and accepts martyrdom” rather than 
transgress religious tenets.
449
  Limit to religious accommodation has to account also for 
respect for different perspectives as part of legislated freedom of religion.  Different 
social situations may warrant changes in the purpose of the law.  In a pluralistic society 
the law has to be able to meet diverse moralities.  Hogg points out that significant 
variations in individual beliefs do exist within a particular religion be it Christianity, 
Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and many others.  And change is costly morally, politically 
and economically.  The democratic process, the judiciary and subsequent Charter rights 
need to be emancipated from the politics of secularization.   
F. Conclusion: interpretative challenges within jurisprudence of 
modernity 
 
As can be seen in the above cases, a pattern has emerged:  where there is 
disagreement on some acute moral, political and legal conflicts, and there is no clear 
distinction between the normatively right and the institutionally feasible positions on 
individual rights with religious freedoms, priority is given to the state interests in 
autonomy and modern secular politics over religious freedoms in most cases.
450
  
                                                 
449
 Beaman, “Defining Religion” supra note 395. 
450
 Heyking, supra note 117. 
141 
 
Although many disputes may be resolved within religious communities, or in various 
levels of courts, the means to administer a diversity of moral perspectives in courts is 
missing.  Legislative integrity is only a political ideal and legislators should try to make 
the total set of laws they enact as morally coherent as possible.
451
  Limits on the claims of 
faith believers should leave them, at a minimum, meaningful choice rather than a 
complete deprivation.  There is no one stable core that can be attributed to ethnic 
experience and difference in Canada is viewed as unchanging essence to the exclusion of 
all others.  The SCC has not been able to find middle ground between compelling state 
interest and religious liberties and tensions have aggravated between the two sides.
452
  
When it comes to determining religiosity for legal purposes and with substantive 
constitutional concepts, there is an indication that courts do not seem to have flexibility.  
In weighing state objectives against individual and collective rights under the s. 2(a) 
guarantee, it would seem that courts are more deferential towards state objectives.  For 
“equal religious citizenship”, according to Ryder, there is a requirement that accepted 
neutral rules be adjusted to accommodate religious practices if there is to be equal 
participation for persons of faith in social and economic life.
453
    
According to Schneiderman, religion and law continually interact, yet always 
insist on boundaries of their own space and the modalities of their use of that space.
454
  
There are many instances wherein a court will be asked to define the outer boundaries of 
a religious faith, and this may require inquiry into the external boundaries, for example 
when an individual seeks accommodation from mainstream practices.  Although, all 
                                                 
451
 Marmor, supra note 340 at ix. 
452
 Heyking, supra note 117. 
453
 Supra note 27, Ryder, “The Canadian Conception”. 
454
 Schneiderman, supra note 412 at 67. 
142 
 
human communities have enforceable rules of conduct, they may or may not be written 
down. Whether they are articulated or not, they exist and are enforced.  Such laws 
embody the experience a community has gained in its struggle to survive.  In time, the 
actors discover methods of cooperation with rules that promote internal order and 
external strength.
455
  However, challenges to the liberal political and normative 
philosophy are bracketed as comprehensive worldviews that are disagreeable, 
unmanageable or costly.  The constitution does not deal effectively with the religious 
challenge. 
Freedom of religion jurisprudence in Canada illustrates that the interests of the 
person of religion or a religious group are pitted against the political and economic 
interests of the modern state as an entity bound by and acting through liberal or 
constitutional law and judiciary. Individuated religion is favoured ahead of the collective 
rituals of whole societies; the abstract individual has primacy but his/her religious 
development is reflected in numerous different ways of living alongside numerous 
religions in Canada.  It is argued that the freedom of religion jurisprudence outlined 
above illustrates that in a democracy such as Canada, guaranteed freedom of religion is 
formally infringed upon when its theoretical vision of justice may no longer be able to 
meet the empirical reality of the adjudicatory needs of a now different, changing and 
pluralizing society.   
The practice of faith is based on sincere beliefs that have historical significance 
and cannot be confined to a general authoritative law.  A plurality of faith-based religious 
values is being trumped by the constitutional freedom based on freedom of individual 
conscience.  The relationship between public reason and religion is a fundamental 
                                                 
455
 Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982” supra note 20 at 56. 
143 
 
problem for present political philosophy and constitutional theory based on secularity.  
While Canadian law examines and responds to random slices of specific religions, it does 
not go far enough in answering these questions to address the normative issues that are 
raised by an increasingly pluralist society.  Conflict is therefore inevitable.  To resolve 
conflict, inclusionary alternatives to the existing legal-political model rest on examining 
plural communities and their plural moral orders that are embedded in different social 
and economic practices.  The next chapter examines the possibilities of peaceful 
coexistence of state law or liberal legalism, religious law, and the customs of the 
multiplicity in Canada. 
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CHAPTER IV - Is Peaceful Coexistence of Liberal Law and Religious Pluralism 
possible?:  Canada’s Multiple Modernities and Multifaceted Legal Orders in the 
21st Century and beyond. 
 
In an age of rapid globalization, mass migration, swift transportation systems 
including instant electronic data exchange, intense social communications, significant 
economic interconnections between far-flung countries and other agencies, one of the 
main features of the modern world is that different laws increasingly come to share fields.  
Although mass migration is having the effect of blurring boundaries between the legal 
and the non-legal, and between Western and non-Western conceptions of law, in Canada, 
in the 21
st
 Century, it would seem that peoples of diverse backgrounds and interests are 
inevitably coming together in organisations of varying types and goals, for different kinds 
and forms of creative expression, which are mostly valuable and deserving of support by 
government and society as a whole.  However, I have argued in this thesis that, although 
Canada is a nominally pluralist society, the legitimacy of religious pluralism has not been 
fully established in its public domain.  Liberal law can be said to be slow in changing as 
it interacts with other norms.  As was evident in Chapter III, in the liberal conception of 
jurisprudence concerning equal religious citizenship, alternative forms of law such as 
religious tenets—that are historically complex and already contextually varied—cannot 
avoid falling prey to the limitations of liberal law.   
Sociocultural life is extraordinarily diverse as is the plurality of norms within 
society.  Where do the other normative sets of meaning and regulation, particularly of 
religious tenets, belong in the conceptual status of the law?   In this chapter, I will discuss 
the works of several different legal pluralists exploring shared normative expectations 
and aspirations.  On the basis of the perspectives of some legal pluralists and on the basis 
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of my review of the jurisprudence as outlined in Chapter III, I would argue that the 
SCC’s approach to normative pluralism is inadequate to the task of recognizing religious 
difference.  This is particularly so when balancing the purpose of the law as against 
freedom of religion where norms are steeped in tradition.  I will also look at how the 
perspectives concerning law and order, generally, are developed to create basic shared 
expectations in consideration of vantage points that exist for particular tasks.   
Canada’s central rule-based power is contained by state institutions.  As was 
evident within the sampling of jurisprudence in Chapter III, this liberal state successfully, 
yet selectively, legitimates particular viewpoints; there is a methodological understanding 
and application of the foundations of religion in a particular context that attempts to 
balance tradition and modernity.  At the same time, the country’s jurisprudence and 
legislation on freedom of religion indicates a continuous deconstruction of state law and a 
crossfertilization of rules and standards seeming to evolve between state law and various 
religious norms giving rise to a further multiplicity of normative expectations.  For legal 
pluralists mentioned here, the struggle for comprehension, recognition and positive 
accommodation of the rights to religious practices in the liberal West must be addressed 
in discussions of social inclusion, immigrant integration, multiculturalism, 
interculturalism, democratic participation and justice.   
This chapter will therefore address legal pluralist viewpoints.  It will address 
questions such as whether the Canadian state is sufficiently prohibited from favouring 
any one religious community such that it can allow maximum religious freedom for all.  
To this extent, legal pluralist perspectives shed light on the non-neutrality of liberal 
legalism.  How can a secular state encourage religious diversity, pluralism and the 
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common good?  The aim eventually, is to understand the relationship between different 
normative systems and the impact of state law on religious diversity in Canada.  Is law 
responsible for society or vice-versa?   
According to Berman, a legal pluralist, although the concept of law is signified by 
empirical reality, that is, political weight or substantive content of legal forms, these legal 
forms and meanings can be built upon by subsequent iterations.
456
  However, the factual 
power of the state that lends empiricity for the existence of its law is in its rule of 
recognition: as discussed previously, the political and legal philosophy of the nation state 
provides its descriptive conceptions.
457
  However, religious norms are central to people’s 
political identity.  Because religion, most times, is at the core of people’s identity rather 
than a consequence of chosen or formalized projects, the search is for a balance between 
state law with the weight of historically recognized interpretive traditions and the 
emergence of an urgent appeal to confront challenges of distinctiveness in the here and 
now or within the empirical reality.  In Canada, a crucial question therefore is whether 
and under what conditions the law could be usefully fashioned into a cross-cultural 
comparative concept, state or not.   
A. The normative, philosophical and theological in the quest to manage 
religious diversity in Canada 
 
In Canada, multiplicities of social norms have continued to surface and grow in 
importance in their own right.  Each social field is full of normative material originating 
from within itself or from external social fields.
458
  And in general, every legal system 
claims to have authority over a particular field of its area of jurisdiction.  This authority 
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also claims to have priority over any other law within the field.  Although there are many 
forms of law, religious laws in particular have historically provided guidance for social 
behaviour in the form of interconnected norms explicitly stated in religious doctrines.  
Religious law and its claim as the final authority in the code of human conduct is a major 
component of legal pluralism (whether for salvation or for liberty); the socio-religious 
diversity itself produces a multiplicity of legal systems.   
That law means different things to different people with different consequences 
for individuals is not necessarily a problem.  Legal pluralists understand law as a “chaotic 
tangle of ongoing social arrangements in which there are complex and binding 
obligations” that exist and that are based on cultural and religious overlaps and collective 
experiences.
459
  However, for pluralists, collective social life also entails institutions, 
networks, and so on, that result from coexistence.  Cotterrel, for example, states that life 
is a realm: 
…of solidarity, identity and cooperation, but also of power, conflict, alienation, 
and isolation; of stable expectations, systems, custom, trust and confidence, but 
also of unpredictable action, unforeseen change, violence, disruption and 
discontinuity.
460
   
 
Pluralism is a key value within society.  Ryder points out the importance of the 
collective aspect of religion and the close relationship of religious and conscientious 
belief systems and community formation and people’s sense of membership in their 
communities and states: “these communities are sources of strength, support, and 
normative authority that provide a counterpoint to the role of the state in people’s 
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lives.”461  However, a condition of openness to the viewpoints of others does not come 
about through “a calculated inhabitation of an ethical intersubjectivity”462   
Legal pluralists are acutely aware of the existence of tension and of the 
impossibility of its resolution within orthodox legal theory and practice.  For Tie, there 
are no indications that religious perceptions are fundamentally altering the shape of 
formal legality; instead, there is a recolonization of citizens that practice religion through 
the assimilation of their views via the language of legal pluralism.
463
  The quest has to be 
purely a moral pursuit that reflects on the damage being by formal presumptious legacy.  
Is it possible to identify the victimization of others for the sake of reparations? 
We have seen that morality which is associated with openness to otherness occurs 
most acutely through resistance and conflict.
464
  Openness to otherness is born in 
negativity.  The concept of legal pluralism therefore begins with this embarrassing, 
unpredictable and precarious phenomenon.
465
  However, this obvious tension between 
identity and morality seems to compromise the personal integrity and human dignity of 
some individual citizens and groups against excessive or harsh punishment.  More 
importantly, there is a danger of cultural imperialism, political subjugation, or simply a 
product of extreme ethnoreligious centricity before the law.  As was evident in Chapter 
III, the judge in Canadian courts dealing with freedom of religion, is torn between: 
creating certainty, “closure”, about law, in ordering the current complex society and at 
the same time “critiquing” the position taken by the assumptions of liberal law or “to be 
self-reflexive about the assumption through which they have come to know and judge 
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law.”466  For Tie, the space between “closure” and “critique” are impossible to inhabit; it 
is this space which has occupied discourse on the recognition of socio-cultural difference 
to create bases for shared social life.
467
   
Peaceful coexistence—of normative orders sharing the same field—that is open-
ended in the midst of rigid dominance is therefore difficult unless the constitution which 
oversees the social plurality is compatible with its social organization and other faith 
norms are able to acquiesce to its power.  In altogether ignoring or missing an ethical 
position towards the ‘other’ and their conceptions of law, the liberal theory of law can be 
construed as politically charged.  Legal pluralists have given us a conceptual framework 
within which one can convincingly argue that liberal legalism in Canada is, emphatically, 
not neutral.  For instance Tully, for whom diversity produces a ‘multiplicity of demands’ 
for self-rule that “conflict violently” in practice, reiterates that the goal has to be to 
construct an approach that does not subjugate other perspectives to itself and in the 
process, disassemble its own cultural imperatives under an aura of neutrality.
468
   For civil 
and peaceful interaction of diverse cultural and faith norms of a multiplicity of 
modernities in Canada, rethinking liberal legalism is urgent.  Of great importance, is the 
fact that the tension through which historical ethics are reshaped are escalating.  Within 
the growing degree of legal pluralism, legal fragmentation, violence, and societal 
weakness, there is urgency to making democracy work in Canada.   
Although all liberal constitutions adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the implementation of these rights is almost impossible precisely due to 
irreconcilable conflicts between the established concept of human rights and the 
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conceptions based mainly on non-Western culture.
469
  And although the standards for 
permissible action and validity of transactions and procedures are provided in liberal 
constitutions to deal with problematic situations such as the management of conflict so 
that disputes are given meaning and are further regulated, discussions that began with 
sensitivity to frequent parallel or duplicatory legal regulations within one political 
organization have now become increasingly dominated by the exchange of many 
conceptual à priori and of stereotypes.   
According to Chiba, a non-Western pluralist, Western people tend to take 
differences for granted and non-Western people are threatened that their human identity, 
based on their specific traditional/ethnic law, are infringed upon, particularly when 
licenced interpretation may distort meaning.
470
  Again, where maintenance of identity by 
different peoples becomes an issue and a social conflict arises, there is a need for mutual 
recognition, accommodation and co-habitation by the parties.  And, if the power of state 
legislation fails in this task, conflicts will escalate.  Differences in legal conceptions and 
differing meanings may incite mortal harm to human life.
471
   
B. Co-existence of different legal systems:  The politics of identity versus 
the location of meaningful and hetereogenous faith-based values 
 
For many pluralists, the tendency to categorize and misidentify a vast number of 
independent heterogeneous claims despite the latter’s meaningful cultural values, raises 
dilemmas such as how are we connected and how do we want to co-exist in all aspects of 
our social realities and existence, economically, politically and even morally in the 21
st
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century and beyond?  
Sack argues that legal pluralism is about the co-existence of different politically 
distinct legal systems of law and he feels that it is not possible to relativize the different 
forms of law.
472
  Cover corroborates, that in ancient societies, political myths and 
religious myths coincided in content and function.
473
  Myths are mapping devices through 
which we look at the multifaceted character of the world.  The space between a simple, 
empirical meaning and the ultimate meaning of life or of death is the complex, socio-
cultural space within which myths operate.  For Cover, because prescription is located in 
discourses of “history and destiny”, “beginning and end”; “explanation and purpose” not 
only are history and literature obviously located within a normative universe, but 
prescription that is embedded in legal text also has its origin and end in experience.
474
  
Incidentally, Tamanaha also places legal pluralism within a historical context “for the 
only way to grasp where we are and where we are headed is to have a sense of how we 
arrived at the present.”475   
Again, for legal pluralists, homogeneity of any type is not a natural condition or a 
starting point; we need to understand, empirically, law and its place in a universe of a 
multiplicity of historical and current social enclaves and lives. For most pluralists, more 
empirical research is needed  in order to further our understandings of the many 
variations within empirical constellations of legal pluralism and the various ways in 
which social, political and economic conditions of life are influenced in the context of a 
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multiplicity of modernities.  In particular, the concepts of difference and sameness are not 
empiricized because they reflect a particular juridical value such as “differences in 
humans ought not to be taken account of” and the sameness lies in the categorization of 
particular normative order of social facts.
476
  The facts themselves remain irrelevant.  
Different rules for identical situations cannot be applied to a common circumstance as the 
functional possibilities vary.  Because justice for a majority is an empirical question, it is 
only empiricity that must distinguish between normative attributes and the variable 
empirical functionality concerning moral considerations and standards of ethics or 
justice.  However, monism seems to be leading to an ideology aimed at legal unification 
on a global scale and freedom of religion processes continue to be redefined in liberal 
terms in adjudication and legislation.
477
 
The extent to which conventional centralized conceptions of law can be relied 
upon to recognize socio-cultural identities in a just manner and adjudicate fairly within 
conflicts between differently-positioned communities such as faith groups and 
associations is questionable.  In the 21
st
 century, the conflicts at the interface of diverse 
sources of legal normativity in Western liberal polities are particularly important and 
urgent to address.   
In Canada, how should a religiously diverse society distribute rights and 
responsibilities?  Do different aspects of law have to be integrated in a systematic 
fashion?  It is understood that liberal law, by its nature, has to fulfil different functions 
and be cognizant of different values.  Despite a variety of forms of self rule available in 
the dominant language of Canadian constitutionalism, and despite the attempts of the 
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proportionality method under s. 1 of the Charter to refine responses to freedom of 
religion, alternative norms are still denied by liberal constitutional law.  As we noticed in 
Chapter III, religious identity is recognized through highly formal norms of equality and 
non-discrimination with decidedly negotiated sets of norms about tolerance or 
accommodation.  For Tully, the ranges of demands for identity are extremely broad:  
various nationalistic, linguistic, ethnic, inter-cultural, feminist, religious and indigenous 
voices call for the right to self-determination, not misrecognition.
478
  For Tully, any 
constitutional suppression of difference signals authoritative justification of 
uniformity.
479
  Cover confirms, that the exclusion of diversity of some and the inclusion 
of others is doctrinally narrow.
480
  Charles Taylor agrees that the monistic Eurocentric 
systems of legality are propelled by a newfound emphasis on identity based on universal 
forms of constitution and which have dominated sociolegal theories of liberalism, 
socialism and feminism.
481
  Arthurs and Arnold suggest that globalization as an ideology 
should involve a change in Canadian and other Western social values and in liberal 
fundamental understandings about what role law does play and should play in society.
482
   
Because law transcends any type of relativity, there can be no superior law except 
individual preferences based on measured individual values that hold strong personal 
convictions concerning characteristics of law.
483
  This individualized and personally 
relativized law eliminates the question of objective superiority and promotes unity in 
society.  Legal pluralism is concerned with basic legal alternatives related to rules and 
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adjudication.  Legal pluralism is not interested in the makeup of rules relating to the same 
subject matter or in the differences in the ways in which adjudicative bodies are 
arranged.
484
  Again, legal pluralists will take account of normative orders in so far as they 
are aspects of social behavior; there is no investigation of the truth of ideologies.  Further, 
the pluralist does not engage in debate over the correctness of propositions about 
doctrines of law generally.  Legitimacy, on the other hand, depends on meeting normative 
expectations—based on heartfelt bonds—of the multiplicity of modernities.  
The works of several legal pluralist scholars are discussed below as they are vital 
to the argument in this thesis that there are other functional sources of normative 
authority in a liberal constitutional democracy than uniform state law.   
C. The works of some legal pluralists  
 
Cover, a foremost supporter of legal pluralism states that although the rules and 
principles of justice as instituted in formal law and conventions of social order are 
important, they are only a small part of the normative universe that ought to claim our 
attention.
485
  “We inhabit a nomos–a normative universe.”486  Law does not reside 
exclusively in the coercive commands of a sovereign power conferred by the Westphalian 
writ of sovereignty.
487
  Great legal civilizations and texts are much more than just their 
technical or practical sophistication, rhetorical power or inventive genius.  The nomos is 
“constituted by a system of tension between reality and vision” and which cannot be 
utopia.
488
  Cover’s nomos constitutes and establishes paradigms for “dedication, 
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acquiescence, contradiction and resistance” and does not require a state.489  The creation 
of the legal process of a state has a collective social meaning and the state does not 
necessarily create legal meaning; law comes from society, which itself is now comprised 
of, as I have argued earlier, a multiplicity of modernities.  For Cover, because universal 
values of modern secular liberal law are broad principles of law, they weaken the 
stronger jurisgenesis or creation of normative meaning based on, for instance, religious 
worship.
490
   
Legal pluralists maintain that within modern liberal democratic and secularized 
constitutions, there is scope for the right to difference to be affirmed.  The relationship 
between a given narrative and the way it comes to address the political conditions of a 
particular group needs to be understood.  Narratives are created by imposing a normative 
force upon a state of affairs, real or imagined.
491
  Narratives become interrelated sets of 
beliefs and attitudes held by a society or cultural group.  Although sovereign assertions of 
law—prescriptive or adjudicatory—count as law, normative commitments also arise 
through the constant construction of law through various norm-generating 
communities.
492
  Again, because the narrative in material reality was sourced by our 
imaginations, law is not merely a system of rules to be observed but a world in which we 
live.  Because the creation of legal meaning, jurisgenesis, Cover explains, occurs through 
a cultural medium where real law grows, normative behavior is most intelligible and 
bonds are stronger within communal narratives as they provide the context of that 
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behavior.
493
  These communal rules of conduct stemming from experience that a 
community has gained in its struggle to survive are the strong bonds of common meaning 
found in shared ritual or prayer and of a common corpus that are recognized as the 
moving normative force of the community.  Cover maintains that societies function better 
on these strong interpersonal bonds, subjective discourse and trust.  “We constantly 
create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and 
void.”494  However, strong interpersonal bonds are absent within state law.  A 
sociocultural space without meaningful values and norms can potentially create divisions 
in terms of rights and obligations giving rise to a society of hierarchies leaving the “civil 
community…spiritually blind and ignorant [with] no faith, no creed and no gospel and its 
members are not brothers and sisters (prayer is not part of life).”495  “To inhabit a nomos 
is to know how to live in it.”496   
To restate Cover, all legal traditions and institutions are part and parcel of a 
complex normative world, the “corpus juris” or prescriptions, including morality 
because, as he stated, “narratives…locate [and give] meaning.”497  The methods to 
develop cooperation between narrative and rules and the promotion of internal order and 
external strength, may or may not be written down.
498
  As rules establish normative 
behavior and legal doctrine between the normative and the material universe, between the 
demands of an ethic and constraints of reality, whether they are articulated or not, they 
exist and are enforced.  The normative meaning therefore inheres in legal doctrines such 
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as in messianic messages of liberation promising peace, truth and happiness and also in 
“apologies of power and privilege and in the critiques that may be leveled as the 
justificatory enterprises of law.”499   
Moore, another pluralist, agrees that complex physical situations involving the co-
existence of religious and non-religious conceptions antedate the establishment of a 
modern state in many contemporary socio-geographical spaces of the world.
500
  She 
emphasizes that the legal organization of society is congruent with its social organization 
and that normative heterogeneity as linked with social action takes place in a “context of 
multiple, overlapping semi-autonomous social fields which…is in practice a dynamic 
condition.”501  Moore’s current socio-geographical spaces are social fields within nation 
states; national states; or even transnational spaces.  According to Moore, each field 
within a particular heterogeneity is self-regulated but it is also vulnerable to the larger 
complex world by which it is surrounded.  For Moore, because the nation state is now the 
fundamental unit of political organization, particularly in democracies and the rule of 
liberal law is its central instrument, and because law is present in every “semi-
autonomous social field” as whole societies are structured and seen as a pattern and 
network of “areas of autonomy and modes of self-regulation”, she points out the dynamic 
aspect of partial autonomy: the tendency of self-regulating social fields is “to fight any 
encroachment on autonomy previously enjoyed.”502  For Moore, legal pluralism is a 
complex social situation in which law finds its working, free from hierarchical, centralist, 
whole society preconceptions, with an emphasis on a continuously variable autonomy of 
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social fields.   
Griffiths agrees with Moore’s descriptive theory of legal pluralism, that the 
sociolegal structure is manifest in the actual pattern of interaction of the various semi-
autonomous fields which can be observed.
503
  But he adds that if the recognition, 
incorporation or validation of normative heterogeneity stem from the perspective of a 
nation-state’s concept of legal pluralism, the latter not only contributes to the theory of 
legal centralism but it obscures this descriptive theory of law.  For Griffiths, the 
normative heterogeneity requires that the “social space is normatively full rather than 
empty.”504   
For Tamanaha, what makes legal pluralism noteworthy is not merely the fact that 
there are multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or overlapping bodies of law, but that there 
is diversity amongst them making competing claims of authority; imposing conflicting 
demands or norms; and having different styles and orientations.  He refers to a 
multiplicity of legal orders ranging from village laws to sophisticated legal systems that 
exist nationally, supranationally, transnationally and internationally.  Globally or locally, 
these laws can be customary law, indigenous law, religious law, or law connected to 
distinct ethnic or cultural groups within a society.  There is also an evident increase in 
quasi-legal activities, from private policing and judging, to privately run prisons, to the 
ongoing creation of the new lex mercatoria, a body of transnational commercial law that 
is almost entirely the product of private lawmaking activities.
505
   
For Berman, the complexity is in law in a world of hybrid legal spaces where a 
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single act or actor continues to be regulated by multiple legal or quasi-legal regimes.
506
  
Hybrid norms are heterogeneous in origin, composition, and style, and have different 
types of independencies.  Although they are descriptive in nature, they may perform the 
same function as the rule of law, rule, regulation, precept, statute, ordinance, and cannon, 
all of which are primary sources of ethical standards of decision-making prescribed by a 
single sovereign authority requiring obedience on those subjected to this authority.
507
   
For De Sousa Santos, there is an incompleteness of each culture and a cross-
culture conception of human rights is called for in a process of “diatopical hermeneutics” 
or on the idea that the topoi of an individual culture, no matter how strong they may be, 
are as incomplete as the culture itself.
508
  It has to be assessed from another culture’s 
topoi.  He raises the consciousness of reciprocal incompleteness to its maximum possible 
by engaging in the dialogue with one foot in one culture and the other in another.  This 
cannot occur in a social void as it shares a political bias in favour of emancipation with a 
different process of knowledge creation.  It requires a production of knowledge that must 
be collective, interactive, intersubjective, networked and perhaps prescriptive.   
However, for Griffiths, the descriptive conception of legal pluralism should break 
the stranglehold of “a single, unified and exclusive hierarchical normative ordering.”509  
For him, the analysis of an empirical state of affairs points to legal orders which do not 
belong to a single system.  For Griffiths also, the term ‘legal pluralism’ is not an attribute 
of a legal system such as a: doctrine, theory, or an ideology.  The concept of legal 
pluralism can never be complete, orderly, and institutionalizable.  And Sack laments, that 
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in the interrelation of legal rules with state law, that unless other forms of law are 
translated into rights and rules, and informal mechanisms are institutionalized, the 
challenges of legal pluralism are unwelcome and therefore a threat to liberal legalism.
510
   
For Berman, Cover’s definition of law as that being constantly constructed 
through the contest of various norm-generating communities is not only unavoidable but 
desirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and as a site for discourse among multiple 
community affiliations including the official prescriptive or adjudicatory jurisdiction.
511
  
And Sack feels that law cannot escape its responsibility within changing societies, 
politics and culturally-specific formations; what is crucial is not analytical clarity and 
consistency achieved through logic and advanced theories of forms of law but the 
performance of practical social tasks.
512
  For pluralists, to be effective, law has to remain 
flexible.  
Globally, the legal system is now an interlocking web of jurisdictional assertions 
by state, international, and non-state normative communities.  Each type of overlapping 
jurisdictional assertion (state versus state; state versus international body; state versus 
non-state entity) creates a potentially mixed legal space that is not easily eliminated.  It 
can be argued that with state versus state conflicts, growth of global communications 
technologies, the rise of multinational corporate entities with no significant territorial 
center of gravity, and the mobility of capital and people across borders mean that many 
jurisdictions “will feel effects of activities around the globe, leading inevitably to 
multiple assertions of legal authority over the same act, without regard to territorial 
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location.”513  And again, in the ever-increasing global flows and frictions, people feel ties 
to—and act based on affiliations with—multiple communities in addition to their 
territorial ones.  These ties may be ethnic, religious, or epistemic, transnational, 
subnational, or international, and the norms asserted by such communities frequently 
challenge territorially-based authority.  Canon law and other religious community norms 
have continued to operate in significant overlap with liberal state laws.   
In Canada, Muslim and Jewish citizens, among others, experience conflict 
between their personal law tied to religion and Canadian law tied to their nation-state and 
this continues to pose constitutional and other challenges.  As stated, because ethnicities 
bond and can also create significant normative communities, some normative systems 
therefore will deny even a limited mutual dialogue creating further challenges.  A 
pluralist approach cannot provide a decision-making authority about which norms prevail 
within a messy hybrid world.  “Pluralism fundamentally challenges both positivist and 
natural rights-based assumptions that there can ever be a single answer.”514   
Paradoxically, universal harmonization is not only unlikely to satisfy everyone 
but neither will it be fully achievable.  Hybridity is therefore a messy reality and it not 
only preserves spaces for contestation, creative adaptation, and innovation, but also 
inculcates ideals of tolerance, dialogue, and mutual accommodation in our adjudicatory 
and regulatory institutions.
515
  The ideal of the legal reality of the modern state is not, and 
as Griffiths affirms, “tidy, consistent, organized … nicely captured in the common 
identification of ‘law’ and ‘legal system.”516  In effect, the ideological heritage of the 
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bourgeois revolutions and liberal hegemony of the last few centuries is also a complex of 
ideas concerning the nature of law and its place in social life.
517
   
D. Hegemonic state law and justification by courts:  are complex and 
divergent interpretations accounting for mythical origins of norms? 
 
As a pluralist, for Griffiths, despite the fact that law and narrative are inseparable, 
the hegemony of legal centralism stemming from Western theoretical approaches of law, 
continues to dictate that “law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all 
persons, exclusive of all other law and administered by a single set of state 
institutions.”518  The intricate union of central law commands a systematic normative 
ordering:  how things ought to be with terms of rules, principles, categories, standards, 
notions, and schemes of meaning.  Within this teleological vision, in other words, a 
commitment of official judges to the constitution, the origin of law in myth and history 
does not exist in the justification by a court.  The liberal secular world disclaims control 
over the interpretation of narrative and it particularly disclaims the thick contextuality to 
all moral situations so that all other normative orderings such as of church, family, 
associations and organizations, both voluntary and economic, are subordinate to liberal 
institutional state law.  State law can therefore permanently separate reality from vision.   
Again, the propositions of state law and general layers of norms lend validity 
from the bottom up until some ultimate norm is reached.
519
  In Canada, as outlined in 
Chapter III, the court may consider a break from its own homogeneity in the interest of 
being tolerable, for instance, in determining and formulating rules regarding conflict of 
identity such as sect, religious group, marriage laws, rites and rituals, etc.  This may 
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strain the court’s own legal ethics in recognizing a particular religious content and norms 
as valid.  When parts of the vision are given depth and are highlighted and other parts are 
cast aside—and associations even reinterpret the terms of their own being—the law takes 
on the role of adjudicating between many different substantive normative orders. 
Both, state constitutions and widespread narrative traditions, that are not 
universally accepted as a basis for interpretation, are competing with ‘natural law’ for 
primacy. Cover points out that insulated communities have established their own 
meanings for constitutional principles in their struggle to maintain independence and 
authority of their own nomos.  The norm-generating aspects of the free exercise of 
religion, corporation law, and contract are all instances of associational liberty protected 
by insular constitutions.  Again, insularity, particularly of ancient scriptural religious 
tenets, is maintained by communities and groups at whatever cost.  However, the insular 
movements that generate their own constitutional law have to this point been considered 
almost as if they operated in a world in which there is no meaning and have been 
subjected to force and violence.   
According to Cover, no religious churches, however small and dedicated, or 
utopian communities, however isolated, or cadres of judges, however independent, can 
ever manage a total break from other groups with other understandings of law.
520
  For 
Cover, just as constitutionalism is part of what may legitimize the state, so 
constitutionalism may legitimize within a different framework, communities and 
movements.  State law may be mistakenly overreaching itself with only a partial insight 
into the operation of law where multiplicities of modernities exist.  Because Canadian 
law and its foundational beliefs are based on political ideology of liberalism, it will 
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require a substantial adaptation and reformulation of both existing legislation and judicial 
precedent to make  provision for substantive recognition of the normative claims of 
religious freedom.  Even though official values are ultimately grounded in rational ethical 
arguments, we need ethical raw data as inputs for critical reflection and agreement.  
These initial ethical inputs come from cultures.   
And Griffiths insists that the plurality of laws in a liberal modernity are “private 
as well as public, and the national legal system is … a secondary rather than a primary 
locus of regulation.”521  In the current normative world, there is no obvious central text 
that exhaustively supplies both narrative and precept.  The complicated reality and 
tension between the ideology of legal centralism and the actual empiricism of a liberal 
state is further problematized by the idealized depiction of law in liberal modernity and 
its use to unjustly compare it to and to belittle other ormative orders.
522
  Yet, state-
declared constitutions and some theological tenets continue to act as supreme law in the 
place of foundational beginnings emanating jurisgeneration.   
This is evident within the jurisprudence wherein strong traditions of common 
visions and obligations continue to be at the heart of religious institutions.  In that 
interdependence of legal meanings makes it possible to say that all communities, 
including the judge, are engaged in the task of constitutional understanding, the distinct 
starting points, stories, commitments to legal meaning and identifications make us realize 
that we cannot pretend to a unitary law.   
This high regard for religious liberty and type of meaning of law can therefore 
destabilize power; there are sometimes tremendous stresses that law abiding citizens, 
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believers for instance, face, when there is conflict between secular principles and deeply 
held religious aspects.
523
  In the majority of the cases of this nature, when there is a 
collision, allegiance is towards “God.”  Therse forms of consciousness have stemmed 
from tortuous histories of hardship and ‘martyrs’ have arisen to ‘suffer’ for tenets that are 
upheld.   
In the law-state link, von Benda-Beckmann argues that dubbing normative 
orders—other than state law that are not recognized—as ethnocentric, obscures the 
fundamental differences in form, structure and effective sanctioning between state law 
and other normative orders.
524
  As far as von Benda-Beckmann is concerned, whether law 
functions as social control or that it resolves conflicts or creates conflicts (it does both) in 
different empirical situations, is not as important as to how effective is it in terms of 
people conforming to the normative boundaries set by their law.  The existence of a rule 
of conduct within an association, such as a religious organization, is a matter of actual 
behavior and recognition by the association of a standard within.  Again, the concept of a 
social group and the concept of rules of conduct are inseparable.  Does the law conform 
to the behaviour of the member in terms of the individual’s place within the specific 
association?   
Pluralists maintain that because interpersonal faith and reason are both 
constitutive of the normative worlds, people cannot be satisfied with rules that disallow 
them to live the law.  Legal meaning is a challenging enrichment of social life, a potential 
restraint on arbitrary power and violence.  Legal pluralism is omnipresent in any human 
society and law remains open and dynamic, not requiring entire legal systems so that the 
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social state of affairs may have multiple legal mechanisms comprising of rules or clusters 
of rules or institutions.   
As we saw in Chapter III, in broad arguments, even at the Supreme Court of 
Canada, there is a range of opinion, but it does choose, as per Cover, a single justification 
of a specific court or “in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice.”525  Cover suggests 
that although normative behaviour can be located within a “common script” it is when 
law is used as social control to justify and ensure the co-existence of many normative 
worlds, that the social basis for jurisgenesis destroys legal meaning—jurispathy.526  Even 
the most perfectly designed statutes need to be interpreted by the courts and ambiguities 
in language are inevitable.  Consistently fresh events are adapted to new situations 
(continual legislative amendment is not always practical).  Meaning is deliberately 
constructed in the normative world by jurisprudence.  Jurisprudence reveals that the 
capacity to turn the customs of a specific religious group into law can only be done in 
specified circumstances when it is allowed to replace its uniform general law.  As new 
law continues to be created through the sectarian separation of communities the “too 
fertile forces of jurisgenesis” create a multiplicity of meanings.527  Jurisgeneration by 
which legal meaning proliferates in cultures including interpretation of history, are strong 
forces but the resultant diversity is subject to violence constrained by monistic norms; the 
jurisgenerative world of multiple incoherent and violent interactions now requires to be 
maintained.   
On the capacity to express a privileged hermeneutic on unresolvable differences 
of opinion by higher courts, Cover quotes US Justice Jackson’s famous aphorism “We 
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are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”528  
If it is the state that creates law only to “confuse the status of interpretation with the 
status of political domination” and if it is the state that elevates the court’s interpretative 
privilege within its political hierarchy, legal codes provided by conscious legislation deny 
the jurisgenerative community its legal meaning and integrity of a law of its own.
529
  This 
exercise of superior brute force by agencies of state law stamps out the creative 
hermeneutic of principle found across a multiplicity of legal meaning.  For Cover, state 
courts can be coercive as they have supreme jurispathic capacity.   
Cover suggests that there is an “undisciplined” yet “visionary jurisgenerative 
impulse” that is indifferent to the state.530  Powerful movements can create their own 
nomian worlds.  That legal pluralists are widely divergent in the conceptualization of law 
and legal pluralism and that the relation of law’s content to its meaning is complicated 
was already well enunciated by Geertz, that “man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun”531  
Complexities also arise when precedents multiply over decades leading to more 
uncertainty in law.  Although common law is valuable, it does not always produce 
desirable results and judges taking numerous such undesirable decisions, including 
conflicting precedents on unsettled points, may have to come to a predicament with no 
obvious escape.  This impasse—a radical dichotomy between the social organization of 
law as power and the organization of law as meaning—would take very long to resolve.   
For Cover, a significant resource that enables us to “submit, rejoice, struggle, 
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pervert, mock, disgrace, humiliate, or dignify,” is manifest in patterns of intricate 
competition, interaction, negotiation, isolationism and the like.
532
  The very existence of 
the normative universe is due to the force of commitment to interpretation and the 
determination of the meaning of law.
533
  Depending on which side a narrative is placed, 
the degree of norm-generating autonomy on the part of any association is not liberty to be 
but liberty and capacity to create and interpret law.
534
  Law therefore is meaningful when 
an interpretation is acceptable with a personal commitment to act, an affirmation, on the 
transformed position taken.  An affirmation projects a commitment to understand the 
norm at work in reality – an ultimate vision in relation to its utility of all possible worlds.  
Again, any transformed views requiring affirmations must be with the understanding that 
the group, religious or otherwise, is being projected into the realm of the unknown.  “The 
distance between the universality of the law and the concrete legal situation in a 
particular case is … indissoluble.”535  For Sack, the presiding “positive law [should 
have]…no difficulties in incorporating even the most exotic forms of substantive foreign 
law.”536  For Cover, we ought to stop “circumscribing the nomos; we ought to invite new 
worlds [in].”537   
Matter of fact statements about law as social control, as culture, as power and as 
process are useful only to the extent of the qualities and function of law in actual life and 
should not to be confused with identifying law with any of these specific manifestations.  
Neither is the scope of moral life designed from an overarching religious domain.  For 
                                                 
532
 Cover ibid at 8. 
533
 Cover ibid. 
534
 Cover ibid at 31. 
535
 Merry, supra note 99.   
536
 Sack, supra note 31 at 6 
537
 Cover, supra note 20 at 68. 
169 
 
Griffiths, uniformed and administered by a single set of institutions, state law is blatantly 
illegitimate as, although it is vast and sophisticated, it is a myopic and stifling umbrella of 
liberal jurisprudence.
538
  In other words, legal centralism has been the major obstacle to 
the development of a descriptive theory of law.   
E. Conclusion: powerful plural epistemological normativities of multiple 
modernities as ‘agents’ of social transformation 
 
According to Shah, generally, the export via colonialism or by voluntary adoption 
of the monistic conception of law that has penetrated legal theory as the only form of law 
which is made and recognized by the state is now fiction.
539
  In referencing Menski, Shah 
insists that to the contrary, the core thesis is that the search for a uniform set of rules for a 
global order is bound to be futile because laws embody and reflect the socio-cultural 
particulars and experiences of functioning societies, and which, although transmitted 
longitudinally within the society, are nonetheless complex, fluid and dynamic.  If conflict 
is predictable due to non-inclusive governance, and it is understood that rejection of 
pluralism may be the spark for this condition, the value of pluralism is essential in pre-
empting the risk of conflict in today’s ever-globalizing world.   
However, a pluralist disposition is also a learned value and a continuous 
investment by government in harnessing the power of diversity.  Allowing communities 
to aspire to self-rule in accord with their own customs and traditions will eradicate the 
injustice of an alien form of rule.
540
  Any adequate theory of law and of a legal order 
therefore must, among other considerations, take account of the particularized socio-
political institutions of the society, that society’s belief systems, its politics and its 
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history.  The one universal characteristic of all legal systems, Shah claims, is thus the 
inherent tendency towards “plurality-consciousness.”541  Plurality is human rights, 
successful democracy, and institutional strength in quality service of humanity all rolled 
into one.
542
 
Shah also brings to our attention that although the West may have been home to 
legal modernism, both, Menski and Chiba, who he also references, would combine 
modern natural law theories with legal liberalism and socio-legal traditions to form an 
interactive, triangular, concept of legal pluralism; in other words, their approaches to 
legal pluralism would include analyses of historical and conceptual development of non-
Western as well as Western jurisprudence.
543
 However, the thinking that reproduction of 
state law by ordinary citizens is not considered legal is deeply ingrained in the 
methodology of social scholars, including some lawyers and judges.
544
  The construction 
of alternative approaches which emphasize morality and maneuvering through conflicting 
political interests, has to resonate with the rule of law.  
However, in the alignment of the rule of constitutional law and liberalism for the 
management of religious diversity, the focus is on practical accomodation, rather than a 
sophisticated normative and philosophical debate.
545
  The liberal attitude of subordination 
of difference, particularly of religion, to an abstract individualism of liberal modernity—
despite the fact that the human identity needs particular anchors—succeeds in invoking 
the constitutional rule of law to resist legislation and democracy.  Democracy and human 
rights suffer even with the lofty achievements of the rule of law.   
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Although Canadians show a high degree of allegiance to or identification with the 
Charter, Blattberg asserts that many Canadian citizens feel somewhat alienated from the 
constitution itself and many can’t seem to reconcile themselves to it at all.546  According 
to Blatberg, many Canadians are confused about what exactly it would mean to have 
achieved any kind of constitutional home.
547
  There is a growing recognition of cultural 
diversity within Canada but the same cannot be said about the recognition of its 
epistemological diversity, that is, the diversity of knowledge systems underlying the 
practices of a plurality of different social groups.  The philosophical argument relies on 
the uncertainties of a rationalized and objective epistemology.  If there are uncertainties 
and limits to popular participation in the political and therefore constitutional openness to 
change, the goal of democracy and liberal justice cannot be realized.   
A more robust notion of religious freedom would explore equality of 
opportunities to be granted to the different kinds of knowledge engaged in ever 
broadening epistemological disputes aimed both at maximizing their respective 
contributions to build a more democratic and just society and the decolonizing of 
knowledge and power.  There is no social justice without cognitive justice.  Berger too 
states that the encounter between law and religion runs into conflict with an ambitious 
culture of the rule of law that is not as ready to delve into deep religious diversity.
548
  
However, the task of jurisprudence is to offer us a means by which we can understand 
and relate to the complex phenomenon of law and society.
549
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CONCLUSION   
The Failure of Canadian Secular Liberal Law to Transcend Difference 
in Globalization:  Religious Rights Remain Accomodational Political 
Claims of a Multiplicity of Modernities 
 
Canada is ruled by a modern, liberal secular rights-protecting polity with an 
entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms making its liberal constitution the supreme 
law of the country.
550
  Its legislatures have a constitutional role in accommodating 
difference and the judicial review function for this role is vested in its courts.  It is in 
courts that rights are actively pursued and the judge is the final arbiter that shapes the 
claims of the constitutional rule of liberal law.  Indeed, it is the commitment to the rule of 
liberal constitutional law that judicial review is legitimated and which forces all 
institutions in society to abide by Charter guarantees.
551
  The 1982 Charter is, in effect, a 
response to diversity in Canada and the post-Charter era is the latest incarnation of 
modernity in Canada, otherwise defined as a multiplicity of modernities.  In the ever 
increasing global flows, different people feel ties to and act based on affiliations to their 
own group in addition to the affiliation to the state.  Yet, the profoundly entrenched 17
th
 
century European ideology of the isolated and abstracted individual endures within the 
Charter.    
In terms of the differences between individual rights and group rights and the 
norms asserted by these communities, the European ideology continues to shape the post-
Charter Canadian approach to diversity.  In the 30 plus years since the institution of the 
Charter, each instance of the difference in current normative systems continues to 
undergo a process of accommodation from within liberal legalism and often adjudicated 
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upon as an expression of something temporary.  In the post-Charter era, religion and the 
associated norms seem to have become inconsequential. 
A. Revisiting the historical and theoretical perspectives within liberal law 
 
As stated, historically, liberal law and jurisprudence have moved from supporting 
a state religion and considering as heathens those who did not conform to that particular 
religion, to a position where some religions are more clearly recognized, yet, many are 
not.  In Canada, because the majority religion stems from Christendom, there is still a 
persistence of Christian privilege in Western institutional practices and structures.  
Although, the relationship between the religious believer and liberal law is specifically 
guaranteed by s. 2 (a) of the Canadian Charter, and basic equality guarantees to specific 
isolated groups, including religious organizations, are also provided in Section 15(1) of 
the Charter, the liberal legal system accommodates the needs, traditions and cultures of 
the majority packaged in the language of neutral rules that conceal their religious, 
sociological and cultural underpinnings.  And although a neutral form of secularism in 
society seems to be entrenched in the Canadian constitution, and religion is a choice that 
is constructed under the dogmatic and individualistic doctrine of the autonomy of the 
individual, or the guarantee of freedom of individual conscience and religion,
552
 the post-
Charter era continues to be based on historical theoretical presuppositions and ideals of 
Eurocentric liberal modernism and in keeping with the Eurocentric concept of secularism 
wherein religious claims are perceived as political claims.  Liberal legalism conflicts with 
multiple modern identities and their plural sociolegal perspectives.   
Again, in Canadian liberal politics and law, because the supreme natural right to 
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pursue happiness has come to mean that each person is the chief bearer of rights as 
against the state, and has equal rights before the law, and because these guaranteed rights 
to life, liberty and security are negative in nature, the Charter does not protect positive 
rights such as economic or social entitlements in the form of employment, shelter, social 
services, et cetera.
553
  Ideas about freedom, equality and justice will always remain 
central to liberalism but they have to be endorsed by all citizens that are loyal to 
competing definitions about these values.  Individual choices that are self-centered are 
liberating, but at the same time, individual choices associated with religious institutions 
and beliefs need more support at the intersection of liberal legal authority and what it 
considers to be illiberal ways of life.  For instance, the constitution emphasizes that 
people might be equal or unequal and may or may not be treated equally, or unequally, 
however the ideal of equality exerts a great moral force.   
Yet, perpetuating historical presuppositions of liberal modernity as central to 
contemporary social theory in Western democracies, and perpetuating the autonomous 
and self-sustaining positive law by power politics and essentialism, context is replicated 
in modern constitutional law as a bearer of traditions.  The consistent imposition of this 
particular approach in a plural society is unjust and may result in violent conflicts.   
B. Recapping on current socio-normative and socio-political contexts in 
Canada 
 
As outlined herein, generally, the sociology of law indicates that law: springs 
forth from sociopolitical contexts—contexts that exist in differrent historical eras; is 
biased in serving some interests rather than others; is differently orientated in different 
societies giving rise to different legal systems; and continues to dominate through a 
                                                 
553
 Supra note 2, CCL at 1133-34.  
175 
 
combination of coercive and ideological legal systems, structures and processes.  It was 
also seen that modern Western liberal constitutional law limits state interference in 
individual freedoms of conscience and religion, and the state is in effect the primary 
agent of social control and change.  Law remains its purposive instrument to transform 
society.  In modernity, liberal constitutional law changes and redirects social relations in 
the pursuit of positive social ends and goals by extensively regulating a range of activities 
from employment practices to financial services to human rights with a bias towards 
informal legal systems, customary law, and religious tenets.  It is precisely when law is 
viewed as an expression of social relations that the complex connections and tensions 
between positive laws of modern societies and the spontaneous relations that have been 
interfered with that the latter become apparent.   
A crucial lesson that is emerging from the social reality in Canada is that state 
ethics cannot be built by only public and elite-driven institutions based on outgrown 
philosophy or by constitutional engineering.  The citizenry has to be fully engaged with 
all aspects of life, including the practice of religion, which is what maintains and 
produces good civic morals in the majority of society.  The religious identity covers a 
large and important area of human life and shapes the way a believer is defined and 
regulated.  Religion is, for believers, the source of their worldview and values, it is the 
very ground of their being and thus their frame of reference in the governance of all areas 
of their lives.  For believers, this is what gives religion its political significance; its 
importance extends well beyond the narrow confines of the liberal constitutional order.  
Philosophically, religion claims to shape public reason rather than be shaped by it.  
Religion in effect assumes that liberal rationalism is not sufficient for principles 
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of conduct and social meaning.  “Scriptural literalists” go even further with their finality 
on the scripture as they argue that rationalism rests on faith; they may be logically 
incoherent.
554
  The secular world, on the other hand, rejects the essence of religion and, 
because state law is based on reasons that are within reach of society at large, the public 
sphere is a realm of reason and rationality as opposed to religious beliefs stemming from 
faith or from cultural community.   
In Canada, the most important mechanism of constitutional change in 
contemporary society is now the rule of constitutional law and judicial interpretation in 
the governance of a multiplicity of modernities and their sincere beliefs.  Since 1982, the 
Charter has enhanced the political power of the courts that are the “natural” interpreters 
of the constitution.  In engaging in constitutional review, Canadian courts can infuse and 
breathe life into the constitution but they may not stray far from the corpus of liberal 
constitutional law if both are to thrive in the present system.  Even the most analysed 
interpretations are subject to constitutional limitations which lends a certain amount of 
vagueness to constitutional outcomes.   
Liberal law’s inconsistent and inelastic approach to liberalism itself denies the 
relevance of the value of diversity at the expense of liberalism itself.
555
  There is no 
feasible position between difference and sameness within modern liberal law.  The 
process of secularization in the liberation of the individual is misunderstood.
556
  The 
tension between the ancient norms of minority religion and the extremely slow reshaping 
of liberal law is apparent in Canadian courts.  Unequal treatment of religious freedom by 
legislation and by courts or misinterpretation of religious norms due to a lack of 
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understanding the social significance of such norms is a form of discrimination.  But 
more importantly, the assertion of difference can be legitimated and sometimes violated.  
C. Constitutional commitment to freedom of religion in Canada 
 
The constitutional commitment to freedom of religion in section 2(a) of the 
Charter must be taken very seriously, particularly by the enactors and enforcers of law 
via legislation, administration and adjudication.  As noted in Chapter III, in Canada, 
when there are disagreements on some acute moral, political and legal conflicts at the 
center of liberal secular values, the importance of religious liberty may be by-passed if it 
is untenable to the political majority.  Because within secular legalism the assumption of 
equality is a uniform treatment, in the event of a challenge of unconstitutionality, courts 
have to determine whether the limit under s. 1 of the Charter is “reasonable” and 
“demonstrably justified.”  Justification of the limit on Charter freedoms such as freedom 
of religion in s. 2 (a) varies in each case.  Some such cases are difficult to solve reflecting 
limitation in the capacities afforded to the judge.  However, as was evident in the case of 
A.C., constitutional constraints on democratic legislation enforced by judicial review or 
judicial restraint are morally problematic and can even be illegitimate.
557
  And those that 
insist on a homogeneous form of liberal legalism may be limiting the capacity to 
adjudicate fairly within conflicts between differently positioned real communities.  Does 
this constitute a violation of human rights?  The overtly narrow treatment of equality 
issues by the courts pulls the judiciary and the law directly into a political debate.  In the 
tendency to politically simplify different religious norms, there is misinterpretation of 
complex social issues; liberal law and its principles overshadow the social goods and pre-
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existing capital of collectivities.  Communities of believers are finding it difficult to 
mobilize the Charter for their constitutional status against social disparities.  It would 
seem that the interest of the believer is legally protected in court and in the event of a 
moral conflict, the cornerstone of religious freedom in the Charter is respect for the 
perspectives of the other.  However, where freedom of religion presents a dilemma, 
judges do not go far enough in the exercise of this purpose of the protection of specific 
claims and equal participation in society.  Various national minorities, religious groups 
and intercultural multiplicities in Canada desire, in their own different ways, society to 
recognize, the legitimacy of their differences which constitute their normative identity 
and well-being.
558
  
D. Possibilities in liberty: a mix of identities, equal religious citizenship 
and legal pluralism? 
   
As long as secularity means non-religiosity or a contra-indication to religion, the 
fear of intervention of religion into political life will remain strong and just as equally, 
will the fear of foreshadowing of religion by secular interventions.
559
  Although a 
conscience that dictates that everything legal that is religious is not acceptable, faith-
based conscience also plays an important role in the well-being of the citizen.
560
  Again, 
religious centralism, like legal centralism, is also an unrealistic analytical tool but in 
terms of ethical behaviour, both individual human rationality and collective morality are 
integral to humanity and a way of life.  The dominance of secularism undermines 
religious ritualistic claims.   
In Canada, the legitimacy of the institution of the judiciary is enduring.  Pluralists 
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and anthropological analysts, however, have suggested that in historical terms, because 
plurality is a product of struggle, negotiation and other interactions amongst a 
multiplicity of social fields, it is a core feature of human experience.
561
  However, it is the 
very commitment to Western modernity that has steadily atrophied the awareness of the 
knowledge of a variety of conventions that humans use to order their lives and 
experiences.
562
   
Although, as per Cover, narrative in material reality was sourced by our 
imaginations and the human is indeed a spin-doctor and gets caught in his/her own 
trappings,
563
 reflection on Canada, and the culture, ethics and political reality in which 
individuals and communities are making myriad different choices, reveals a widening, 
transforming, hyperplural and overlapping identity that has to grapple with the 
complexities of law in a world of multiple normative communities.  Equality before the 
law, and equal protection of the law, needs to be defined in culturally sensitive contexts, 
of differential treatment of different groups, and not as one serving as a cloak for 
discrimination or privilege.  The problem of cultural diversity and justice, and the fate of 
law in plural societies, particularly in Canada, are crucial concerns.  It is evident that the 
many shades of modernity in Canada have far-reaching implications for democracy in the 
context of law and society.  A definition of the many shades of modernity—multiple 
modernities—requires a much needed understanding of not only the relationship between 
the democratic institutions and the critique of liberal modernity but also of the practical 
implications of liberal secular constitutional law.  Only through a pluralistic, multi-
juridical framework can we fully respect the place of plural legal thinking.   
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F. The need for continued research of the law by pluralists 
In that the law is seen as: primarily symbolic; focused on the implicit forms of 
normativity; arising in myriad everyday relationships; and aimed at facilitating human 
interaction, the goal is not just to consider technical questions of primary interest to the 
legal profession, but substantive matters that bear on the lives of people who fall outside 
of the legal mainstream: the socially disadvantaged and the politically marginalized.  As 
such, failing to recognize the significance of religious law (for instance) will result in the 
impoverishment of our understanding of Canadian laws and legal processes.  Consistent 
interrogation by pluralists will put on notice the degree of inclusivity that represents 
normative reality and why law and the state are at the center of our inquiries.  
In the interim, as globalization and the cultural pluralizations of the multiple 
modernities are proceeding simultaneously, so too are arguments being advanced for 
legal pluralism to allow a co-existence of jurisdictional systems for different cultural and 
religious traditions and acceptance of a variety of institutional design for societies with 
strong ethnic, cultural and linguistic cleavages.
564
  But the very pluralization of life-
spaces endows them with highly ideological absolutizing orientations and, at the same 
time, brings them into the political arena.  Western liberal law could be said to be 
therefore developing without religion.  It is understood that to get to the authenticity of a 
religious tenet of any particular religion is an extremely difficult task.   
If the precepts of religion and the constitutional rule of law are two competing 
normative systems both claiming sovereignty over the religious citizen, the relationship 
between religion, politics and law in Canada is not only difficult, it is illogical.
565
  To 
continue to refuse to acknowledge or respect the public elements of other religious 
                                                 
564
 Benhabib supra note 194 at 19. 
565
 Taylor, “The Polysemy” supra note 41.  
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traditions is a risk of alienation of large sectors of the dynamic multiplicity of populations 
in Canada.
566
  Pluralized constitutional law will ensure that multiplicities of laws 
continue to be constitutionalized.  A robust pursuit of truth has to accept that unitary 
approaches will fail as no single known position is known to have reached the truth.   
 
                                                 
566
 Heyking, supra note 117. 
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